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Chapter One explores whether teacher grading standards affect learning. Lenient standards
are controversial because of concerns that students may put less effort into a course. Conversely,
harder standards may discourage the lower performing students. Using detailed longitudinal data
on all North Carolina public school students and teachers over 10 academic school years, I find
that harder standards increase student achievement in math but not in English and Language Arts.
Contrary to popular belief and standard models of student optimizing behavior, harder standards
do not leave the lower performing students behind—students of all abilities benefit similarly from
harder standards. Altogether, I find that students assigned to a more lenient teacher earn higher
course grades, report spending less time on homework, yet learn no more than students assigned
to a harder teacher.
Using the same data as Chapter One, Chapter Two explores whether differences in grading stan-
dards among teachers in middle school have long-term effects on high school through the student’s
course selection, achievement or college major interests. Differences in grading standards among
teachers make grades less informative, may unfairly reward or penalize students when grades are
used in high-stakes decisions, like class assignment, and may distort a student’s perception of their
own ability. I do not find consistent evidence that students benefit from lenient standards in the fu-
ture, or become more interested in related subjects/majors, even though students do end up earning
higher course grades as a result of lenient standards.
Chapter Three studies how the effectiveness of teachers varies by classroom composition, com-
bining random assignment of teachers with rich measures of teaching practices based on a popular
teacher-evaluation protocol. We find that some teaching practices are more effective in raising math
iii
achievement in classrooms with higher average prior achievement, and others are more effective
in classrooms with less heterogeneity in prior achievement. We use these estimates to simulate the
effects of reallocating classrooms among teachers within schools. We find substantial differences
between counterfactual and actual teacher effectiveness rankings, supporting the importance of
classroom composition for evaluating teachers and prescribing practice.
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CHAPTER 1
EASY AS A-B-C: THE EFFECTS OF TEACHER GRADING STANDARDS ON STUDENT
LEARNING
1.1 Introduction
From 1990 to 2009 average high school GPAs in the United States have increased by about 13
percent in all subjects (Nord, Roey, Perkins, Lyons, Lemanski, Brown, and Schuknecht 2011). This
considerable increase in the level of grades undoubtedly varied among schools (Gershenson 2018),
and it is well documented that the rigor of grade assignment methods can vary among teachers and
subjects as well. These trends—broadly referred to as grade inflation and disparities in grading
standards—have sparked concerns largely due to perceptions about how the level and variability
of grading standards affect student outcomes.
Lenient grading standards are controversial because of concerns that students may put less
effort into a course. For instance, a parent may complain that her child is not being challenged
because it is too easy to earn an A. Conversely, harder grading standards may discourage the lower
performing students. I test whether the rigor of middle school teachers’ grading standards affect
how much students learn, as measured by their performance on state-wide exams administered at
the end of each school year.
The simplest model has standards directly entering achievement production. This direct rela-
tionship makes sense if harder standards are packaged with more challenging instructional prac-
tices (i.e., assigning more homework and teaching higher-order concepts). Alternatively, standards
could indirectly enter achievement production through students’ effort responses. Using a simple
theoretical model, I provide a framework for thinking about how harder standards may affect stu-
dent effort and hence achievement. The model predicts substantial heterogeneity in how students
with different grade expectations respond. If the minimum cut-off for a course grade is increased,
those expecting that grade or higher put more effort into that course and less into other courses. In
contrast, students expecting a lower grade put less effort into that course and more into their other
courses.
To study the effects of standards on student outcomes, I rely on longitudinal administrative
records on all North Carolina public school students from grades three to twelve. My analysis
focuses on one cohort of students and on grades six to eight in particular. I use the information
on teachers in up to six additional school years to measure standards. I observe student course-
taking in addition to a rich set of student characteristics that include standardized test scores and
teacher-assigned course grades.1
To determine the rigor of a teacher’s standards I estimate a grade assignment function, that
allows me to measure the extent to which a teacher’s assigned grades are higher or lower than
would be expected given the academic performance of a student and her classroom peers. Specifi-
cally, I regress an individual student’s course grade on measures of her performance in all available
subjects (contemporaneous standardized test scores) and peers’ performance (a student’s ordinal
class rank and peer average standardized test scores)—estimating the model using within-teacher
variation across multiple school years and classes to account for nonrandom matching of students
to teachers. Then, I use this grade assignment function to predict a student’s course grade and ulti-
mately to construct residuals at the student-level (i.e., deviations from these predictions). Finally,
I average these residualized grades at the teacher level as an estimator of standards. In addition to
estimating a teacher’s overall rigor, I also determine the rigor of earning specific letter grades as a
robustness check to better test the theoretical predictions (i.e., it may be difficult to earn an A but
easy to earn a C).
Two important endogeneity issues remain. First, standards might adapt to the characteristics of
a class. For example, a teacher may grade more leniently when students struggle. This potential re-
sponse to classroom composition generates a correlation between standards and (unobserved) class
characteristics that could make it appear that lenient standards hurt student outcomes. Even with-
out any teacher adaptation, given its derivation, the standards measure is increasing in unobserved
1I also observe a teacher’s judgments of a student’s mastery of material, a student’s race/ethnicity, English Lan-
guage Learner Status, economically disadvantaged student status, gifted status, and disability status.
2
classroom shocks in the same year. To deal with these issues, I instrument for standards measured
in a given school year with a measure of standards using students from all remaining school years
and estimate the model by Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). This approach also demonstrates that
measured standards are correlated within teachers over time (i.e., a teacher who grades hard in one
school year tends to do so throughout her teaching career).
A second endogeneity issue is the nonrandom matching of students to teachers. Differences
in standards between schools may be correlated with other school inputs, or (unobserved) charac-
teristics of the student population, like family income, which shape sorting into schools and also
affect the rate at which students learn. Due to these potential confounders, I only use variation in
standards between teachers within a school and grade. To address matching of students to teachers
within a school and grade, I include predetermined student and peer characteristics in all regres-
sions (i.e., lagged standardized test scores, lagged course grades and demographic information).
This approach accounts for selection on observables. Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014a) find
that this is enough to get estimates of teacher value-added free from matching and a similar argu-
ment might extend to this framework. I also take more conservative approaches to address selection
on fixed unobservables by leveraging the panel data on students.2
There are a few key findings. First, I find that harder standards in middle school positively
affect student achievement in math, yet I fail to find evidence that standards affect achievement
in English and Language Arts (ELA). If the lower performing students in a class are negatively
affected by harder standards, then perhaps this could justify setting lenient standards despite the
negative average effects. Contrary to popular belief and standards models of student optimizing
behavior, I find that harder standards do not leave the lower performing students behind—students
of all abilities benefit similarly from harder standards.3 Second, I find that students report spending
2I use the panel data in two ways to address selection on fixed unobservables. One approach uses within-student
variation in standards between grades six and eight. Here, the assumption is that unobserved student heterogeneity is
fixed throughout middle school and thus can be differenced out. Another approach tests whether the grading standards
of future teachers affect current achievement and course grades. If this turns out to be the case, it would cast doubt on
whether results are driven by a student’s teacher since unobserved differences between tracks could also be correlated
with grading standards and affect student outcomes.
3I estimate three different specifications that interact standards with a measure of student initial performance.
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substantially less time on homework with a more lenient grading teacher. Altogether, these results
show little benefit to grading leniently in terms of learning.
Third, I find that teacher-to-teacher differences in standards lead to substantial differences in
realized course grades. By assigning a class to a one standard deviation more lenient teacher,
grades (converted into GPA units on a 4.0 scale) would increase by more than 0.37, on average. The
next chapter explores the long-term consequences of being assigned to a lenient grading teacher
and thus receiving an inflated course grade.
This study makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to a handful of
studies on the effects of grading standards prior to college. Betts and Grogger (2003) estimate the
effects of high school grading standards on student achievement, later educational attainment and
entry-level earnings, finding positive effects of harder standards on test scores but mixed evidence
on other outcomes.4 Figlio and Lucas (2004) focus on the short-run effects of standards on test
scores and behavior in elementary school and find that harder standards positively affect test scores
on average, and even more so for higher achieving students. I complement this work by focusing
on the grading standards of middle school teachers and build on their estimation strategy in a
few notable ways: First, I use a different estimator for grading standards which has a number of
advantages over those used in prior studies. Second, I use up to seven school years of information
on teachers to estimate a teacher’s standards. This longer panel on teachers allows me to instrument
for contemporaneous standards with standards measured on a different set of students, addressing
key endogeneity issues described earlier. Without this instrumental variables approach, estimates
are biased due to how grading standards are measured and by any teacher adaptation.
This work also relates to experimental and quasi-experimental work on how standards and
One specification interacts standards with a student’s lagged standardized test score in the same subject. A second
specification interacts standards with a student’s initial class rank tercile. A third specification interacts standards
with a student’s lagged course grade in the same subject. The main specifications include class fixed-effects and I
consistently fail to find evidence of heterogeneity.
4Since these authors match students across high schools, these results potentially confound the effects of standards
with other unobserved student characteristics and school inputs that vary between schools.
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information provision affect student outcomes. Jalava, Joensen, and Pellas (2015) study the short-
term effects of different grading schemes on student motivation and effort by assigning different
grading schemes to students immediately before taking a math exam. Bandiera, Larcinese, and
Rasul (2015) rely on variation across departments in whether students are provided with their first
period test score before studying for the second period test, and find that test scores improved more
when information on first period performance was provided. These studies suggest that student
effort responds to standards and to the information provided in course grades.
1.2 Data
To study the effects of grading standards, I rely on administrative records on all North Carolina
public school students from the North Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC). The
data follow both students and teachers over time, and links students to their classrooms and teachers
by subject. My analysis focuses on one cohort of students, that I follow from grades three to twelve
(through the 2006-07 to 2015-16 school years). In this chapter, I focus on grades six to eight.5
These students’ teachers are observed over seven school years.
Advantages of these data include the detailed information on course-taking and on students.
Student characteristics, such as economically disadvantaged student status (EDS), race/ethnicity,
English language learner status (ELL), gifted status, and disability status are helpful for dealing
with selection into courses. Math and ELA courses in grades three to eight are aligned with state-
wide exams: End of Grade (EOG) tests taken in the spring, towards the end of each school year.
At the time of the EOG, teachers also report anticipated course grades and judgments of each
student’s mastery of the material in math and ELA. Course grades are anticipated because grades
are typically not finalized at the time of the EOG, yet these measures serve as useful proxies
of the final grade a student receives. Because I use course grades reported before grades are
finalized, this introduces measurement error, which I assume to be classical measurement error.
Thus, when course grades are used as a dependent variable in a regression, which is their main
role throughout this paper, estimates are noisier yet unbiased. When course grades are used as an
5Course grades are more salient in middle school than elementary school and I am not able to measure a teacher’s
grading standards in high school.
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explanatory variable, estimates are biased towards zero. In the next chapter, I present evidence that
anticipated course grades are strongly associated with GPA from high school transcripts, among
other high school outcomes. Additionally, the instrumental variables approach I describe later on
would presumably have a weak instruments issue if these anticipated course grades were too noisy
to isolate a teacher’s grading standards. I will refer to ‘anticipated course grades’ as simply ‘course
grades’ throughout the rest of this paper.
Sample Restrictions: I make a number of sample restrictions before estimating the effects of
standards on test scores in grades six to eight. I restrict the research sample to students observed in
each of grades five through eight, with non-missing test scores, course grades and teacher grading
standards in each grade and subject. Furthermore, I restrict the sample to students in the same
school from grades six to eight, who were never retained in these grades: this selection is to ensure
that within-student changes in standards over time are not associated with a school change (and
other differences in school inputs that accompany a school change) or retention. Missing measures
of standards arise for two reasons: First, many students cannot be matched to a unique teacher
and class for each subject. To avoid attributing standards to the wrong teacher, I treat standards
as missing when a student does not have a unique teacher and class by subject. Second, I do not
always observe teachers for multiple school years, and my estimation strategy requires at least
two school years of data per teacher. As a result, I must exclude students with teachers who are
observed only one school year. I also restrict to students in classes with more than one student
observed in the final research sample.6
The restricted research sample, summarized in Table (1.1), includes 373 schools and 22,141
students. Among the final research sample, the most common grade earned is a B, followed by
an A and then a C. Less than 10 percent of students earn grades lower than a C. Appendix Table
(A1) compares student characteristics prior to any sample restrictions with student characteristics
in the final research sample. The final research sample is a bit higher achieving than the full sample
and includes about half as many schools. Appendix Table (A1) also includes fractions of the full
6This class size restriction is related to class fixed-effect specifications, which drop groups (classes) with just one
observation.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics: Student-Grade Observations in the Restricted Research Sample
Mean SD Min Max Count
Math EOG Test Score -0.000 1.000 -3.653 2.768 66423
ELA EOG Test Score -0.000 1.000 -3.733 2.741 66423
Math ‘A’ Course Grade 0.278 0.448 0.000 1.000 66423
Math ‘B’ Course Grade 0.393 0.489 0.000 1.000 66423
Math ‘C’ Course Grade 0.230 0.421 0.000 1.000 66423
Math ‘D’ Course Grade 0.078 0.268 0.000 1.000 66423
Math ‘F’ Course Grade 0.021 0.142 0.000 1.000 66423
ELA ‘A’ Course Grade 0.312 0.463 0.000 1.000 66423
ELA ‘B’ Course Grade 0.394 0.489 0.000 1.000 66423
ELA ‘C’ Course Grade 0.210 0.408 0.000 1.000 66423
ELA ‘D’ Course Grade 0.066 0.249 0.000 1.000 66423
ELA ‘F’ Course Grade 0.017 0.129 0.000 1.000 66423
Lagged Math Tch. Judg. 3.105 0.748 1.000 4.000 66423
Lagged ELA Tch. Judg. 3.103 0.760 1.000 4.000 66423
Lagged Math Grade 2.859 0.969 0.000 4.000 66423
Lagged ELA Grade 2.959 0.932 0.000 4.000 66423
Economically Disadv. 0.386 0.487 0.000 1.000 66423
Limited English Proficient 0.053 0.224 0.000 1.000 66423
Student With a Disability 0.058 0.233 0.000 1.000 66423
Gifted Math 0.174 0.379 0.000 1.000 66423
Gifted Reading 0.161 0.368 0.000 1.000 66423
Gifted Math and Reading 0.129 0.335 0.000 1.000 66423
Male 0.477 0.499 0.000 1.000 66417
Asian 0.021 0.145 0.000 1.000 65070
American Indian 0.012 0.109 0.000 1.000 65070
Black 0.201 0.400 0.000 1.000 65070
White 0.651 0.477 0.000 1.000 65070
Hispanic 0.089 0.284 0.000 1.000 65070
Multiracial 0.026 0.160 0.000 1.000 65070
Total Number of Schools 373
Notes: Short-run regression sample includes all NC public school students from the cohort who would
have graduated during 2015-16 school-year, after sample restrictions described in this paper. One ob-
servation refers to a student-grade combination, and this sample follows a balanced panel of students
from grades six through eight. Teacher judgment of 4 corresponds to consistently performs in a superior
manner, 3 to consistently demonstrates mastery, 2 to demonstrates inconsistent mastery of knowledge,
and 1 to does not have sufficient mastery. Teacher judgments replaced to missing if student is not a clear
example of any of these options.
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sample which meet a number of the sample restriction criterion described earlier. For instance, I
can follow about 81 percent of the full sample from grades five to eight. Among these students,
about 77 percent are enrolled in the same school from grades six to eight. Only 3.5 percent of the
full sample are retained at some point during grades six to eight. The largest sample restriction is
related to a student’s teacher. I observe a student’s unique math and ELA teacher by grade, from
grades six to eight, for about 48 percent of students.7
Variation in Grading Standards Among Teachers: A key aspect of the estimation strategy
described in Section 1.4 is that grading standards vary considerably among teachers within-schools.
Table (1.2) documents considerable within-school heterogeneity in grading standards. It is worth
noting, however, that grading standards do vary more between-schools than within-schools. Addi-
tionally, Table (1.2) presents within and between-school variation in course grades for comparison.
Course grades vary more within-schools than between schools.
Working Conditions Survey of Teachers: This study relies on the assumption that teachers
have discretion to grade how they see fit. To demonstrate that teachers have discretion, I rely on
the North Carolina Working Conditions Survey (WCS) which asks teachers about this directly. Be-
ginning in 2002, Governor Easley and the North Carolina Professional Teaching Standards Com-
mission (NCPTSC) conducted a survey of all teachers, principals and other licensed personnel in
public and charter schools. The survey was conducted for the fifth time in 2010 with 88.8 percent
of teachers completing the survey. The year 2010 also aligns with the time students in the cohort
data began 7th grade. The survey asks teachers, “Please indicate the role teachers have at your
school in setting grading and student assessment practices.” Column (1) of Table (1.3) summarizes
the responses of all teachers in the state, with 76 percent reporting they have a large or moderate
role. Only five percent of teachers reported having no role at all in setting grading standards and
assessment practices. Columns (2) through (4) break these responses down by elementary, middle
and high school teachers, based on the grade ranges offered by the school.8 Teachers report having
7This percentage is unconditional (i.e,. some teachers may be unobserved because the student is not observed in
each grade.)
8I consider elementary schools to be those where the highest grade offered is no higher than five. Middle schools
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to a 4.0 Scale
8th Grade Math 2.80 1.00 0 4 0.43 0.94
8th Grade ELA 2.88 0.99 0 4 0.45 0.92
7th Grade Math 2.84 0.98 0 4 0.43 0.92
7th Grade ELA 2.92 0.96 0 4 0.44 0.90
6th Grade Math 2.86 1 0 4 0.43 0.92
6th Grade ELA 2.96 1 0 4 0.41 0.88
Grading Standards
Leniency
8th Grade Math 0 1 -3.93 3.63 0.88 0.64
8th Grade ELA 0 1 -3.62 3.11 0.92 0.56
7th Grade Math 0 1 -3.60 3.34 0.85 0.65
7th Grade ELA 0 1 -3.40 3.78 0.87 0.66
6th Grade Math 0 1 -3.52 3.71 0.93 0.63
6th Grade ELA 0 1 -3.85 4.26 0.87 0.59
Notes: The sample size is 22141 students for each grade. Grading standards are measured on the
reference data set. The last two columns decompose the standard deviation for each variable into
between school and within school components.
greater control over setting grading standards in middle and high school: 80 percent of middle
school teachers and 84 percent of high school teachers report having a moderate or large role.
are classified as those with a minimum grade offered of at least six and a maximum grade offered of eight or lower.
Finally, high schools are classified as those with a minimum grade offered of nine. Schools that fit none of these
criteria, such a those enrolling students in K-12, are included in column one, but excluded from columns two through
four.
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Table 1.3: Teachers’ Reported Role in Setting Grading and Assessment Practices
Please indicate the
role teachers have at














No Role At All 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03
Small Role 0.16 0.20 0.14 0.11
Moderate Role 0.35 0.38 0.34 0.32
Large Role 0.41 0.33 0.46 0.52
Don’t Know 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02
Count 89775 40328 25768 25476
Notes: All North Carolina teachers receive the North Carolina Working Conditions Survey bian-
nually. This table summarizes responses to the question, Rows denote the fraction of teachers
with a given response. The counts in columns two through four do not add up to the count in
the first column, because they omit teachers in schools with grade ranges that do not fit into any
category.
1.3 Theoretical Model
The goal of this section is to explain the ways in which a teacher’s grading standards can
affect student achievement. The simplest model has standards directly entering achievement pro-
duction. This makes sense if harder standards are packaged with more challenging instructional
practices (i.e., assigning more homework and teaching higher-order concepts). Alternatively, stan-
dards could indirectly enter achievement production through students’ effort responses. Using a
simple theoretical model, I provide a framework for thinking about this second model—how harder
standards may affect student effort and hence achievement.
First, I generate predictions for how grading standards affect a student’s effort in a course, and
between courses. Students choose effort to maximize expected achievement and course grades.
Teachers determine the mapping of achievement to course grades, which affects the returns to
student effort. The model predicts substantial heterogeneity in how students with different grade
expectations respond. If the minimum cut-off for a course grade is increased, then those expecting
that grade or higher put more effort into that course and less into other courses. In contrast, students
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expecting a lower grade put less effort into that course and more into their other courses. Then to
simulate grading more leniently overall I present comparative static results in which each of these
minimum cutoffs are shifted downwards jointly. When a student expects to earn an A, setting
harder standards increases the returns to effort through grades. When a student expects to earn an
F, setting harder standards decreases the returns to effort through grades. At all other points of the
grades distribution (B through D), effects are ambiguous.
While teachers may face interesting tradeoffs between setting standards to challenge students,
please them, or convey accurate information, I do not model teachers’ decision to set harder or
more lenient standards, as some other studies do (e.g. Ahn, Arcidiacono, Hopson, and Thomas
2015). Many factors may contribute to a teacher’s standards. For instance, teachers may not agree
on what level of competency deserves an A—or may vary in how they weight assignments, award
points for late and missing work, work completed in groups, attendance, effort, behavior and par-
ticipation (Marzano 2000; Kelly 2008). A teacher’s incentives also favor grading leniently. For
example, Butcher, McEwan, and Weerapana (2014) finds that more lenient teachers receive better
student reviews. I take a teacher’s standards as given in estimation (but account for the endogene-
ity of standards), and focus instead on estimating the effects of standards on student outcomes.
There is currently no consensus about why grading standards could affect student outcomes, so my
theoretical model motivates one potential channel.
1.3.1 Modeling Student Effort
Consider a school that offers courses in two subject areas, English and Language Arts and
math, which I denote with r and m subscripts, respectively.
Achievement Production The achievement produced in each subject yi ≡ {yir, yim} is deter-
mined by a student’s i’s effort choices ei ≡ {eir, eim} and fixed abilities ai ≡ {air, aim}. That is,
yik = yk(aik, eik) + εik for k = r,m. The achievement production functions yk(.) are increasing
in ability and effort in the same subject, and I assume these functions to be supermodular. Hence,
ability can affect achievement directly and also through the returns to effort. Mean zero shocks
εi ≡ {εir, εim} are not observed by the student when making choices and thus introduce uncer-
tainty. This is important because εi will affect a student’s final course grades through yi. Yet,
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students know the distribution of εi, which I will define shortly.
Grade Concerns Suppose the grade that a student receives gik is a function of achievement,
but a teacher’s standards determine the mapping of achievement to grades. I denote a teacher j’s
standards as grade criterions sjk ≡ (sjkA, sjkB, sjkC , sjkD) for k = r,m such that
gik = A if {sjkA ≤ yik}
gik = B if {sjkB ≤ yik < sjkA}
gik = C if {sjkC ≤ yik < sjkB}
gik = D if {sjkD ≤ yik < sjkC}
gik = F if {yik < sjkD}
k = r,m. (1.1)
This function allows for a teacher to determine cutoffs for which levels of achievement are
awarded with letter grades (i.e., A through F). Two students with the same achievement can earn
different course grades depending on the standards of their teacher.







F (gik) are defined analogously. A student derives utility
from achievement and grades in English and math, less the cost of effort. Utility U i(yi, gi, ei) has
the following functional form












Preferences for achievement, uik(.), may come from an intrinsic motivation to learn or knowl-
edge about the returns to human capital. Students also gain utility {βik,A, ..., βik,F} from grades, I
am agnostic about why. Absent grade concerns, grading standards should not affect effort so the
model considers how standards affect effort when students do care about the grade earned. Effort
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is costly, according to c(., .).
Expected Utility Using the achievement production function and the grading rule, we can then
derive an individual’s expected utility















` (gik)|eik; aik, sjk`+1, sjk`, fk(εik)]
+ βik,FE[χ
k
F (gik)|eik; aik, sjkD, fk(εik)]
]
− c(ei). (1.3)
where uncertainty comes from εi which follows the probability distribution fk(εik), assumed to be
known to the student. Note that I use ` + 1 to denote the next letter grade higher than `. I make a
few assumptions before proceeding:
1. Utility is weakly increasing in achievement such that ∂uik
∂yk
≥ 0.
2. All students strictly prefer higher grades to lower grades such that βik,A > βik,B > βik,C >
βik,D > βik,F for k ∈ (r,m).
3. The cost of effort in each subject is convex and may be increasing in effort spent in other
subjects, such that it satisfies the properties of a supermodular function.
4. Effort, ability and standards are known to the student, so that the only source of uncertainty
comes from shocks to achievement.
5. Shocks to achievement εi follow a mean-zero normal distribution.
Assumptions 1 and 2 impose minimal restrictions on students’ preferences. I make no assump-
tions about the curvature of preferences over achievement and grades, but if a student does not
prefer higher grades to lower ones, then she will not respond to standards. Assumption 3 is for
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the intuitive properties that the marginal cost of effort is increasing in its level, and that the cost
of effort in one class may depend on the level of effort exerted in another class.9 Assumption 4 is
for tractability, to more clearly show how changes in standards affect effort, but these assumptions
do not drive results. Intuitively, a student may not respond to standards if she has no information
about standards or her own abilities. Assumption 5 is also for tractability. Random shocks are
typically assumed to be mean zero, but what is important for my predictions is that the probability
distribution function (pdf) over shocks satisfies ∂f
k(x)
∂x
< 0 for x ≥ 0 and ∂f
k(x)
∂x
> 0 for x < 0 (i.e.,
distributions with thinner tails). Any continuous, unimodal probability distribution function that is
mean zero would yield similar predictions. I have written the model so that shocks affect grades
through achievement production, and we could obtain the same results allowing shocks to affect
realized grades but not achievement.
The probabilities of earning a given grade can be written
E[χkA(gik)|eik; aik, sjkA, fk(εik)] ≡ P ({sjkA ≤ yik})
= 1− F k(sjkA − E[yk(eik; aik) + εik])
E[χk` (gik)|eik; aik, sjk`+1, sjk`, fk(εik)] ≡ P ({sjk` ≤ yik < sjk`+1})
= F k(sjk`+1 − E[yk(eik; aik) + εik])
− F k(sjk` − E[yk(eik; aik) + εik]) for ` = B,C,D.
E[χkF (gik)|eik; aik, sjkD, fk(εik)] ≡ P ({yik < sjkD})
= F k(sjkD − E[yk(eik; aik) + εik])
k = r,m (1.4)
as a function of expected achievement and the cumulative distribution function (cdf) over shocks
F k. Taking first-order conditions of equation (1.3) with respect to effort gives us
9For my application, assuming that the marginal cost of effort is increasing in its level is equivalent to writing a





























for k = r,m (1.5)
a system of equations that determines optimal effort (e∗ie, e
∗
im), where f
k for k ∈ (r,m) are inde-
pendent probability distribution functions (pdf) over shocks, taking a teacher’s grade criteria as
given.
1.3.2 Effects of Standards on Effort Provision
Next, I apply a standard comparative statics analysis to determine the effects of standards on
student effort. Without loss of generality, I present comparative static results for how standards
in math affect effort in math, holding English standards constant. Predictions depend on where a
student expects to fall in the grade distribution conditional on utility maximizing effort, prior to
the change in standards (i.e., E[ym(e∗im; aim) + εim]).
Case 1: Middle of the Grade Distribution First, suppose that in the absence of shocks, a
student expects to earn a C (i.e. sjmC ≤ E[ym(e∗im; aim) + εim] < sjmB). If the teacher raises the
criterion for a B, this shift affects the marginal returns to effort through grades, but not the marginal
returns to effort through achievement, nor the marginal cost of effort. The effect of increasing sjmB












Any student expecting to earn lower than a B decreases effort in response to raising the B criterion.
This result comes from the assumption that the probability distribution for shocks becomes smaller
as we get further away from the mean. Intuitively, the same increase in effort now has a smaller
probability of increasing a student’s letter grade from a C to a B.
Next, suppose that the teacher raises the criterion for a C, holding all other criteria the same.











Any student expecting to earn higher than a C increases effort in response to raising the C criterion.
Intuitively, the same increase in effort now has a greater probability of avoiding a drop from a C to
a D.
Because I am interested in how the overall level of standards affects effort in order to directly
address concerns about grade inflation, I now consider results from equations (1.6) and (1.7) to-
gether. We see that raising the grade criterions for both letter grades by the same amount has an
ambiguous effect on effort for students expecting to earn between a B and a D. The reason for this
ambiguity is we do not know a student’s preferences over grades (i.e., how (βie,B−βie,C) compares
to (βie,C − βie,D)). These results also predict that more complicated standards such as narrowing
the grade criteria around a student’s expected grade would increase that student’s effort.
Case 2: Upper Tail of the Grade Distribution Next, I consider a student in the upper tail of
the grade distribution (i.e., students expecting to earn an A given optimal effort e∗im.) The effect of












Since there is no grade higher than an A, we get a monotone effect of raising the A criterion.
Case 3: Lower Tail of the Grade Distribution Finally, consider a student in the lower tail of
the grade distribution (i.e., students expecting to earn an F given optimal effort e∗im.) The effect of
increasing sjmD on effort in the same subject has the same sign as










Since there is no grade lower than an F, we get a monotone effect of raising the D criterion.
1.4 Estimation
This section focuses on identification issues that arise in estimating the effects of grading stan-
dards on short-term learning (i.e., nonrandom matching of students to teachers, adaptation of stan-
dards to a classroom, and measuring standards).
1.4.1 Short-Term Effects
My analysis focuses on one cohort of students I follow from grades three to twelve, which I call
the cohort data set. I use another data set on these students’ teachers in up to six other school years
to measure standards, which I call the reference data set. Beginning with the cohort data set, each
student i attends a school h = h(i, t) and is assigned to a classroom c = c(i, t) in school year t. Let
j = j(i, c(i, t)) denote student i’s teacher in year t. Because the cohort data do not include retained
students, notation for a student’s grade g = g(i, t) is redundant. However, separate notation for
grade and year is necessary when discussing the reference data set.
A teacher’s grading standards, sjgt, is the leniency of a teacher’s mapping of achievement to
course grades relative to other teachers. Measurement of standards will be discussed shortly but
for now assume that standards are observed directly. Stacking the data from grades six to eight,
the average effect of standards on a student’s standardized test score Yit is modeled as
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Yit = α0 + αSsjgt +Xit−1α
′
X + µhg + eit for g=6,7,8. (1.10)
School-grade fixed-effects, µhg, are included to account for the possibility that standards are
correlated with other between school or between grade differences (e.g., other school inputs or
unobserved characteristics that affect both achievement and sorting between public schools). Yet,
even within schools, initial student characteristics and classroom composition can vary greatly
between classes and may be correlated with the rigor of grading standards in a class. A number
of predetermined student and peer characteristics, Xit−1, are included to account for selection
into courses and peer effects. This vector includes lagged standardized test scores, lagged course
grades, lagged teacher judgments, demographic information and averages over the lagged test
scores of i’s peers.10 The parameter of interest is αS or the average effects of standards sjgt on
a student’s test score. Later on, I will explore whether there exists evidence of heterogeneous
effects by initial student characteristics. There are three identification concerns that deserve further
consideration: 1) nonrandom matching of students to teachers, 2) teachers may adapt standards to
fit the class, and 3) measurement of standards.
Matching of Students to Teachers As mentioned, the vector of student and peer characteristics
Xit−1, are included in equation (1.10) to account for selection into courses. Chetty et al. (2014a)
provide compelling evidence that observables similar to those in Xit−1 are enough to account for
matching of students to teachers.
I am sensitive to concerns that selection on unobservables may still confound the effects of
grading standards, since grades may be more affected by (unobserved) noncognitive skill than
standardized test scores. Another possible concern is that I am comparing students in different
academic tracks (i.e., advanced and remedial math) and the rigor of grading standards may vary by
track. ObservablesXit−1 may not be enough to account for these differences in grading standards
10Specifically, I control for a third-order polynomial of prior math and ELA test scores, and peer average prior test
scores. I also include controls for a rich set of other student characteristics listed in Table (1.1).
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between track. Later, I consider more conservative approaches to account for selection on fixed
unobservables using panel data on students.
Teacher Adaptation Standards may change over time and between classrooms because teach-
ers can adjust standards depending on characteristics of a class (i.e., teachers may award an A more
leniently if there would be no A’s otherwise). This adaptation generates an endogeneity concern:
standards might respond to unobserved student or class characteristics, such that E[sjgteit] 6= 0.11
Any correlation between sjgt and test score gains coming from teachers’ adaptation will bias αS
in equation (1.10). To address this issue, I rely on a unique feature of the data: the same teach-
ers are observed across up to seven school years. I use a teacher’s average standards from other
school years but the same grade, sjg−t, to instrument for sjgt. The structural and first-stage regres-
sion equations I estimate use adjusted test scores as the dependent variable and an instrumental
variables approach, which can be written as
Yit = α0 + αSsjgt +Xit−1α
′
X + µhg + eit for g=6,7,8,
sjgt = δ0 + δSsjg−t +Xit−1δ
′
X + δsg + vit for g=6,7,8. (1.11)
If teachers tend to grade harder or more leniently throughout their teaching careers, then δS > 0.
Estimating equations (1.11) by Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) identifies the effects of teachers’
natural grading standards, rather than class-specific standards. Even without any teacher adapta-
tion, given the derivation of the standards measure (in the next section) it is increasing in exogenous
student and classroom shocks in the same year. This IV approach will help to break this correlation,
which may have biased αS .
Measuring Grading Standards To determine the rigor of a teacher’s standards, I estimate the
extent to which a teacher’s assigned grades are higher or lower than would be expected given the
academic performance of a student and her peers. I refer to this as a grade assignment function. A
11Specifically, I am concerned about eit containing unobserved student or peer characteristics. Even if unobserved
student or peer characteristics are independent of fixed teacher characteristics, the teacher could respond to them while
setting standards.
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teacher may have a hard minimum threshold for each course grade, and thus grade harder overall.
Alternatively, a teacher may have a harder standard for some grades but a more lenient standard
for others (i.e., a harder A threshold but a more lenient C threshold)—following Section 1.3. Here
I discuss measuring a teacher’s overall rigor, and this same approach will be extended to estimate
the rigor of an A, B, and C, to test the theoretical predictions later on.12
To build intuition, let course grades Git take the values 4 for an A, 3 for a B, 2 for a C, 1 for
a D and 0 for an E/F. Suppose that grades can be written as a linear function of own performance
and classroom peers’ performance.13
Git = Yitβ
′





R + νit, (1.12)
where νit = sjgt + θc + ε̃it. (1.13)
Yit is a vector that includes all end-of-year standardized test scores observed in a given school year
(math, ELA and also science in 8th grade), while Y −ict includes averages of these test scores over
i’s classroom peers. I use observed standardized test scores rather than residualized test scores
in equation (1.12), hence the superscripts. I also control for a student’s ordinal class rank Rict




, Rict ∈ [0, 1]
where nict is a student’s ordinal class rank using a given standardized test score, Yit, and Nct
denotes the number of students in a class. Intuitively, the mapping of an individual student’s test
score to a course grade may depend on the level and distribution of achievement in a class. Ordinal
12For example, to estimate the rigor of a teacher’s B I use a linear probability model to estimate the probability of
earning a B and eveything else about the estimator remains the same.
13Technically, it would be best to use an ordered logit to model course grades (or logit to model grade cut-offs), yet
these nonlinear models are subject to incidental parameter bias when fixed-effects are included and groups (teachers)
are observed over a relatively small number of time periods (or classes). One way that I have eased these concerns
is by measuring standards using a regression at the class-level, where average course grades at the class-level are
approximately normally distributed in the population. Using this measure I obtain very similar results. One could
extend these results using nonlinear models that correct for incidental parameter bias.
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class rank has been shown to affect student outcomes beyond prior test scores and linear-in-means
peer effects (Murphy and Weinhardt 2018; Elsner and Isphording 2017; Tincani 2017), so I use it
here as a flexible way to allow peers to affect realized course grades. All of the terms described
above are included in their level, square and cube to more flexibly model the grade assignment
function.
The error term is decomposed into three components: (i) a teacher’s standards sjgt, (ii) exoge-
nous class shocks θc, and (iii) an idiosyncratic student error term ε̃it. I denote the net effect of
student and class shocks as εit ≡ θc + ε̃it from this point forward. We can see from the error term
decomposition that matching of students to teachers generates a correlation between observables
and standards. I use within-teacher across class variation to account for this matching.









R + αjg + ε̃it (1.14)
separately by grade, where αjg denotes a teacher-grade fixed-effect and ε̃it denotes time-varying
components of the error term, which may include student/class shocks εit or within-teacher changes
in standards. As mentioned, within teacher-grade variation accounts for correlation between sjgt
(and other teacher characteristics) with student or class characteristics originating from time-
constant αjg. Using the parameter estimates from this production function, I calculate residualized
course grades Ĝit for each student in both the cohort and reference data set. That is,
Ĝit = Git − Yitβ̃
′





= sjgt + θc + ε̃it (1.15)
Let Cjgt denote the set of students who are in any of teacher j’s classes in grade g and year t, and
Cjg−t the set of students from other school years but the same grade and teacher. The estimators
























where Ñjgt and Ñjg−t denote the number of students in Cjgt and Cjg−t, respectively. These mea-
sures are used to estimate equations (1.10) and (1.11), and the equations that follow. Note that with
relatively few classrooms and perhaps students, per teacher, standards are measured with error. Yet,
as long as θc+ ε̃it is uncorrelated across classrooms then the instrumental variables strategy is valid
and corrects for this measurement error.
Panel Data Approaches to Address Matching of Students to Teachers High and low achiev-
ing students may also vary in unobserved ways, or be exposed to many different inputs that ob-
servable student and class characteristics may not capture. Beginning in elementary school many
students are sorted into classrooms by ability; in fact, Horvath (2015) finds that about half of all
North Carolina elementary schools begin tracking in elementary school. Different tracks may be
exposed to a number of different inputs including differences in teacher quality, peer characteris-
tics, curriculum and standards. A student’s academic track is unobserved in the data and may be
correlated with grading standards.
To mitigate these concerns, I use approaches that rely on panel data to address selection on
fixed unobservables of the student or fixed unobservables of a track. One approach is to use a
student fixed-effect estimator to difference out fixed unobserved student heterogeneity from the
residual. I apply this approach to the short-term analysis in order to contrast how it affects results
on the same sample of students.14
I also develop “falsification tests” to more explicitly test concerns that a student’s academic
14Nickell (1981) shows that lagged dependent variables become endogenous when individual fixed-effects are
included. Thus, controlling for lagged test scores with student fixed-effects can bias the estimated effects of grading
standards. To account for these concerns I show that results are similar using a range of persistence parameters on a
student’s lagged test score.
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track is unobserved in the data and may be correlated with grading standards. First, I test whether
having a hard grading teacher in one year predicts having a hard grading teacher in the following
year. Second, I test whether the grading standards of a future teacher (in the subsequent year)
affect achievement and course grades in the current year. Since future teachers cannot have a
causal effect on current outcomes, finding a statistically significant effect would likely indicate
the presence of an unobserved student characteristic or school input which is both correlated with
grading standards and student outcomes. These approaches are detailed further in Appendix (A.3).
1.5 Results
First, this section presents some results related to estimation of the grade assignment function,
to further explain how I measure the rigor of a teacher’s standards. The rest of this section presents
results showing how grading standards affect student achievement and course grades.
1.5.1 Modeling Grade Assignment
To further illustrate how I measure grading standards, results using math and ELA course
grades in grade eight are presented in Table (1.4). I use information on all North Carolina public
school students and teachers between 2007 and 2013 and estimate the effects of student and peer
characteristics on realized course grades. As mentioned, matching of students to teachers may bias
these estimates (i.e., higher achieving students may be matched with harder grading teachers) so I
estimate the model with teacher-grade fixed-effects.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table (1.4) show that contemporaneous standardized test scores in math
and ELA strongly predict course grades in both subjects, with an adjusted R-squared of 0.368 and
0.322, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) add controls for peer average achievement (excluding own
achievement) and a student’s ordinal class rank using each of these test scores. Both are controlled
for flexibly, up to the cube. This specification is the full model I discuss in equation (1.14) and use
to form my primary estimator for grading standards (equation 1.16).
These peer controls are jointly statistically significant, showing that course grades depend on
the achievement of one’s peers, even with the same teacher. Also, notice that the effect of math
and ELA standardized test scores on course grades increases when including peer controls. Be-
cause own and peer standardized test scores are positively correlated, failure to account for the
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distribution of achievement in a class introduces a downward bias on standardized test scores.
1.5.2 Do Standards Affect How Much Students Learn in a Course?
Column (1) of Table (1.5) regresses a student’s standardized test score on their teacher’s le-
niency in the same subject (see equation 1.16 for a derivation). Column (2) includes the leniency
of a student’s math and ELA teacher in the same regression, because Section 1.3 shows that a
student’s effort in one subject may depend on the opportunity cost of that time — which depends
in part on the marginal returns to that effort in other subjects. Column (3) presents the effects of
teacher quality (value-added) for comparison (see Appendix Section A.4 for a derivation). In each
regression, I instrument for a teacher’s contemporaneous standards (or value-added) with standards
(or value-added) estimated on the reference data set (detailed further in Section 1.4). Panels A and
B display estimates of the effect on math and ELA standardized test scores, respectively. Students
are pooled across grades six to eight and all regressions include a rich set of predetermined student
and peer characteristics.15
In column (1), more lenient standards are negatively associated with standardized test score
gains in both subjects. The magnitude of these effects are large in math and statistically significant
at the 1% level, yet small in ELA and statistically significant at the 5% level. After including a
teacher’s leniency in both subjects, in column (2), the effects in ELA become even smaller and are
no longer statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, there is only robust evidence that harder
standards increase standardized test scores in math. Another way of thinking about the magnitude
of these effects is to compare them to the effects of teacher value-added, in column (3). The effects
of standards in math are about 34% as large while the effects of standards in ELA are about 11%
as large.
Columns (1-3) of Table (1.6) regress course grades on grading standards and value-added.
Results show that grading standards strongly affect realized course grades in the same subject, yet
not across subjects. Value-added has small and statistically insignificant effects on course grades.
15Specifically, these regressions control for a student’s prior year math and ELA test scores, lagged course grades,
lagged teacher judgments, race/ethnicity, English Language Learner Status, economically disadvantaged student sta-
tus, gifted status, and disability status. I also control for classroom peer average prior test scores in both subjects. I
control for the level, square and cube of continuous variables.
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Table 1.4: Effects of Own Performance and Peers’ Performance on Course Grades
Git Math Git ELA Git Math Git ELA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own Achievement 0.755*** 0.450*** 0.819*** 0.493***
Yit Math (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Y 2it Math 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.014*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Y 3it Math -0.044*** -0.023*** -0.045*** -0.022***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Yit ELA 0.096*** 0.349*** 0.132*** 0.385***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Y 2it ELA -0.014*** -0.021*** -0.008*** -0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Y 3it ELA 0.001*** -0.017*** 0.001*** -0.016***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Class Averages -0.187*** -0.106***
Y it Math (0.005) (0.004)
Y
2




it Math 0.001 -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)








it ELA -0.014*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002)
Ordinal Class Ranks -0.449*** -0.295***
Rit Math (0.021) (0.021)
R2it Math 1.090*** 0.692***
(0.044) (0.043)
R3it Math -0.807*** -0.583***
(0.029) (0.028)
Rit ELA -0.086*** -0.201***
(0.022) (0.021)
R2it ELA 0.299*** 0.431***
(0.045) (0.043)
R3it ELA -0.316*** -0.378***
(0.030) (0.028)
Count 1965189 2113138 1965189 2113138
Adjusted R-squared 0.368 0.322 0.370 0.324
Joint significance of 0.000 0.000
peer controls p-value
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Columns (1)-(4)
regress realized course grades on a number of student and peer characteristics, where 4 refers
to A, 3 to B, 2 to C, 1 to D and 0 to E/F. Columns (1) and (2) regress math or ELA grades on
the level, square and cube of end-of-grade standardized test scores both subjects. Columns (3)
and (4) add controls for classroom peer average achievement (excluding own achievement) and
ordinal class rank based on prior year test scores. The adjusted R-squared and joint significance
tests on the peer variables are presented in the bottom panel. All regressions include teacher-
grade fixed-effects and school year indicators.
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Table 1.5: Short-Term Effects of Standards and Teacher Value-Added on Standardized Test Scores:




Math Teacher’s Leniency -0.083*** -0.081***
(0.011) (0.012)
ELA Teacher’s Leniency -0.008
(0.013)
Math Teacher’s VA 0.241***
(0.005)
Count 66423 66423 66423
F-stat first† 508.055 187.149 701.454
Corr(ŝjg−t,q̂jg−t) -0.311
Panel B ELA
Math Teacher’s Leniency -0.011
(0.007)
ELA Teacher’s Leniency -0.019** -0.016*
(0.009) (0.009)
ELA Teacher’s VA 0.152***
(0.012)
Count 66423 66423 66423
F-stat first† 446.519 187.149 85.834
Corr(ŝjg−t,q̂jg−t) -0.213
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Columns (1)
of Panels A and B correspond to regressions in which math or ELA standardized test scores
are regressed on a teacher’s contemporaneous leniency in the same subject, which are instru-
mented with a teacher’s average leniency in the reference data. Column (2) introduces the
leniency of a student’s teacher in the other subject, instrumenting for both teacher’s standards
similarly. Column (3) is similar to Column (1) except uses teacher value-added rather than a
teacher’s leniency. Each regression controls for predetermined student and peer characteris-
tics listed in Appendix Table (1.1). These regressions also include school-grade fixed effects
and standard errors are clustered at the school-grade level. † Reports the Kleibergen-Paap rk
Wald statistic for a weak instrument test.
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Table 1.6: Short-Term Effects of Standards and Teacher Value-Added on Course Grades: IV Esti-




Math Teacher’s Leniency 0.379*** 0.374***
(0.009) (0.010)
ELA Teacher’s Leniency 0.016
(0.012)
Math Teacher’s VA -0.013
(0.023)
Count 66423 66423 66423
F-stat first† 508.055 187.149 701.454
Corr(ŝjg−t,q̂jg−t) -0.311
Panel B ELA
Math Teacher’s Leniency -0.011
(0.009)
ELA Teacher’s Leniency 0.381*** 0.384***
(0.010) (0.010)
ELA Teacher’s VA 0.034
(0.048)
Count 66423 66423 66423
F-stat first† 446.519 187.149 85.834
Corr(ŝjg−t,q̂jg−t) -0.213
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Columns (4-6)
are similar to Columns (1-3) of Table (1.5) except the dependent variable is course grades Git,
where 4 refers to A, 3 to B, 2 to C, 1 to D and 0 to E/F. Each regression controls for predetermined
student and peer characteristics listed in Table (1.1). These regressions also include school-grade
fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the school-grade level. †Reports the Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald statistic for a weak instrument test.
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These findings demonstrate there is substantial teacher-to-teacher variation in grading standards
within middle schools that is unexplained by measured teacher quality. Thus, grading standards
are not affecting course grades due to a correlation with teacher quality and establishes that there
exists disparities in grading standards among teachers. These differences in grading standards
among teachers are fairly large in magnitude. By assigning a class to a one standard deviation
more lenient teacher, grades (converted into GPA units on a 4.0 scale) increase by more than 0.37,
on average.
1.5.3 Robustness
This section begins by addressing concerns about selection on unobservables (i.e., perhaps
students assigned to harder grading teachers have higher ability in ways that I cannot observe in
the data). Second, I address concerns that a student’s academic track (i.e., advanced vs. remedial
math) may be highly correlated with a teacher’s grading standards. If, all else being equal, students
learn more in advanced math than in remedial math, this could confound the effects of grading
standards with the effects of one’s academic track. Third, I contrast my estimator of grading
standards described in Section 1.4 to an estimator following the logic of prior studies (Betts and
Grogger 2003; Figlio and Lucas 2004).
Previous results rely on observable characteristics of a student and her classroom peers to
match students across teachers. Chetty et al. (2014a) find that this approach is enough to get es-
timates of teacher value-added free from matching and a similar argument might extend to this
framework. I present additional results to ease concerns about selection on fixed unobservables
that may be correlated with a teacher’s grading standards. Column (1) of Appendix Table (A2) is
analagous to column (2) of Table (1.5) except the regression includes student fixed-effects rather
than school-grade fixed-effects. The effects in math are smaller in magnitude, yet robust, suggest-
ing that selection on fixed unobservable characteristics is not driving the main results. Technically,
lagged dependent variables become endogenous when student fixed-effects are included in large
N, small T panels (Nickell 1981). This could also bias the estimated effect of grading standards
on student achievement. To get a sense for the magnitude of this bias, I move to a simpler model
in which I regress a student’s achievement on her lagged achievement in the same subject and
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contemporaneous grading standards in the same subject. These results are presented in column (3)
and are very similar to results that control for grading standards in both subjects and a richer set of
student and peer controls. In this simpler model, I manually set the persistence of lagged achieve-
ment to different values between 0 and 1 at increments of 0.1. Column (4) reports the smallest
estimated effect of grading standards, while Column (5) reports the largest, which can be thought
of as lower and upper bounds for these student fixed-effect results. Regardless of the persistence
parameter, results are similar.
Next I address concerns that a student’s academic track (i.e., advanced vs. remedial math)
may be highly correlated with a teacher’s grading standards, even conditional on the student and
peer controls. If this is the case, earlier estimates could confound the effects of grading standards
with the effects of one’s track.16 Column (1) of Appendix Table (A3) shows that sixth and seventh
grade students with a lenient grading teacher are no more likely to have a lenient grading teacher the
following year, which would be the case if grading standards are picking up a student’s unobserved
track. Furthermore, using this same sample of sixth and seventh grade students, I test whether
the grading standards of a future teacher (in the subsequent year) affect current achievement and
course grades in columns (3) and (5). Since future teachers cannot have a causal effect on current
outcomes, any correlation would be due to unobserved student ability or school inputs correlated
with grading standards. We see that having future teachers that are more lenient graders does not
increase a student’s current course grade nor does it affect their current achievement.
Third, I contrast the estimator I use for standards with those used in prior studies (Betts and
Grogger 2003; Figlio and Lucas 2004). I construct an alternate estimator following their approach
(see Appendix Section A.2 for more details). This alternate estimator may confound grading stan-
dards with teacher quality given how it is measured and does not isolate how own and peer char-
acteristics affect grades, among other differences. I present results using this alternate estimator in
Table (A4) which replicates my main results in Table (1.5).
There are a few key takeaways from comparing these tables. First, the alternate estimator of
16Although the student-fixed effects results mitigate these concerns if a student is tracked prior to the start of middle
school.
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standards has a much stronger correlation with teacher value-added, which is to be expected given
how it is measured. Second, Column (2) of Table (A4) shows that the effects of standards on
test scores is much larger in magnitude than those in Column (2) of Table (1.5) and statistically
significant at the 1% level in both subjects. These findings show that measurement issues are key
to understanding how standards affect student achievement and course grades.
1.5.4 Are Grading Standards Associated with Homework Time?
A teacher who chooses to grade leniently may also choose instructional practices that are less
challenging or assign less homework. Distinguishing between the effects of grading standards
and any associated instructional practices would require an experiment, which may not be feasible
given that grades play an important role in the US educational system. Yet, we can still learn about
whether grading standards are associated with homework time from student-reported time spent on
homework. From grades five to eight, the data include student-reported time spent on homework
from all courses. Table (1.7) summarizes these responses for the estimation sample, separately by
grade. In grade five, the most common response is, “less than one hour each week,” while in grades
six to eight, the most common response is, “between one and three hours.”
In order to estimate whether the rigor of a teacher’s grading standards is associated with home-
work time, I replace the responses of, “has homework, but does not do it,” to missing. Additionally,
I replace, “more than 10 hours,” to 12.5 hours, and replace all other values to the midpoint of a
given range of hours. Then, in Table (1.8) I present estimates of how standards affect homework
time. These regressions condition on a student’s lagged reported homework time, in addition to all
of the same predetermined student and peer characteristics used to account for matching of students
to teachers in Table (1.5). As before, I include school-grade fixed-effects and grade indicators.
Columns (1) and (2) show that students report spending 13.08 fewer minutes on homework
a week with a one standard deviation more lenient math teacher and 9.54 fewer minutes a week
with a similarly more lenient ELA teacher. These findings are statistically significant at the 1%
level and are likely an underestimate, given the wide ranges of hours within each response from
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which students are asked to choose.17 Column (3) shows that standards in math and ELA each
independently contribute to homework time. Column (4) shows that teacher value-added has a
much noisier effect on homework time than standards. Finally, column (5) shows that standards
still have a statistically significant association with homework time when accounting for teacher
value-added. Results are similar using a student fixed-effect estimator. Altogether, these results
suggest that more lenient teachers also assign less homework.
Table 1.7: Students’ Reported Homework Time per Week on Average
Time on Homework Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 7 Grade 8
No homework is ever as-
signed by all their teachers
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Less than one hour each week 0.42 0.30 0.30 0.28
Between 1 and 3 hours 0.31 0.44 0.46 0.46
More than 3 but less than 5
hours
0.17 0.14 0.14 0.14
Between 5 and 10 hours 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08
More than 10 hours 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Has homework, but does not
do it
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Missing a response 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Count 22141 22141 22141 22141
Notes: This table summarizes students’ reported time spent on homework. Rows denote the
fraction of students with a given response, by grade.
1.5.5 Do Standards Heterogeneously Affect Test Scores?
Even though harder standards benefit students on average, especially in math, teachers may
still choose to grade leniently so as not to discourage the lower performing students in a class.
Thus, in this section I test whether standards heterogeneously affect test scores depending on a
student’s initial achievement. We may expect to see heterogeneous effects of standards if harder
grading standards are packaged with more challenging instructional practices (i.e., assigning more
homework and teaching higher-order concepts). Alternatively, standards could indirectly affect
achievement through students’ effort responses. Either way, we may be concerned that lower
17For instance, a student may decrease their time spent on homework but still fall within the, “between 1 and 3
hours” range. In this case, I would find no effect even when there could exist a considerable one.
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Table 1.8: The Effects of Standards on Student-Reported Homework Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time Time Time Time Time
Math Teacher’s -0.218*** -0.184*** -0.179***
Leniency (0.034) (0.036) (0.039)
ELA Teacher’s -0.159*** -0.116*** -0.100**
Leniency (0.038) (0.040) (0.041)
Math Teacher’s 0.080** -0.002
VA (0.040) (0.044)
ELA Teacher’s 0.143 0.174*
VA (0.098) (0.099)
Count 65428 65428 65428 65428 65428
F-stat first† 509.472 445.038 186.642 40.938 20.390
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Student-
reported homework time is regressed on standards and/or teacher value-added in one or both
subjects. Standards and/or teacher value-added at time t are instrumented with similar measures
estimated in the reference data set. Each regression controls for lagged homework time reported
by a student, in addition to predetermined student and peer characteristics listed in Table (1.1).
These regressions also include school-grade fixed effects and grade indicators, and standard
errors are clustered at the school-grade level. † Reports the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic for
a weak instrument test.
performing students become discouraged in response to harder standards.
Table (1.9) regresses a student’s standardized test score on the interaction between their teacher’s
leniency in the same subject and measures of a student’s initial achievement. Students are pooled
across grades six to eight and controls are included for predetermined student characteristics listed
in Table (1.1). These regressions also include class fixed-effects, so the interactions of standards
with measures of a student’s initial achievement are identified, but not the level effect. Column (1)
interacts a teacher’s leniency with a student’s lagged standardized test score in the same subject,




) based on a student’s
lagged standardized test score in the same subject, and column (3) with indicators for a student’s
lagged course grade in the same subject. I find no evidence that lower performing students benefit
from a teacher’s leniency compared to higher performing students.
The theoretical model in Section 1.3 suggests that we may be missing some meaningful het-
erogeneity by focusing on a teacher’s average rigor rather than the rigor of specific letter grades.
The model predicts that two types of heterogeneity may be important— the rigor of specific letter
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grades (or minimum cut-off) and where a student expects to fall in the grade distribution. If the
minimum cut-off for a course grade is increased, then those expecting that grade or higher put
more effort into that course and less into other courses. In contrast, students expecting a lower
grade put less effort into that course and more into their other courses. If a teacher’s rigor for each
letter grade has enough independent variation, then perhaps I can estimate grade-specific rigor to
better test the theory. Thus, I estimate the rigor of earning at least an A, a B, and a C, following
the same estimation procedure detailed in Section 1.4 except I estimate a linear probability model
(i.e., to estimate the rigor of a B, the dependent variable is whether or not a student earns a B or
higher). I do not estimate the rigor of a D because less than 10% of my sample earn grades lower
than a C and less than 2% earn an F (see Table 1.1).
Appendix Table (A5) displays the average effects of these grade-specific standard measures,
where higher values denote more lenient grading. In Columns (1) to (3) we see that for each
grade-specific standards measure there is a negative association with test score gains in math but
not ELA. These results are quite similar to those found when using a teacher’s overall rigor. The
rigor of adjacent grades are highly correlated, but the rigor of an A and C are less so, with corre-
lations of 0.518 and 0.444 in math and ELA. Column (4) includes the rigor of an A and C in the
same regression while Column (5) includes the rigor of an A, B and C in the same regression. In
math standards are always jointly significant while in ELA they are not. So far, these results are
consistent with earlier results that estimate effects of the overall level of standards.
Next, I test for heterogeneity using the leniency of a teacher’s A and C, which exhibit the
most independent variation. I repeat the analysis presented in Table (1.9) using these new standard
measures in the same regression, interacting the leniency of a teacher’s A and C with the same
measures of a student’s initial achievement. If anything, I find that higher performing students
are hurt less from a lenient A and that lower performing students are hurt less from a lenient C.
Yet, these effects are small in magnitude, so both high and low performing students are negatively
affected overall by lenient standards in math.18
18These results are available upon request.
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Table 1.9: Heterogeneous Effects of Standards by Measures of Initial Student Achievement
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A Math Yit Yit Yit
Math Teacher’s Leniency 0.003
× Yit−1 (0.004)








Math Teacher’s Leniency 0.000
× Git−1 = A (0.010)
Math Teacher’s Leniency -0.002
× Git−1 = B (0.009)
Math Teacher’s Leniency 0.007
× Git−1 = C (0.009)
Count 66423 66423 66423
Panel B ELA
ELA Teacher’s Leniency 0.007**
× Yit−1 (0.003)








ELA Teacher’s Leniency -0.012
× Git−1 = A (0.011)
ELA Teacher’s Leniency -0.007
× Git−1 = B (0.010)
ELA Teacher’s Leniency -0.011
× Git−1 = C (0.011)
Count 66423 66423 66423
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Panels A
and B regress observed math and ELA standardized test scores on a teacher’s leniency in the
same subject interacted with a measure of initial student performance, predetermined student
characteristics listed in Table (1.1), and class fixed-effects. Thus, with class fixed-effects the
interaction of standards with a given student characteristic is identified but not the level effect
of standards. Yit−1 denotes lagged standardized test in the same subject as the dependent
variable. Top and Mid. 13 Class Rank denote a student’s initial class rank tercile based on
Yit−1 (i.e., top or middle third of the class). Git−1 = A denotes whether a student’s lagged
course grade in the same subject was an ‘A’, and similarly for other grade indicators.
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1.5.6 Does Consistent Exposure to Lenient Grading Matter?
Earlier results present the effects of teacher grading standards on contemporaneous student
outcomes. Students with a more lenient grading teacher earn considerably higher course grades in
that subject. Students also learn less in math with a lenient grading teacher. This section explores
two questions: First, do the effects of having a lenient grading teacher persist over time? Second,
are students worse off if they have a lenient grading teacher for two consecutive years?
Taking the sample of sixth and seventh grade students and stacking the data, first I test whether
teachers affect achievement and course grades earned in the subsequent year (i.e., I test if a stu-
dent’s sixth grade teacher affects seventh grade course grades and if her seventh grade teacher
affects eighth grade coruse grades).19 Column (1) of Table (1.11) shows that grading standards
do not affect realized course grades in the subsequent year. This finding further supports that the
effects on contemporaneous course grades are driven by a teacher’s grading practices rather than se-
lection on unobservable student characteristics or development of noncognitive skill in the course.
Column (1) of Table (1.10) shows the negative effects of having a lenient math teacher persist over
time, affecting math achievement in the following year. ELA achievement in the following year is
not affected, which is not surprising given that grading standards do not affect contemporaneous
achievement.
Next, in column (2) of these tables, I introduce the grading standards of a student’s time t and
time t+ 1 teachers into the same regression and estimate effects on achievement and course grades
realized at time t + 1. These regressions control for student and peer characteristics at the start of
time t, Xit−1. Since grading standards do not exhibit much correlation over time within-students,
results are consistent with what we have seen earlier. Finally, in column (3) of these tables, I
include an interaction between time t and t + 1 grading standards in the same subject. It appears
that achievement and grades are not differentially affected by having a lenient grading teacher
for two consecutive years (i.e., there does not appear to be interactions between standards across
19These regressions include controls realized at the start of the grade and I estimate the reduced form rather than
by 2SLS.
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Math Teacher’s Leniency at t -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
ELA Teacher’s Leniency at t 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Math Teacher’s Leniency at t+ 1 -0.041*** -0.041***
(0.007) (0.007)
ELA Teacher’s Leniency at t+ 1 -0.002 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007)
Math Teacher’s Leniency at t 0.006
×Math Teacher’s Leniency at t+ 1 (0.005)
ELA Teacher’s Leniency at t 0.001
× ELA Teacher’s Leniency at t+ 1 (0.005)
Count 44282 44282 44282
Panel B ELA
Math Teacher’s Leniency at t -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
ELA Teacher’s Leniency at t 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Math Teacher’s Leniency at t+ 1 -0.007 -0.007
(0.005) (0.005)
ELA Teacher’s Leniency at t+ 1 -0.004 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005)
Math Teacher’s Leniency at t 0.002
×Math Teacher’s Leniency at t+ 1 (0.004)
ELA Teacher’s Leniency at t -0.005
× ELA Teacher’s Leniency at t+ 1 (0.004)
Count 44282 44282 44282
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Column
(1) regresses standardized test scores at time t+ 1 on the leniency of time t teachers, which
were estimated on the reference data set, in addition to student and peer controls Xit−1
corresponding to the time t class (student controls are listed in Table (1.1)). These are reduced
form estimates rather than 2SLS. Column (2) introduces the leniency of time t+ 1 teachers.
Column (3) includes the interaction between time t and t+ 1 standards in the same subject.
These regressions also include school-grade fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at
the school-grade level.
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Math Teacher’s Leniency at t -0.009 -0.012* -0.012*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
ELA Teacher’s Leniency at t 0.002 0.004 0.004
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Math Teacher’s Leniency at t+ 1 0.210*** 0.210***
(0.014) (0.014)
ELA Teacher’s Leniency at t+ 1 0.017 0.016
(0.010) (0.010)
Math Teacher’s Leniency at t -0.005
×Math Teacher’s Leniency at t+ 1 (0.008)
ELA Teacher’s Leniency at t 0.006
× ELA Teacher’s Leniency at t+ 1 (0.006)
Count 44282 44282 44282
Panel B ELA
Math Teacher’s Leniency at t 0.005 0.005 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
ELA Teacher’s Leniency at t -0.001 -0.005 -0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Math Teacher’s Leniency at t+ 1 0.023** 0.023**
(0.010) (0.010)
ELA Teacher’s Leniency at t+ 1 0.189*** 0.190***
(0.013) (0.013)
Math Teacher’s Leniency at t 0.004
×Math Teacher’s Leniency at t+ 1 (0.006)
ELA Teacher’s Leniency at t 0.012
× ELA Teacher’s Leniency at t+ 1 (0.008)
Count 44282 44282 44282
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Column (1)
regresses course grades at time t+1 on the leniency of time t teachers, which were estimated
on the reference data set, in addition to student and peer controls Xit−1 corresponding to
the time t class (student controls are listed in Table (1.1)). These are reduced form estimates
rather than 2SLS. Column (2) introduces the leniency of time t + 1 teachers. Column (3)
includes the interaction between time t and t+ 1 standards in the same subject. Git denotes
course grades, where 4 refers to A, 3 to B, 2 to C, 1 to D and 0 to E/F. These regressions also




In this study, I determine the rigor of a teacher’s standards by estimating a grade assignment
function, or the extent to which a teacher’s assigned grades are higher or lower than would be
expected given the academic performance of a student and her peers. I use up to seven school
years of data to estimate each teacher’s standards and use an instrumental variables approach to
account for measurement error and to guard against standards adapting to a class. Additionally, I
use school-grade fixed-effects and control for a rich set of predetermined student and peer charac-
teristics in all regressions to account for nonrandom matching of students to teachers. First, I find
that harder grading standards in middle school positively affect student achievement in math, yet I
do not find effects in ELA. These results are robust to more conservative approaches that account
for selection on fixed unobservables and “falsification tests” further support that these results are
driven by the teacher rather than a student’s unobserved characteristics or their academic track.
Given that from 1990 to 2009 average high school GPAs in the United States have increased by
about 13% in all subjects (Nord et al. 2011) and there is mixed evidence of grade inflation among
colleges (Rojstaczer and Healy 2012; Pattison, Grodsky, and Muller 2013), evidence that lenient
grading standards negatively affect student achievement is concerning. Perhaps these trends are
driven by an increasing pressure from students and parents to grade more leniently, as Butcher
et al. (2014) finds that more lenient teachers receive better student reviews. Another possibility
is that the lower performing students in a class benefit from more lenient standards, despite the
negative average effects in math. If this were the case, grading more leniently would shift the
distribution of learning in a class from higher to lower performing students. I test this hypothesis
but find no evidence that lower performing students benefit more from more lenient standards—
students of all abilities are affected similarly.
Second, I find that teacher-to-teacher differences in standards lead to substantial differences
in realized course grades in middle school math and ELA. Assignment to a more lenient teacher
boosts a student’s course grade in that year, but since students are no more likely to earn a high
grade in the following year, these effects on grades do not appear to be driven by what was learned
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in the class. If course grades are used for high-stakes decisions, such as tracking, then these
disparities could have inequitable effects on students. Even if grades are used only as information
by students and parents, receiving an inflated (or deflated) grade could affect later achievement
and specialization choices depending on how students respond to this information. For instance,
grading leniently may improve confidence beyond what is learned. The next chapter explores
whether differences in grading standards between teachers have long-term effects on students not
captured by achievement.
Data limitations in this study highlight worthwhile areas to explore in future research. First,
while I find that harder standards have robust positive effects on student reported homework time,
I do not observe the specific reasons why some teachers award higher grades than others. Perhaps
some of the more lenient teachers are rewarding students more for effort and participation than for
performance, while others are simply not challenging students. This heterogeneity could be im-
portant for understanding the effects of standards on students, and may even explain why teachers
are so divided on the effects of grading standards, and even whether to grade students at all.20 Yet,
on their own, these findings have important implications for concerns about grade inflation and
disparities in grading standards among teachers.




THE EFFECTS OF TEACHER GRADING STANDARDS ON SUBSEQUENT COURSE
SELECTION, COLLEGE MAJOR INTERESTS AND ACHIEVEMENT
2.1 Introduction
Course grades are not necessarily aligned with standardized test scores and are known to pre-
dict future outcomes, such as college enrollment, even when standardized test scores are controlled
for (Cornwell, Mustard, and Van Parys 2013; Jacob 2002). This fact suggests that grades capture
valuable information about an individual that standardized test scores fail to capture. Yet, differ-
ences in grading standards among teachers make grades less informative, may unfairly reward or
penalize students when grades are used in high-stakes decisions, like class assignment, and may
distort a student’s perception of their own ability. In this study, I explore whether the rigor of mid-
dle school teachers’ grading standards have long-term effects on high school through the student’s
course selection, achievement or college major interests.
Possible effects on students derive from the functions of grades. First, grades provide feedback
to students and are used by parents to judge their child’s performance. Second, grades are a cur-
rency: Beginning early in one’s schooling, school staff use grades to advise course placement, and
grade requirements are built into the tracking policy of many schools (Austin and McCann 1992;
Kelly and Price 2011). Later on, college admissions offices and employers rely, in part, on the
information conveyed by grades even though they have little information about the standards by
which the grades were assigned. Given these two functions, asymmetric information about differ-
ences in standards may allow students to benefit from inflated grades beyond what is learned, or
may affect subsequent human capital investments through beliefs about own ability. Despite the
negative attention that grade inflation receives, there is little causal evidence that shows adverse or
inequitable effects on students through these channels.1
To study the effects of standards on student outcomes, I rely on longitudinal administrative
records on all North Carolina public school students. My analysis focuses on one cohort of stu-
dents that I follow from grades three to twelve, and I use the information on teachers in up to
six additional school years to measure standards. I observe student course-taking in addition to a
rich set of student characteristics that include standardized test scores and teacher-assigned course
grades.2 The data also include a broad set of high school outcomes and interests, which allow
me to test whether standards in middle school have long-lasting effects. The primary outcomes
I consider are Advanced Placement (AP) course-taking, GPA, ACT scores and students’ plans
to attend college. In addition, the ACT Interest Inventory (ACT 2014; Cunningham, Hoyer, and
Sparks 2016; Radunzel, Mattern, and Westrick 2016) includes measures of college major interest.
Because of the emphasis on Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM) course-taking, I
break course-taking and college major interest into STEM and Non-STEM groupings. Increasing
the number of STEM graduates is viewed by many policy makers as critical to maintaining eco-
nomic growth (Olson and Riordan 2012), and math and science grades may be a way that students
assess their capacity for STEM courses.
Chapter One provided evidence that teacher-to-teacher differences in standards lead to sub-
stantial differences in realized course grades in middle school math and ELA, yet students did not
appear to learn more with a lenient teacher. Here, I extend the estimation approach from Chapter
One and test whether being assigned to more lenient teachers in grades six to eight affect the high
school outcomes described earlier. I estimate the effects of teachers separately by grade, for each
of grades six to eight. I also test whether being consistently assigned to more lenient teachers in
1There are a few exceptions: Policy changes to grading standards at Cornell University and Wellesley College
provide convincing evidence that lenient standards attract more students to a given course or major (Bar, Kadiyali,
and Zussman 2009; Butcher et al. 2014). This response speaks more to students’ preferences for earning high grades.
Additionally, Diamond and Persson (2016) show that students benefit from lenient grading (or teacher discretion) of
high-stakes standardized exams in Sweden. This provides compelling evidence that grades themselves can matter
beyond what is learned and motivates exploring a similar mechanism in a lower-stakes setting.
2I also observe a teacher’s judgments of a student’s mastery of material, a student’s race/ethnicity, English Lan-
guage Learner Status, economically disadvantaged student status, gifted status, and disability status
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grades six to eight matters differently than having lenient teachers for just one school year. Lenient
standards could affect high school outcomes through what is learned, or through inflated course
grades. I show robustness to including measured teacher quality (value-added) in these regressions
to distinguish between effects driven by inflated grades and learning.
First, I find that a student’s GPA in grades six to eight is a statistically significant predictor
of each of these high school outcomes, even when standardized test scores are controlled for.
This demonstrates that grades contain valuable information which is relevant to the outcomes of
interest. Given that students earn substantially higher course grades when assigned to more lenient
teachers, it would not be surprising if school decision-makers or students themselves responded to
the misinformation in these grades. Yet, I do not find consistent evidence that students benefit from
lenient standards in the future, or become more interested in related subjects/majors. These results
are consistent when I estimate the effects of teachers’ standards grade-by-grade (in 6th through 8th
grade) or the effects of average leniency from grades six to eight.
This study makes a few contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to a handful of studies
on the long-term effects of grading standards prior to college. First, Betts and Grogger (2003)
estimate the effects of high school grading standards on student achievement, later educational
attainment and entry-level earnings, finding positive effects of harder standards on test scores but
mixed evidence on other outcomes. I estimate the long-term effects of teacher grading standards
rather than school grading standards and estimate the effects within-schools. These differences
allow me to account for selection into schools and unobserved differences in inputs or amenities
between schools.3
Diamond and Persson (2016) study the long-term effects of grading standards, albeit in a dif-
ferent context than I consider. The authors find that when teachers in Sweden use discretion to
increase a student’s score on high-stakes math tests, this leads to substantial long-term educational
and earnings benefits beyond what is learned. Discretionary grading in math causes students to
3Since Betts and Grogger (2003) match students across high schools, these results potentially confound the effects
of standards with other unobserved student characteristics and school inputs that vary between schools.
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perform better in other subjects as well as math, suggesting that students use grades to inform fu-
ture decisions, and/or benefit from inflated grades. Our results may differ for many reasons, such
as the degree to which grades are used in high-stakes decisions in these settings.
Other work documents the importance of course grades for predicting outcomes even after con-
trolling for standardized test scores (Cornwell et al. 2013; Jacob 2002). Complementing this work,
I similarly find that course grades are important for predicting outcomes even when controlling for
standardized test scores. I also demonstrate that differences in grading standards among teachers
exist yet do not affect long-term outcomes in a meaningful way. These findings support the use of
middle school grades as feedback in combination with standardized test scores.
2.2 Data
To study the effects of standards, I rely on administrative records on all North Carolina public
school students from the North Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC). The data
follow both students and teachers over time, and links students to their classrooms and teachers by
subject. My analysis focuses on one cohort of students from grades three to twelve (through the
2006-07 to 2015-16 school years) for which I observe a rich set of high school outcomes. These
students’ teachers are observed over seven school years.
Advantages of these data include the detailed information on course-taking and on students.
Student characteristics, such as economically disadvantaged student status (EDS), race/ethnicity,
English language learner status (ELL), gifted status, and disability status are helpful for dealing
with selection into courses. Math and ELA courses in grades three to eight are aligned with stan-
dardized test scores: End of Grade (EOG) tests taken in the spring, towards the end of each school
year.
At the time of the EOG, teachers also report anticipated course grades and judgments of each
student’s mastery of the material in math and ELA. Course grades are anticipated because grades
are typically not finalized at the time of the EOG, yet these measures serve as useful proxies of the
final grade a student receives. Because I use course grades reported before grades are finalized,
this introduces classical measurement error. Thus, when course grades are used as a dependent
variable in a regression, which is their main role throughout this paper, estimates are noisier yet
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unbiased. When course grades are used as an independent variable, estimates are biased towards
zero. Later on, I present evidence that anticipated course grades are strongly associated with GPA
from high school transcripts, among other high school outcomes (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3). I will
refer to ‘anticipated course grades’ as simply ‘course grades’ throughout the rest of this paper.
Additionally, I observe standardized test scores, course grades and teacher judgments for sci-
ence in 8th grade.4 As a result, the long-run analysis includes science grading standards in grade 8
only.
Long-Run Outcomes: To test whether middle school teachers’ standards have long-term ef-
fects, I rely on a number of different high school outcomes. Because inflated grades may cause
students to invest more in their schooling, I test for effects on ACT composite scores, weighted
GPA upon graduation from high school, and whether students plan to attend a four-year college
upon graduation. I also consider whether inflated grades affect outcomes and interests in related
subjects/college majors. The subject-specific outcomes I consider are Advanced Placement (AP)
course-taking throughout high school, and college major/occupation interest in 11th grade. In-
creasing the number of STEM graduates is viewed by many policy makers as critical to maintain-
ing economic growth (PCAST, 2012), and math and science grades may be a way that students
assess their capacity for STEM courses. Because of the interest in STEM course-taking, I break
course-taking and college major interest into STEM and Non-STEM groupings. I test two types
of measures: whether students take at least one course in a STEM area, and the share of each
student’s overall AP course-load that is made up of STEM courses.5
Students’ expressed and measured interests in STEM come from the ACT questionaire. For
the cohort I consider, all students were required to take the ACT in high school during 11th grade.
I follow earlier work by the ACT in constructing expressed and measured interests in STEM (ACT
4Science is only tested in grades 5 and 8 in North Carolina.
5Courses included as STEM were AP Biology, Chemistry, Calculus AB, Calculus BC, Statistics, Environmental
Science, Any Physics Course and Computer Science. Non-STEM includes all other AP courses, including History
Courses, Government, English Courses, Psychology, Foreign Languages, Art Courses and Economics. Economics is
the only controversial categorization, and less than 550 students in the final regression sample took an AP Economics
course.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: High School Outcomes
Mean SD Min Max Count
Plans to Attend 4-Year College 0.568 0.495 0.000 1.000 15808
Std. ACT Composite 0.324 0.904 -2.593 3.373 16086
GPA Weighted 3.542 0.850 1.033 5.410 11854
Take any AP Course 0.421 0.494 0.000 1.000 16313
Takes an AP STEM Course 0.268 0.443 0.000 1.000 16313
Takes an AP Non-STEM Course 0.368 0.482 0.000 1.000 16313
AP STEM Share 0.343 0.336 0.000 1.000 6874
Expressed STEM Interest 0.432 0.495 0.000 1.000 14065
Expressed Non-STEM Interest 0.509 0.500 0.000 1.000 14065
Measured STEM Interest 0.250 0.433 0.000 1.000 15123
Expressed and Measured STEM
Interest
0.175 0.380 0.000 1.000 14065
Notes: This table summarizes the high school outcomes observed for the research sample, after
sample restrictions described in this paper. ACT scores are divided by the cohort mean and divided
by the standard deviation prior to sample restrictions.
2014; Cunningham et al. 2016; Radunzel et al. 2016). Expressed interest in STEM comes from stu-
dents’ planned college major or occupation, chosen from one of 294 possibilities listed on the ACT.
I rely on STEM groupings from ACT (2014), which first assigns a subset of majors/occupations
to finer STEM groupings of Science, Computer Science and Mathematics, Medical and Health,
and Engineering and Technology, that together make up a broader STEM category. Assignment of
majors and occupations to these groups was performed by an expert panel of ACT staff members
and was informed by three sources: (1) STEM-designated occupations from the US Bureau of La-
bor Statistics (BLS), (2) STEM-designated degree programs from US Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), and (3) a quantitative approach outlined in Cunningham et al. (2016).
Measured interest in STEM comes from the ACT Interest Inventory Scores. As explained in
Radunzel et al. (2016),
Students indicate whether they like, dislike, or are indifferent to 72 common activities
related to four basic work tasks: data, ideas, people and things. Examples of activities
include: explore a science museum, make charts or graphs, conduct a meeting, teach
people a new hobby. Based on student responses to these items, six interest inventory
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standard scores are calculated. These six scores correspond to six interest types in
Holland’s theory of careers (ACT 2009; Holland 2009). The six ACT Interest Inven-
tory scales (and the corresponding Holland type) are Technical (Realistic), Science and
Technology (Investigative), Arts (Artistic), Social Service (Social), Business Admin-
istration and Sales (Enterprising), and Business Operations (Conventional). Internal
consistency estimates of reliabilities of the ACT Interest Inventory standard scores
range from 0.84 to 0.91 across the scales.
Radunzel et al. (2016) find that students with both expressed and measured interests in high school
were more likely to persist in and complete a STEM degree in college after accounting for aca-
demic preparation and demographic characteristics. I rely on these measures of STEM interest to
test whether teachers’ standards in middle school affect interest in related areas.
Sample Restrictions: I make a number of sample restrictions before estimating the effects of
standards on test scores in middle school. I restrict the research sample to students observed at least
from grades five through eight, with non-missing standards in each grade and subject. As opposed
to the previous chapter, 8th grade science in now included in this sample restriction. Furthermore,
I restrict the sample to students who were never retained in these grades. Missing measures of
standards arise for two reasons: First, while most students merge to the course membership file, I
cannot always assign students to a unique teacher and class for each subject. To avoid attributing
standards to the wrong teacher, I treat standards as missing when a student does not have a unique
teacher and class by subject. Second, I do not always observe teachers for multiple school years,
and my estimation strategy requires at least two school years of data per teacher. As a result, I
must exclude students with teachers who are observed only one school year.
Table (2.1) summarizes the long-run sample. We see that about 57 percent of students plan
to attend a four-year college and that 42 percent end up taking an AP course in high school. Yet,
10 percent fewer students take an AP STEM course than an AP Non-STEM course. Whether this
statistic is driven by preparation for STEM, preferences for STEM or factors on the supply-side
is unclear. These trends roughly mirror college major interest in 11th grade, with 43 percent of
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students expressing interest in a STEM college major and 51 percent a Non-STEM college major.
While a substantial portion of the research sample expressed interest in a STEM college major,
only 25 percent of students were measured as having interest in STEM based on the ACT Interest
Inventory.
2.3 Theoretical Model
The goal of this section is to explain some ways in which a teacher’s grading standards can af-
fect long-term student outcomes without affecting learning. These effects are generated by asym-
metric information about standards. Any uncertainty about standards and own ability can distort
a student’s beliefs about own ability. For decision makers relying on grades for high-stakes deci-
sions, uncertainty about standards allows more lenient standards to have positive signaling effects.
Prior to introducing some examples, I define some notation.
Achievement Production The achievement produced yi is determined by a student i’s effort
choice ei and fixed ability ai. That is, yi = y(ai, ei) + εi.
The achievement production function is increasing in ability and effort, and I assume this func-
tion to be supermodular. Hence, ability can affect achievement directly and also through the returns
to effort. Mean zero shocks εi introduce uncertainty so that students do not know their achievement
with certainty when choosing effort.
Grade Concerns Suppose the grade that a student receives gi is a function of achievement,
but a teacher’s standards determine the mapping of achievement to grades. I denote a teacher j’s
standards as grade criterions sj ≡ (sjA, sjB, sjC , sjD) such that
gi = A if {sjA ≤ yi},
gi = B if {sjB ≤ yi < sjA},
gi = C if {sjC ≤ yi < sjB},
gi = D if {sjD ≤ yi < sjC},
gi = F if {yi < sjD}. (2.1)
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This function allows for a teacher to determine cutoffs for which levels of achievement are awarded
with letter grades (i.e., A through F). Two students with the same achievement can earn different
course grades depending on the standards of their teacher.
Signaling Suppose that a school principal wants to group students with high achievement into
one course and low achievement into another course. Assuming that the principal cannot observe
achievement directly, the principal forms expectations of achievement conditional on math course
grades and beliefs about the teacher’s standards
E(yi|gi, sj).
If principals have no knowledge of standards, then E(yi|gi, sj) = E(yi|gi). But we know from
earlier results that standards affect the mapping of grades to achievement, which allows the teachers
standards to distort the principal’s beliefs about their students’ achievement. Even if a principal
has partial information about sj , as long as the principal underestimates how lenient standards are,
then there can be positive signaling effects that result from inflated course grades.
Self-Signaling Students themselves may have uncertainty about their own abilities and/or
achievement and may use grades to learn about their strengths and weaknesses. Beliefs about
ability are important because they affect human capital investments (i.e., effort and plans to at-
tend college), and specialization choices. Students observe their effort and course grade from the
prior year, and form expectations about their own ability based on their beliefs about the teacher’s
standards
E(ai|gi,t−1, ei,t−1, sj,t−1).
Since students are in the class each day, they are likely to have more information about stan-
dards such that E(ai|gi,t−1, ei,t−1, sj,t−1) 6= E(ai|gi,t−1, ei,t−1). But it is realistic that students may
not quite know how lenient standards are. If a student underestimates how lenient the teacher’s
standards are, then the student may confound lenient standards with having higher ability.
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2.4 Estimation
This section describes my empirical strategy for estimation of how teachers’ grading standards
in grades six to eight affect students’ high school outcomes and interests. Many estimation details
such as measurement of grading standards and accounting for nonrandom matching of students to
teachers are described in Chapter One. Here, I briefly review some notation and discuss extending
the estimation approach from Chapter One to study long-term effects of middle school on high
school.
2.4.1 Long-Term Effects
My analysis focuses on one cohort of students I follow from grades three to twelve, which I
call the cohort data set. I focus on the grading standards of these students’ teachers in grades six to
eight in particular. I use another data set on these students’ teachers in up to six other school years
to measure grading standards, which I call the reference data set. Beginning with the cohort data
set, each student i attends a school h = h(i, t) and is assigned to a classroom c = c(i, t) in school
year t. Let j = j(i, c(i, t)) denote student i’s teacher in year t. Because the cohort data does
not include retained students, notation for a student’s grade g = g(i, t) is redundant. However,
separate notation for the grade is helpful for descriptive purposes.
A teacher’s grading standards, sjg−t, is the average leniency of a teacher’s mapping of achieve-
ment to course grades relative to other teachers, measured on the reference data set. As described
in Chapter One, the “-t” subscript indicates that standards are measured with students other than
those included in these regressions.
Let Li denote a given high school outcome listed in Table (2.1) (e.g., whether the student plans
to attend a four-year college). We may expect to see the largest effect of 8th grade teachers on
high school outcomes, given that they are the most recent “treatment” prior to high school. Yet, if
lenient grading teachers affect high school outcomes solely through course grades then all teachers
in grades six to eight can affect a student’s grade history and thus her perceptions of her own ability
or others’ perceptions of her ability. In separate regressions by grade (e.g., grades 6, 7 or 8), I begin
by regressing Li on the leniency of a student’s teachers in that grade;
49
Li = γ0 + ŝjg−tγS +Xit−1γX + γhg + εi for g=6,7,8 (2.2)
where ŝjg−t is written in bold because it includes the standards of i’s grade g math and ELA
teacher, and also science in 8th grade. I also control for Xit−1, which includes lagged student
characteristics and averages over i’s classroom peers’ prior achievement and course grades. See
Appendix Table (B1) for a list of student characteristics observed in the data.6 School-grade fixed-
effects γhg are included to account for unobserved differences in inputs or student composition that
may vary between schools.
Including standards from multiple subjects in the same equation may be important for two
reasons. First, one of the main channels through which I expect standards to affect Li is through
realized course grades Git. This grade inflation (or deflation) generates the signaling and/or self-
signaling effects explained in Section 2.3. For either channel, relative grades may affect students’
outcomes, especially for students on the margin of pursiung STEM and Non-STEM fields. Receiv-
ing a higher course grade in one subject can affect outcomes and interests related to all subjects. For
instance, harder standards in math lead to lower math grades, which could hurt a student’s chances
of being placed in an advanced math course, or discourage the student from pursuing STEM areas
in the future through beliefs about own math ability (relative to non-math ability), because these
subjects often require strong math skills. Second, students may determine the amount of effort to
invest in one subject depending on the opportunity cost of that time — which depends in part on the
marginal returns to that effort in other subjects. Thus, a student’s optimization problem motivates
allowing for subject-spillovers in the estimating equations.
Separating Grading Standards from Learning As we saw in Chapter One, lenient grading
standards positively affect realized course grades yet also can affect what is learned in a class. To
better isolate the effects of standards through grades from the effects through learning, I construct
a value-added measure of teacher quality and include it in these long-term regression models.
6Regressions control for the same lagged student characteristics described in Chapter One.
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Teacher value-added is constructed in a few steps: First, I estimate the effect of initial student and
peer characteristicsXit−1 on student achievement Yit using the reference data set.
Yit = Xit−1α̃
′
X + ψjg + εit. (2.3)
Equation (2.3) is estimated with teacher-grade fixed-effects ψjg because observable student
and peer characteristics may be correlated with the unobserved teacher effect. Next, I construct test
scores in both the cohort and reference data set which are adjusted for the observed (predetermined)
characteristics of a student and her classroom peers i.e.,
Ŷit ≡ Yit −Xit−1α̃
′
X . (2.4)
Third, I average these residualized test scores Ŷit at the teacher-grade level separately in the













Averages of these residualized test scores, q̂jg−t, from the reference data is what I refer to
as teacher value-added. Studies have shown that teachers with higher value-added have a large
positive impact on test scores, the probability of attending college and future salaries and decrease
the probability of having a child as a teenager (Chetty et al. 2014a; Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff
2014c).














i for g=6,7,8. (2.7)
The parameter estimate of γS indicates whether students benefit from, or are influenced by, more
lenient standards while accounting for measured teacher quality.7
Aggregate Effects of Grading Standards Perhaps the effect of one lenient teacher is small,
yet the effects of consistently getting assigned to lenient teachers are large. For example, a student
receiving an inflated math grade in one school year may not necessarily finish with an inflated
math GPA from grades six to eight. Chapter One showed that grading standards are not highly
correlated over time within-students. Thus, I calculate the average leniency of a student’s math,


























where I have controlled for student and peer characteristics that are predetermined in 6th grade and
the value-added of each teacher a student is assigned to throughout grades six to eight.8
2.5 Effects of Grading Standards in Middle School on High School Outcomes
First, this section demonstrates that early course grades predict a student’s course selection,
achievement and college major interests measured in high school. Then, I explore whether hav-
ing more lenient grading math, science and ELA teachers in grades six to eight affect these same
7I have also considered models that control for end of 8th grade test scores Yit instead of q̂jt and results are similar.
Another interesting specification is instrumenting for Git with ŝjg−t, which more directly gets at standards affecting
Li through course grades. Yet, with either specification the main source of variation identifying γ
′
S is Cov(Li, ŝjg−t),
the difference being the first-stage we divide by. Results end up being very similar.
8An alternative way to get at the effects of consistently having lenient grading teachers is to include interactions
between grading standards across years and subjects. I found that this approach is harder to interpret and to present.
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outomes. As explained in Section 2.3, receiving an inflated grade may unfairly reward students
when grades are used in high-stakes decisions, like class assignment, and may distort a student’s
perception of their own ability. Grading standards may also have long-term effects through con-
temporaneous learning, which I account for using students’ scores on state-wide exams.
2.5.1 Do Course Grades Predict Outcomes Conditional on Test Scores?
Tables (2.2) and (2.3) show that a student’s math, ELA and science GPA from grades six to
eight predict many important high school outcomes, even while conditioning on all of a student’s
scores on state-wide exams during these grades. These outcomes include a student’s AP course
selection, achievement and college major interests measured in high school and are summarized in
Table (2.1).
Specifically, I regress each high school outcome on a student’s subject-specific GPA from
grades six to eight, while controlling for each standardized test score observed during these grades.
Additionally, these regressions include 8th grade fixed-effects to account for possible differences
in grading between schools.9 We see that math, ELA and science GPAs jointly predict each out-
come and p-values from F-tests are all 0.000. We also see that early GPA explains a considerable
amount of the variation for some of these outcomes. I report the change in the adjusted R2 from
the same regression with and without including GPA. Early GPA explains an additional 5 percent
of the variation in plans to attend college, and 19 percent of the variation in high school GPA. For
other outcomes, grades explain a smaller portion of the variation (i.e., grades explain an additional
1 percent of ACT composite scores).
Given that early grades predict these high school outcomes, it would not be surprising if schools
were to use this information to judge student ability or if students were to use this information to
judge their own ability. Thus, receiving an inflated or deflated grade could have a causal effect on
these outcomes as well. Correlations between STEM-related outcomes in high school and early
math and science outcomes support the decision to divide outcomes by subject. For example,
9 Anticipated Grade of 4 refers to A, 3 to B, 2 to C, 1 to D and 0 to E/F. These course grades are converted into
GPA units on a 4.0 scale and then averaged within-subject to form GPA. Note that a student’s science course grade is
only observed in grade 8.
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Average GPAs 0.069*** 0.259*** 0.027** 0.041*** 0.045***
Math 6th to 8th (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008)
ELA 6th to 8th 0.131*** 0.336*** 0.130*** 0.121*** 0.067***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
Science 8th 0.045*** 0.161*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.033***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Yi8 Math 0.052*** 0.154*** 0.149*** 0.048*** 0.072***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Yi8 ELA 0.022*** 0.048*** 0.138*** 0.022*** 0.007
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Yi8 Science -0.025*** 0.032*** 0.116*** 0.009* 0.026***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Yi7 Math 0.025*** 0.051*** 0.102*** 0.033*** 0.048***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
Yi7 ELA 0.013** 0.011 0.057*** 0.017*** -0.006
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Yi6 Math -0.023*** -0.023** 0.062*** 0.010* 0.020***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Yi6 ELA 0.026*** 0.018** 0.108*** 0.021*** 0.003
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Count 15808 11854 16086 16313 16313
P value (Joint Sig.
Grades)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
P value (Joint Sig.
Test Scores)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ch. Adj. R2 Due
to Grades
0.056 0.190 0.013 0.044 0.025
Notes: Different outcomes realized during high school are regressed on a student’s math and ELA
GPA from grades six to eight, and science GPA from grade eight. These regressions also condition
on each EOG test score observed from grades six to eight and include school fixed-effects. P
values from separate joint significance tests on GPA and test scores are reported. I also report
the change in the adjusted R2 from introducing controls for grades in addition to test scores (i.e.,
how much additional variation in a given high school outcome do grades explain?) These high
school outcomes include (1) Whether a student plans to attend a four year college, (2) a student’s
weighted high school GPA upon graduation, (3) ACT Composite Scores, standardized to be mean
zero and standard deviation one in the full sample, (4) Whether a student takes at least one AP
course and (5) Whether a student takes at least one AP STEM course.
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Average GPAs 0.024*** 0.062*** 0.037*** 0.014* 0.020***
Math 6th to 8th (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
ELA 6th to 8th 0.122*** -0.041*** 0.005 -0.004 0.006
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
Science 8th 0.041*** 0.013* 0.017** 0.018*** 0.015***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Yi8 Math 0.036*** 0.051*** 0.038*** -0.003 0.006
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Yi8 ELA 0.031*** -0.030*** -0.021*** -0.001 0.002
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Yi8 Science 0.003 0.033*** 0.039*** 0.083*** 0.061***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Yi7 Math 0.016** 0.058*** 0.023*** 0.001 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Yi7 ELA 0.020*** -0.029*** -0.022*** -0.010* -0.013**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Yi6 Math 0.006 0.026*** 0.002 -0.019*** -0.013**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
Yi6 ELA 0.031*** -0.040*** -0.029*** -0.000 -0.005
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Count 16313 6874 14065 15123 14065
P value (Joint Sig.
Grades)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
P value (Joint Sig.
Test Scores)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ch. Adj. R2 Due
to Grades
0.039 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.002
Notes: Different outcomes realized during high school are regressed on a student’s math and ELA
GPA from grades six to eight, and science GPA from grade 8. These regressions also condition
on each EOG test score observed from grades six to eight and include school fixed-effects. P
values from separate joint significance tests on GPA and test scores are reported. I also report the
change in the adjusted R2 from introducing controls for grades in addition to test scores (i.e., how
much additional variation in a given high school outcome do grades explain?) These high school
outcomes include (1) Whether a student takes at least one AP Non-STEM course, (2) Share of AP
courses which are STEM, given that a student takes at least one AP course, (3) Whether a student
has an expressed interest in choosing a STEM college major, (4) Whether a student has a measured
interest in choosing a STEM college major and (5) Whether a student has both an expressed and
measured interest in choosing a STEM college major.
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students scoring higher on the state-wide exam and/or receive higher course grades in math and
science are much more likely to take a larger share of AP STEM courses and express interest in
STEM college majors.
2.5.2 Do Lenient Grading Teachers Affect Long-term Outcomes?
Next, I test whether students benefit from (or are influenced by) their teachers’ leniency in
math, science and ELA. Specifically, I test whether students become more interested in related
subjects/majors, or end up taking more advanced courses in related areas. I also test for general ef-
fects of lenient standards on students’ high school GPA, plans to attend college, or ACT Composite
scores, presumably through a student’s confidence.
Given that 8th grade course grades are the most recent feedback students receive prior to high
school, I begin by estimating the effects of 8th grade teachers’ leniency on high school outcomes.
Specifically, I estimate equation (2.2) which includes the grading standards of a student’s 8th grade
math, science and ELA teacher in the same regression and controls for all predetermined student
and peer characteristics observed in the data at the start of 8th grade. These regressions also include
school-grade fixed-effects. I estimate separate regressions for different high school outcomes of
interest.
Columns (1) to (4) of Table (2.4) consider the effects on general outcomes, including students’
high school weighted GPA, ACT Composite scores, whether a student takes at least one Advanced
Placement (AP) course in high school and plans to attend a four year college. There is no evidence
to support that lenient standards positively affect these outcomes. Columns (5) to (10) consider the
effects on STEM and Non-STEM course-taking and college major interests. While I hypothesized
that more lenient math and science standards would positively affect STEM course-taking and col-
lege major interest through the higher grades earned, the results do not seeem to support this. There
is a positive correlation between math leniency and the share of AP STEM courses a student takes
in high school, yet this result is not robust to including teacher value-added, which I detail shortly.
More lenient science standards are negatively correlated with expressed STEM interest, which is
surprising. Perhaps lenient standards may be associated with other teacher characteristics such as
less challenging/engaging instruction, yet I can only speculate on this given what is observed in
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the data.
As mentioned, students assigned to a more lenient teacher earn higher course grades, yet may
also learn less. In order to isolate the long-term effects of a teacher through grades, I include
controls for teacher value-added in Table (2.5), following equation (2.7). We see that the positive
correlations between lenient math standards and STEM course-taking are not robust while other
results remain similar. Altogether, there is little evidence to support that lenient standards positively
affect long-term student achievement or interest.
Given that students are assigned to many different teachers prior to high school and earn many
different course grades, Appendix Tables (B2) and (B4) separately estimate the effects of 6th and
7th grade teachers on high school outcomes. Additionally, Appendix Tables (B3) and (B5) intro-
duce teacher value-added from these grades. For the most part, results are similarly null. The only
evidence that grading standards matter after conditioning on teacher value-added occurs in grade
6. Students assigned to a more lenient 6th grade math teacher are less likely to express interest in
a STEM college major during high school. Similar to the previous results, there is little evidence
to support that lenient standards positively affect long-term student achievement or interest.
Previous results explore the long-term effect of teachers, grade-by-grade. Next, I test whether
the average leniency of teachers in grades six to eight affect these outcomes. First, I calculate the
average leniency of a student’s assigned teachers in grades six to eight, separately by math and
ELA. Then, I test whether the average leniency of these teachers and a student’s 8th grade science
teacher affects long-term outcomes.10 Specifically, I estimate equation (2.8) which controls for
student characteristics realized prior to 6th grade and 6th grade peer (initial) characteristics. Results
in Table (2.6) show that the average leniency of a student’s math teachers negatively affects plans
to attend college, high school GPA and ACT Composite score. Additionally, we see that the
average leniency of a student’s ELA teachers positively affects measured STEM interest. Finally,
I introduce controls for teacher value-added in Table (2.7) in order to isolate the effect through
course grades rather than through learning. With the exception of the negative effects on ACT
10I have only included science grading standards from 8th grade, since science course grades are not observed in
grades six or seven.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
Math Teacher’s -0.002 -0.006 -0.007 -0.001 0.001
Leniency G8 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
ELA Teacher’s 0.005 0.006 -0.003 -0.003 0.002
Leniency G8 (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Science 0.008 0.001 0.007 -0.005 -0.004
Leniency G8 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Count 15808 11854 16086 16313 16313
P value (Joint Sig.
Standards)

















(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel B
Math Teacher’s -0.003 0.013** 0.001 -0.007 -0.004
Leniency G8 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
ELA Teacher’s -0.003 0.001 0.003 0.010 0.006
Leniency G8 (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Science -0.002 -0.009 -0.028*** -0.006 -0.011*
Leniency G8 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Count 16313 6874 14065 15123 14065
P value (Joint Sig.
Standards)
0.783 0.116 0.006 0.420 0.176
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Panel A and
B correspond to different regressions that test whether 8th grade standards affect plans to attend
a four year college, weighted high school GPA, ACT composite scores, AP course-taking (both
taking at least one, and the share), expressed interest in a STEM college major and measured
interest in a college major. Following equation (2.7), I include controls for the level, square and
cubic term of prior test scores, prior course grades, prior teacher judgments and other student
characteristics listed in Appendix Table (B1). I also control for peer average prior test scores in
these subjects and peer average prior course grades. These regressions include school-grade fixed-
effects and standard errors are clustered at the school-grade level. P values are reported from joint
significance tests on all teachers’ grading standards.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
Math Teacher’s 0.004 -0.000 -0.005 0.000 0.001
Leniency G8 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
ELA Teacher’s 0.002 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0.003
Leniency G8 (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Science 0.008 -0.001 0.006 -0.006 -0.005
Leniency G8 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Math 0.019*** 0.014 0.007 0.001 -0.001
VA G8 (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
ELA -0.019*** -0.028*** -0.008 -0.007 -0.001
VA G8 (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Science -0.009 -0.017* -0.008 -0.010 -0.007
VA G8 (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
Count 15808 11854 16086 16313 16313
P value (Joint Sig.
Standards)
















(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel B
Math Teacher’s -0.002 0.012* 0.001 -0.004 -0.003
Leniency G8 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
ELA Teacher’s -0.005 0.002 0.002 0.012* 0.008
Leniency G8 (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Science -0.001 -0.010 -0.028*** -0.008 -0.013**
Leniency G8 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Math 0.004 -0.005 0.002 0.007 -0.000
VA G8 (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
ELA -0.013** 0.008 -0.004 0.010* 0.006
VA G8 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Science -0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.009 -0.005
VA G8 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Count 16313 6874 14065 15123 14065
P value (Joint Sig.
Standards)
0.733 0.170 0.011 0.254 0.094
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. These regressions
follow Table (2.4) but additionally include controls for teacher quality (value-added). P values are
reported from joint significance tests on all teachers’ grading standards.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
Avg. Math -0.020** -0.039** -0.040*** -0.017* -0.014*
Leniency (0.009) (0.016) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008)
Avg. ELA 0.005 0.018 0.002 -0.004 0.008
Leniency (0.010) (0.016) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008)
Science 0.007 0.002 0.004 -0.004 -0.003
Leniency G8 (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005)
Count 15808 11854 16086 16313 16313
P value (Joint Sig.
Standards)

















(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel B
Avg. Math -0.012 -0.004 -0.016 -0.004 -0.007
Leniency (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
Avg. ELA -0.003 0.016 0.014 0.023*** 0.019**
Leniency (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Science -0.001 -0.010 -0.025*** -0.004 -0.007
Leniency G8 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Count 16313 6874 14065 15123 14065
P value (Joint Sig.
Standards)
0.589 0.291 0.003 0.068 0.098
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Panel A and B
correspond to different regressions that test whether the average leniency of math, ELA and science
teachers in grades 6 to 8 affect plans to attend a four year college, weighted high school GPA, ACT
composite scores, AP course-taking (both taking at least one, and the share), expressed interest in a
STEM college major and measured interest in a college major. Science leniency is only observed
in grade 8. Following equation (2.8), I include controls for the level, square and cubic term of
5th grade test scores, course grades, teacher judgments and other student characteristics listed in
Appendix Table (B1). I also control for peer average prior test scores and peer average prior course
grades at the start of 6th grade. These regressions include school-grade fixed-effects and standard
errors are clustered at the school-grade level. P values are reported from joint significance tests on
all teachers’ grading standards.
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Table 2.7: Effects of Average Standards in Grades 6 to 8 on High School Outcomes Accounting












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
Avg. Math -0.012 -0.023 -0.027** -0.014 -0.008
Leniency (0.010) (0.017) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009)
Avg. ELA 0.004 0.020 0.005 -0.003 0.010
Leniency (0.010) (0.017) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009)
Science 0.007 -0.001 0.003 -0.006 -0.005
Leniency G8 (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Controls for
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Teachers’ VA
Count 15808 11854 16086 16313 16313
P value (Joint Sig.
Standards)

















(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel B
Avg. Math -0.010 0.001 -0.014 -0.001 -0.005
Leniency (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
Avg. ELA -0.003 0.017 0.013 0.027*** 0.021**
Leniency (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Science -0.001 -0.012* -0.024*** -0.005 -0.008
Leniency G8 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Controls for
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Teachers’ VA
Count 16313 6874 14065 15123 14065
P value (Joint Sig.
Standards)
0.731 0.223 0.007 0.022 0.061
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. These regressions
follow Table (2.6) but additionally include controls for teacher quality (value-added). To more
flexibly allow teacher value-added in different grades and subjects to affect high school outcomes,
I have included each teacher-grade-subject value-added observed in grades six to eight separately.
P values are reported from joint significance tests on all teachers’ grading standards.
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Composite scores, previous effects on general outcomes are not robust The negative effects on
measured STEM interest are robust. Based on the sign of these effects, there is little evidence to
support that lenient standards positively affect long-term student achievement or interest.
2.6 Conclusions
In Chapter One, I found that teacher-to-teacher differences in standards lead to substantial
differences in realized course grades in middle school math, ELA and science, which does not
appear to be driven by teacher quality. If course grades are used for high-stakes decisions, such
as tracking, then these disparities could have inequitable effects on students. Even if grades are
used only as information by students and parents, receiving an inflated (or deflated) grade could
affect later achievement and specialization choices depending on how students respond to this
information. For instance, grading leniently may improve confidence beyond what is learned.
Thus, in this study I test whether lenient standards in middle school math, science or ELA have
lasting effects on high school through the student’s course selection, achievement or college major
interests. I do not find consistent evidence that students benefit from lenient standards in the
future, or become more interested in related subjects/majors. Specifically, I test for effects on ACT
composite scores, high school GPA, plans to attend college, Advanced Placement course-taking
(divided into STEM and Non-STEM), and college major interest (divided into STEM and Non-
STEM). Based on the outcomes available, students do not appear to benefit from being assigned to
lenient grading teachers nor do they become more interested in related advanced courses or college
majors.
On their own, these findings have important implications for concerns about grade inflation and
disparities in grading standards among teachers. Data limitations in this study highlight worthwhile
areas to explore in future research. The (lack of) long-term effects may not generalize to other
outcomes, age-ranges, or to higher-stakes settings. The outcomes observed in high school are
certainly interesting measures of a student’s human capital choices and interests, but it would be
great to see how standards affect the selectivity of a student’s college or their later career choices.
While this study explores teacher-to-teacher differences in grading standards within schools, it may
not generalize to explain the long-term effects of between-school or between-subject differences
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in grading standards. This is harder to test empirically because the standards of an institution are
more challenging to separate from all other aspects of that institution. Boleslavsky and Cotton
(2015) show, in theory, that schools may strategically adopt grading policies that do not perfectly
reveal graduate ability to evaluators. Grade inflation and strategically set grading policies are areas
that researchers should continue to monitor, particularly among high schools and colleges.
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CHAPTER 3
TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS AND CLASSROOM COMPOSITION1
3.1 Introduction
Teachers are largely understood to be the most important school-level determinant of achieve-
ment. Dating at least back to the Coleman Report of 1966, school peers have also been viewed as
a key factor. While a vast literature has contributed to significant improvements in our understand-
ing of the roles of teachers and peers (Gamoran, Secada, and Marrett 2000; Rivkin, Hanushek, and
Kain 2005; Sacerdote 2011; Epple and Romano 2010), a significant limitation of this literature is
the treatment of teachers and peers in isolation. We address this gap by studying complementar-
ities between teachers and classroom composition. The existence of complementarities has im-
portant implications for key teacher-related policies, including the importance of taking classroom
composition into account when measuring teacher effectiveness and prescribing teaching practice.
It further pushes the envelope on peer-effect-related policies beyond the often stark tradeoffs of
regrouping students to the question of better matching teachers or teaching practice to different
classroom compositions.
Why might complementarities between teachers or teaching practice and classroom composi-
tion be an important part of achievement production? One example is that the benefits of encour-
aging classroom discussion may vary depending on the heterogeneity in initial achievement of a
student’s classmates. Furthermore, teachers can play a central role in determining the nature of
classroom peer interactions. For instance, peer effects could be amplified by teaching practices
that create a positive learning environment and promote a learning dialogue among students.2
1This chapter is joint work with the following coauthors: Esteban Aucejo, Patrick Coate, Jane Fruehwirth and
Sean Kelly.
2Teaching practices not only involve the principles and methods used for instruction (e.g. class discussions vs.
recitation), but also those actions that affect the social dynamics of a given classroom (e.g. classroom management).
Two important barriers have hindered the exploration of complementarities between teachers
and classroom composition. First, detailed longitudinal data on teaching practices on a large scale
are relatively rare. Second, endogeneity concerns related to nonrandom allocation of teachers to
classrooms has posed significant challenges to identification. We overcome these challenges by
exploiting a unique data set—the Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) Longitudinal Database.
The key features of the data are rich information on teaching practices in a context where teachers
are randomly assigned to classrooms. Teachers are evaluated by trained raters using a research-
based protocol that is increasingly used to measure teaching effectiveness in schools nationwide,
the Framework for Teaching Evaluation Instrument (FFT) (Danielson 2011).3 For classroom com-
position, we focus on classroom peer initial achievement, the most-studied type of peer spillover
in the literature (Sacerdote 2011).
The random assignment of teachers eliminates one of the most important confounding factors
for measuring teacher effectiveness, the systematic matching of students to teachers that would
lead us to confound teachers or peer effects with unobservable teacher or peer quality. However,
even with random assignment, our identification strategy needs to address a number of remain-
ing endogeneity concerns. The first is that there is considerable non-compliance in the data. We
address this by relying on the variation generated by the randomly-assigned teacher rather than
the actual teacher. Second, classroom composition may be endogenous. We apply a result in
Bun and Harrison (2018) and Nizalova and Murtazashvili (2014) to show that the random assign-
ment of teachers to classrooms is enough to obtain consistent estimates of the complementarities
between teaching practice and classroom composition as long as students do not re-sort to class-
rooms in response to teachers, which we can test using initially-assigned classrooms.4 Third, if
teachers choose practices to maximize student achievement, the observed teaching practice could
be endogenous to the classroom composition. We address this primarily by focusing on prior year
3Kane, Taylor, Tyler, and Wooten (2011) shows the importance of this teacher evaluation protocol in an observa-
tional context.
4Balancing tests support that classroom composition is indeed random within randomization blocks and that sim-
ilar results hold when we use initially assigned classrooms, before students had an opportunity to re-sort based on
teachers.
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teaching practices, thus capturing teachers’ proclivity toward certain practices. Fourth, teaching
practice is measured with error. We exploit multiple measures of teaching practice and use factor
models to identify what aspects are separable in the data. We rely primarily on averages of multiple
measures of teaching practices to address measurement error, but show robustness to a number of
other approaches.5
We ground our empirical strategy in a simple theoretical model of student behavior, which
helps inform the structure of the estimating equations and illustrates the potential pervasiveness of
the complementarities in teaching practice and classroom composition. We show that even when
the learning production function does not directly depend on the interaction between teaching
practice and peer initial achievement, a complementarity between teachers and peers could emerge
indirectly through students’ endogenous responses to teaching practices. One such example is
when teachers with better classroom management practices make engagement less costly, and
students benefit more from their peers if they are engaged with the material.
Our main finding indicates that complementarities between classroom composition and teach-
ing practice play a key role in student achievement. More specifically, we identify two main
mechanisms that are driving this result. While certain subdomains of FFT, which we label as
classroom management practices, interact positively with average peer initial achievement; other
subdomains, which we label as challenge/student-centered practices, interact negatively with the
interquartile range of prior achievement. Moreover, FFT does not emerge as an important predic-
tor of achievement until classroom composition is taken into account. Finally, we illustrate the
importance of complementarities in determining teachers contribution for measuring teacher ef-
fectiveness through some simulations. We show that re-allocations of teachers across classrooms
within school has significant effects on measures of teachers’ contributions to learning. This points
to the need for caution particularly in implementing high-stakes policies such as those that aim to
replace the worst 5% to 10% of teachers with average teachers (Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff
5These include instrumenting contemporaneous teaching practices with prior practice and adapting the estimation
approach developed by Hausman, Newey, Ichimura, and Powell (1991) for nonlinear error in variables models to apply
to our setting, a panel model where the nonlinearity takes the form of complementarities.
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2014b; Hanushek 2011).6
The identification of the mechanisms behind our main finding is not simple given that measured
teaching practice may be correlated with some unobservable aspects of the teacher. This is an
issue that all the literature that seeks to evaluate characteristics of effective teaching shares.7 To
address this concern, we explore whether our findings are driven instead by some other correlated
teacher attribute. First, we show that after combining our teaching practices in a single specification
our key results are not economically or statistically significantly different from specifications that
include them separately. Second, we show that our results are robust to controlling for an unusually
rich set of teacher quality measures, including principal and student surveys along with a teaching
knowledge assessment.8
We make several important contributions to the literature. First, we demonstrate how failing to
capture the heterogeneity in the effectiveness of teaching practice by classroom composition leads
us to understate the importance of measures of teacher effectiveness and even, in some cases, to
infer that the practice does not matter when in fact the effects are sizable in certain classrooms.
This provides insight into why observable teacher measures may often do a poor job of capturing
teacher quality (e.g. Rivkin et al. 2005). From a policy perspective then, understanding this type
of heterogeneity is crucial for identifying what teaching practices matter and in what classroom
contexts.
Second, our research connects closely to a number of recent studies that consider heterogeneity
in teacher effectiveness by student background characteristics (Lavy 2015; Fox 2016; Konstan-
topoulos 2009).9 However, by focusing on heterogeneity by classroom composition, our work
6Section 3.7 describes how we define teacher contribution to learning.
7For instance, see Araujo, Carneiro, Cruz-Aguayo, and Schady (2016) and Taylor (2018) for discussions of this
challenge.
8Taylor (2018) also shows that different type of instructional methods play an important role on student achieve-
ment beyond just teaching skills. Although educational researchers make an important distinction between teacher
quality and teaching quality (Hamilton 2012; Kennedy 2010), we use the term “teacher” here, assuming the teacher
knowledge measures reflect relatively stable traits.
9For instance, Lavy (2015) finds larger effects of challenge/student-centered teaching for girls and low-SES stu-
dents. Connor, Morrison, and Katch (2004) show larger effects of some types of challenge/student-centered practices
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is substantively different in focus. Furthermore, we show that heterogeneity by classroom com-
position seems to be of significantly larger magnitudes than heterogeneity by a student’s prior
achievement.
Third, our study also provides useful complementary evidence to the value-added literature
which argues fairly persuasively that teachers matter (Jackson, Rockoff, and Staiger 2014; Koedel,
Mihaly, and Rockoff 2015; Rivkin et al. 2005; Chetty et al. 2014b; Rothstein 2010). Consistent
with our central hypothesis that teacher effectiveness varies with who the teacher teaches, interest-
ing recent work by Stacy, Guarino, Reckase, and Wooldridge (2013) shows that value-added esti-
mates are significantly more stable year-to-year for teachers of students with higher-initial achieve-
ment. The most closely related work is an innovative paper by Jackson (2013), which demonstrates
a significant role for match quality between teachers and schools. While the econometric issues
associated with allowing estimated teacher value-added to vary by classroom composition are also
of interest, illustrating the potential variation in teacher effectiveness using teacher evaluation pro-
tocols is a natural starting point, particularly given the increasing importance of these protocols
for schools. Another key benefit of using the protocols is to examine teacher effectiveness as a
multidimensional construct, which proves central to our analysis and is less straight-forward from
a value-added perspective.
A number of other studies have used the MET data to identify effective teachers. Already
studies from the MET project have generated important insights (Cantrell and Kane 2013). For
instance, Kane, McCaffrey, Miller, and Staiger (2013) verify that value-added metrics can be ef-
fective ways of evaluating teacher effectiveness in observational data and that multiple metrics
of teacher effectiveness, including observations of practice, further improve understanding of a
teachers’ underlying effectiveness. Mihaly, McCaffrey, Staiger, and Lockwood (2013) show that
the different metrics of teacher effectiveness (value-added, classroom observation video scores
and student survey reports) have important commonalities. Araujo et al. (2016) and Bacher-Hicks,
for children with higher initial achievement. Finally, Konstantopoulos (2009) finds somewhat larger effects of teacher
effectiveness for high-SES students.
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Chin, Kane, and Staiger (2017), in different settings, also illustrate the importance of teacher ob-
servation protocols for measuring teacher effectiveness. In the present study, we shift the emphasis
from identifying effective teachers to analyzing whether teachers who display higher skills in cer-
tain dimensions are more effective in certain types of classrooms.
Fourth, our paper also contributes to the literature on peer effects from classroom composition.
The literature has considered fairly extensively how the effects of classroom composition vary by
student background characteristics because of the important implications of this type of hetero-
geneity to tracking and desegregation policies (For instance, see Burke and Sass 2006; Fruehwirth
2013; Gibbons and Telhaj 2006; Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin 2009; Hanushek and Rivkin 2009;
Hoxby and Weingarth 2005; Lavy, Paserman, and Schlosser 2012, among others). Zimmer (2003)
and Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2011) consider heterogeneity by student prior achievement and by
whether the school tracks or not, which relates to the present study in interesting ways. A handful
of recent studies of peer effects may be driven by how the teacher adapts or targets her teaching
(Jackson 2016; Duflo et al. 2011; Lavy et al. 2012; Lee, Turner, Woo, and Kim 2014). This pa-
per relates most closely to these latter studies. By showing complementarities between classroom
composition and teaching practice, we show benefits of matching certain types of teachers with
certain classroom compositions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We first describe the data in Section 3.2, including
our measures of teaching practice. Section 3.3 presents our theoretical framework and Section 3.4
our empirical strategy. Section 3.5 presents our main findings, followed by an analysis of the possi-
ble mechanisms behind our main results in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 performs simulation exercises
that study how reallocation of teachers into classrooms affects their contribution to learning and
their relative rankings. Finally, Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Data
The Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) Longitudinal Database provides detailed infor-
mation on teaching practices, student outcomes, and classroom composition from six large urban
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public school districts in the United States over two academic years (2009-2010 and 2010-2011).10
The data are linked to district administrative records, which include detailed student information,
most importantly, current and prior measures of student achievement, but also age, race/ethnicity,
gender, special education status, free lunch eligibility, gifted status, and English language learner
status. The data also include rich measures related to teacher aptitude, such as the Content Knowl-
edge for Teaching (CKT) assessment, and school principal evaluations.11 Finally, a key aspect of
the MET data is that teachers were randomly assigned within school and grade to classrooms of
students during the second academic year of the study (2010-2011).12
We analyze students’ math performance because it has traditionally been shown to be more
malleable to school inputs. Moreover, we focus on elementary school students (grades four and
five) given that most of them are taught by general elementary teachers in self-contained class-
rooms with more concentrated exposure to the same peers and teachers.13
3.2.1 Measuring Teaching Practice
We make use of a well-known, research-based classroom observation protocol that measures
teaching practices, the Framework for Teaching (FFT). Increasingly school districts have begun
to use these types of protocols for teacher evaluation purposes and FFT is the most popular (AIR
2013). According to MET project (2010b), “FFT has been subjected to several validation studies
10These districts include New York City Department of Education, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, Denver Public
Schools, Memphis City Schools, Dallas Independent School District, and Hillsborough County Public Schools. Kane
and Staiger (2012) provides a detailed description on how schools were selected to participate in the MET project.
More importantly, Kane and Staiger (2012) argues that MET teachers are comparable by most measures to their non-
MET peers in the district, suggesting that they are representative of the districts included.
11The purpose of the CKT math assessment is to measure knowledge tied to the teaching of mathematics, such as:
choosing and using appropriate mathematical representations; choosing examples to illustrate a mathematical concept;
interpreting student work, including use of nonstandard strategies; and evaluating student understanding.
12When schools joined the MET study in 2009-2010, principals were asked to identify groups of teachers that 1)
were teaching the same subject to students in the same grade, 2) were certified to teach common classes and, 3) were
expected to teach the same subject to students in the same grade the following year. These groups of teachers were
called “exchange groups.” The plan was for principals to create class rosters as similar as possible within an exchange
group, and then send these rosters to MET to be randomly assigned to “exchangeable” teachers. One issue in practice
was that, when it came time to perform the randomization, not all teachers within an exchange group were able to
teach during a common period. As a result, randomization was performed within subsets of exchange groups called
“randomization blocks”.
13Appendix A provides a detailed description of the sample selection.
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over the course of its development and refinement, including an initial validation by Educational
Testing Service (ETS).”14 The protocol divides teaching into four domains and the MET database
rates teachers on two of them: classroom environment and instruction. We observe scores for
eight different subdomains of these two domains by a median of seven different highly trained,
independent raters, many of them current or former teachers.15 These raters had to pass reliability
tests in which their scores were compared with master scores on a number of videos. This provides
some assurance of the quality of these observational data and help us to address measurement error,
as we discuss further in Section 3.4.
Though FFT was designed so that each subdomain represents a separate aspect of teaching
practice, we perform an exploratory factor analysis to determine the number of components that
are actually separable in the data. Appendix Table C2 shows the correlations between the different
subdomains and the loadings on each subdomain after performing an oblique rotation of the fac-
tors.16 This analysis suggests that FFT measures can be divided into two separable broad teaching
practices. There are five sub-scales which load heavily on the first factor, including establishing a
culture of learning, communicating with students, engaging students in learning, using assessment
in instruction and using questioning and discussion techniques. These all reflect what we will
call challenge/student-centered practices that encourage classroom dialogue and student involve-
ment.17 The subdomains that load on the second factor are creating an environment of respect and
rapport, managing student behaviors and managing classroom procedures. We will refer to these
14Of the MET observation protocol, two, FFT, and CLASS are generic protocols designed to apply across instruc-
tion in a range of subject-matters. In our view, of these, FFT has the most comprehensive architecture capturing
teaching practices.
15The score assigned to each component ranges between 1 and 4, where each each number refers to a level (1:un-
satisfactory, 2:basic, 3:proficient, 4:distinguished). Appendix Table C1 provides a description of each of the sub-
components of the FFT protocol.
16The results reported take the average across raters so that there is one observation per component per teacher.
Results are similar if we perform the exploratory factor analysis at the level of the rater or if we use orthogonal
rotations. They are also similar if we extract rater fixed effects and video quality prior to performing the factor
analysis.
17We have chosen the term “challenge/student-centered practices” to try to capture the overall emphasis of the
model items. These include all of the items in a domain called “Instruction” and one item from the ”Classroom en-
vironment” domain in the Danielson rubric. We prefer not to use the label instruction because it is not descriptive of
what the protocol is designating as good instruction. Many of the FFT domains entail elements of student-centered
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as classroom management practices, as they all relate to teaching practices that lead to a better
classroom environment. Taken together the factors explain 92% of the total variance in the data.18
As a final robustness check, we also implemented confirmatory factor analysis with the aim to
establish whether the proposed grouping of the FFT subdomains provides a better fit of the data
than alternative models. First, we compare our model with a competing specification in which
all the FFT subdomains load in only one latent factor. Second, we test our classification with
the grouping that has been predetermined in the FFT protocol (i.e., classroom environment and
instruction domains).19 In both cases, the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) indicates that our
proposed classification provides a better fit of the data.20 Our empirical strategy will mainly make
use of averages across the sub-scales that according to the exploratory factor analysis correspond to
each broad practice (i.e., classroom management and challenge/student-centered practices), but we
also explore other ways of addressing measurement error, as described in detail in Section 3.4.21
3.2.2 Sample
We restrict the sample in several ways necessary for the analysis, removing students who are
missing either a contemporaneous or lagged test scores, or missing teaching practice or CKT (our
measure of teacher quality) for the student’s actual or randomly-assigned teacher. This brings the
sample down from 5,730 to 4,201. We also drop the bottom percentile of class sizes (classrooms
less than 7 students) out of concern for measurement error in classroom composition, leaving 4,121
instruction (e.g., in the engaging students in learning domain,“students identify or create their own materials for learn-
ing”). Yet, it is important to note that the FFT protocol is well balanced with “challenge” items (e.g. the first indicator
of proficiency in the questioning and discussion techniques sub-domain is “questions of high cognitive challenge”
(Danielson 2011).)
18An initial exploratory factor analysis shows that there is only one eigenvalue greater than 1, a possible rough rule
of thumb for determining the number of factors. However, one factor explains 0.79 of the variation and a second factor
explains a substantial additional part, 0.13, which is an additional criteria used to determine the number of factors.
19Classroom environment includes: environment of respect and rapport, establishing a culture for learning, manag-
ing student behaviors, and managing classroom procedures. While instruction includes: communicating with students,
engaging students in learning, using assessment in instruction, and using questioning and discussion techniques.
20This analysis has been performed using the “confa” command in Stata, which deals with problems of identifica-
tion in factor models (Kolenikov 2009).
21We also replicated our empirical strategy using principal component and following the FFT classification as
alternative measures of challenge/student-centered and classroom management practices. Results in all cases are
similar.
72





Grade Level 4.50 0.50 4.00 5.00
Joint Math and ELA Class 0.87 0.33 0.00 1.00
Age 9.40 0.92 7.52 12.20
Male 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Gifted 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
Special Education 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
English Language Learner 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00
White 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
Black 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
Hispanic 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
Asian 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
American Indian 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00
Race Other 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
Race Missing 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00
Math Score (Year 09-10) 0.02 0.90 -2.82 2.75
Math Score (Year 10-11) 0.04 0.90 -3.26 3.01
Unique Districts 5 - - -
Unique Classes 147 - - -
Unique Schools 39 - - -
Unique Randomization
Blocks
57 - - -
Unique Teachers 147 - - -
Percentage of Class w/ 09-10
Math Scores
0.91 0.07 0.67 1.00
Percentage of Class in Ran-
dom Assignment
0.78 0.14 0.32 1.00
Teachers per Randomization
Block
2.86 0.83 2.00 4.00
Randomization Block Com-
pliance Rate
0.93 0.09 0.50 1.00
Notes: Joint Math/ELA Class refers to a self-contained course in which students learn
both math and ela, the remaining courses are either math or ela only. We summarize
the percentage of each class w/ prior math test scores since students new to the district
will not have prior test scores. We also summarize the percentage of each class in
randomization because not all students in the classes we observe were on the original
randomly assigned class rosters.
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students. Our identification strategy also requires at least 2 teachers per randomization block, the
level of randomization. This restricts the sample further to 3,618 student. We also restrict to
randomization blocks with at least a 50% compliance rate so that the randomly assigned teacher
has some significant relationship with the assignment, restricting to 2,682 students. 50 additional
observations are dropped because of duplication between classes and rechecking after these re-
strictions that the class size and teachers per randomization block criteria were met, leaving 2,632
students in the final sample. 22
Table C3 reports summary statistics for characteristics of the students in our final sample. This
is a racially-diverse sample; 31% of students are black, 25% are white, 29% are Hispanic, and 11%
are Asian, indicating that the school districts included in our data are not necessarily representative
of the whole US population of students. Though the randomization sample was not selected to
be representative, it is still useful to compare our estimation sample to the randomization sample
(Appendix Table C4). The samples are demographically very similar, and math scores of the
selected sample are marginally lower, by about 0.1 of a standard deviation. The bottom part of
Table C3 further characterizes the data by displaying the number of districts (5), schools (39),
teachers (147), and randomization blocks (57) in our final sample.
Table 3.2 displays summary statistics corresponding to the the FFT domains and classroom
prior achievement average and inter-quartile range (IQR) in prior achievement.23 The last two
columns of Table 3.2 show standard deviations within and between randomization blocks. We find
considerable within-randomization block variation in teaching practice and classroom composi-
tion.
22We estimate our main results on the largest possible sample as well, after we remove the duplications, class size,
teachers per randomization block restrictions and drop the compliance rate to 25 percent. We find results are not
statistically significantly different, though point estimates are marginally smaller and standard errors are larger, as you
would expect with lower compliance rates and noisier measures of classroom composition.
23We use IQR (i.e. difference in test score performance between the 75th and 25th percentile students in a given
class) to measure classroom heterogeneity rather than standard deviation due to the fact that IQR is less sensitive to the
presence of outliers, which is a particular concern in a context where classrooms could be small in size. Nevertheless,




We motivate here how interactions between teaching practice and peer initial achievement arise
through a number of intuitive mechanisms. The simplest model has these interactions arising
through the production technology. This makes sense for a number of possible teaching practices.
For instance, encouraging classroom discussion would create more of a team production climate
where peers matter more for each student’s achievement. Alternatively, for some practices, teacher
practice could enter indirectly to the achievement production function through students’ behav-
ioral responses (e.g., engagement, attentiveness). In this case, complementarities would arise if
good behavior changes whether students benefit from their peers. For instance, classroom man-
agement practices could help ensure the necessary behavior to create a good learning environment.
While the production technology channel is straightforward, it is helpful to illustrate the behavioral
channel with a simple model. The model also informs the empirical specification we take to the
data.24
Let Yit denote achievement of a student i at time t. Let the index ct = c(i, t) denote i’s
classroom in period t and then the vector of classroom peer achievement excluding i is denoted
Y−ictt = (Y1t, ..., Yi−1,t, Yi+1,t, ..., YNt). A student’s class has a teacher indexed j = j(i, t) who
uses teaching practice(s) Pj . We begin with a value-added model where achievement production is
a function of prior achievement, some moment of the prior achievement distribution of their time
t classmates (m(Y−ictt−1)). We introduce student behavior, bit, which we conceptualize broadly
as behaviors conducive to achievement, such as attentiveness, engagement and/or effort. Achieve-
ment production includes direct interactions between teaching practice and classroom composition
and the possibility of an indirect channel by allowing the marginal benefits of behavior to vary by
24We take the teaching practice as given in order to focus on student responses. We can identify most convincingly
the effects of a fixed or persistent aspect of teaching practice and postpone considering the endogenous response of
teachers to the classroom composition in future work.
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Avg Peer Matht−1 0 1 -2.31 3 0.84 0.58
IQR Peer Matht−1 0 1 -2.45 2.92 0.78 0.69
Avg Peer Matht−1 (random) 0 1 -2.75 3.02 0.84 0.57
IQR Peer Matht−1 (random) 0 1 -2.34 4.15 0.78 0.7
Teaching Practices
Challenge/Student-Centered 0 1 -3.06 2.23 0.74 0.69
Classroom Management 0 1 -3.15 2.25 0.74 0.63
FFT Subdomains of Challenge/Student-Centered
Using questioning and discus-
sion techniques
2.21 0.37 1.25 3.25 0.27 0.25
Establishing a culture of
learning
2.62 0.34 1.67 3.5 0.27 0.21
Communicating with students 2.68 0.33 2 3.33 0.24 0.24
Engaging students in learning 2.54 0.34 1.67 3.5 0.23 0.26
Using assessment in instruc-
tion
2.43 0.37 1.33 3.5 0.27 0.26
FFT Subdomains of Classroom Management
Managing student behaviors 2.81 0.36 1.67 3.5 0.25 0.24
Managing classroom proce-
dures
2.74 0.37 1.67 3.5 0.27 0.25
Creating an environment or
respect & rapport
2.79 0.34 1.67 3.5 0.24 0.23
Notes: The sample size is 2632 and focuses on 2010-11 school year when students were randomly as-
signed within randomization blocks. Teaching practices are measures in t − 1 based on FFT. The last
two columns decompose the standard deviation for each variable into between randomization block and
within randomization block components.
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the classroom composition, i.e.,







jm(Y−ictt−1) + εit, (3.1)
where εit denotes the residual. Note that this form of the achievement production function is
comparable to the classic achievement production function with peer spillovers that is generally
the focus of the literature when m(Y−ictt−1) is equal to average peer prior achievement (Sacerdote
2011), though it is augmented with controls for measures of teaching practice and teaching practice
interacted with peers. This is understood to capture the reduced-form effect of peers, inclusive
of both endogenous (effects arising through simultaneity in achievement) and contextual effects
(arising through direct spillovers from peer prior achievement), as in the terminology set forth by
Manski (1993). Other models may consider potential teacher effects by changing the behavior of
both the student and her peers, but we begin here as it is the most straightforward model to connect
with the literature.
Students choose their behavior to maximize their expected utility from achievement net of the
costs of behavior. To introduce a role for teaching practice in affecting behavior, we also permit
that the marginal utility/cost of behavior varies with the practice, i.e.,














Behavior is increasing in initial achievement, peer initial achievement and importantly teaching
practice. Classroom management practices may affect behavior directly through minimizing op-
portunities for disruptive behavior, whereas challenge/student-centered practices might do so by
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better engaging students in learning.
We cannot estimate (3.1) directly because we do not observe behavior. Instead, we assume that
the achievement we observe in the data is coming through student optimizing behavior. To obtain
the achievement production we can take to the data, we plug in for utility-maximizing behavior to
obtain the following reduced form








































jm(Y−ictt−1) + αȳm(Y−ictt−1) + αȳ2m(Y−ictt−1)






jYit−1 + αyȳYit−1m(Y−ictt−1) + εit.
Note that even if βp = βpy = βpȳ = 0, so that teaching practice does not affect achievement
directly and, more importantly, does not have direct complementarities with peer achievement, this
specification illustrates how we would also get complementarities from the indirectly behavioral
channel. This relies on two intuitive conditions. First, student behavior is affected by practice
(βbp 6= 0). Second, the achievement spillovers from peers vary with behavior (βbȳ 6= 0). Note that
in this model, the spillovers from peer prior achievement arise both directly through the production
technology and indirectly through peer effects on the unobserved behavior of the student coming
from the marginal return of behavior varying with peer prior achievement.
3.4 Estimation
Our empirical strategy focuses on estimation of the reduced form model described in equa-
tion (3.2), which relates most closely to models estimated in the literature. We take as a starting
point that m(Y−ictt−1) = Ȳ−ictt−1 and expand to include the IQR of the peer initial achievement
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distribution in the application, i.e.,
Yit = α0 + αpPj′+ αpȳPj′Ȳ−it−1 + αȳȲ−ictt−1 + αȳ2Ȳ 2−ictt−1 + αyYit−1 + αy2Y
2
it−1
+ αpyPj′Yit−1 + αyȳYit−1Ȳ−ictt−1 + εit, (3.3)
where we assume that observed achievement is a result of students’ utility-maximizing behav-
iors. Our main parameter of interest is αpȳ, which captures how the marginal benefits of teaching
practices vary with the classroom composition.25 Without loss of generality we set E(Pr) =
E(Ȳ−ictt−1) = E(Yit−1) = 0. Demeaning these variables aids in interpretation of the level terms
αp, αȳ and αy in equation (3.4) by making them invariant to adding the interaction terms to the
equation while leaving the interactions unchanged.
As discussed above, a unique aspect of these data is that teachers are randomly assigned to
classrooms within randomization blocks. However, even with random assignment of teachers
to classrooms, several important endogeneity concerns remain. First, there is considerable non-
compliance to the random assignment in the data. Largely, this was because assignments are made
from preliminary rosters before school administrators had a good sense of who would be attending
their school. Second, classroom composition may be endogenous as principals were not required
to randomly assign students to classrooms. Third, teaching practice may still be endogenous even
with random assignment because of measurement error. We discuss each of these issues in turn.
3.4.1 Non-compliance
Because the data include an indicator of the teacher that was randomly assigned to the stu-
dent, we can use standard approaches for dealing with non-compliance, focusing on the variation
from the randomly assigned teacher. We focus most of our discussion around the more conserva-
tive “intent-to-treat” estimates, which replace the observed teaching practice with the randomly-
assigned teaching practice. Let Pr denote the teaching practice of the randomly-assigned teacher,
25To simplify exposition, we ignore the role of other student and teacher observables though we include these
additional controls in the analysis.
79
indexed r = r(i, t), then
Yit = α0 + αpPr′+ αpȳPr′Ȳ−ictt−1 + αȳȲ−ictt−1 + αȳ2Ȳ 2−ictt−1 + αyYit−1 + αy2Y
2
it−1
+ αpyPr′Yit−1 + αyȳYit−1Ȳ−it−1 + αb + ε̃it. (3.4)
Because teachers are randomly assigned at the randomization block levels, we include random-
ization block fixed effects αb, where b = b(i, t) indexes randomization blocks. We show that our
results are very similar when we instrument the observed with the randomly-assigned teacher’s
teaching practice, and so choose to focus on the intent-to-treat estimates for simplicity.
3.4.2 Endogeneity of classroom composition
Classroom composition could be endogenous for two reasons. First, the principals were not
required to assign classroom composition randomly, though there was incentive to create compa-
rable classrooms within randomization blocks to make the random assignment of teachers to either
classroom palatable. Second, non-compliance by students could lead the classroom composition
to be endogenous even after addressing non-compliance at the teacher-level.
The question is then whether we can identify αpȳ even though Ȳ−ictt−1 is potentially endoge-
nous. Nizalova and Murtazashvili (2014) show that indeed with randomized control trials that
interactions of the random treatment with endogenous characteristics are exogenous. Bun and
Harrison (2018) expand this and provide weaker conditions for identification.26 The key assump-
tion is that (Ȳ−ictt−1, εit) are jointly independent of Pr, conditional on other controls. This means
that matching of students to peers based on unobservables does not vary with teaching practice.
Thus, the main concern is about potential re-sorting of students after teachers are randomly as-
signed. We do not believe this poses a threat to identification for several reasons, which we discuss
in Section 3.4.4.
26See also Annan and Schlenker (2015) and Di Falco, Feri, Pin, and Vollenweider (2018) for other examples of
applications of this argument.
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3.4.3 Measurement error and endogeneity of teaching practice
Recall that we have multiple observations of teaching practice taken from video observations
from multiple raters of the teacher both in the initial observational year and in the random assign-
ment year to help deal with potential measurement error in teaching practice. As in Araujo et al.
(2016), our preferred approach is to use t − 1 measures to capture the teaching practice. This
address two related concerns. First, video raters may have difficulty separating the teacher’s prac-
tice from the students they are teaching. Second, if teachers change their practice in response to
classroom composition, then teaching practice would no longer be exogenous, violating our key
identifying assumptions.
Our main strategy relies on the most straightforward approach to measurement by taking simple
averages of the measures of practice (Prt−1). To clarify the potential effects of measurement error
on our estimates, let the subscript k capture different observations of the teaching practice, i.e.,
Prkt−1 = Pr + urkt−1. (3.5)
Substituting in the the average measured practice for the true measures, we have
Yit = α0 + αpPrt−1 + αpȳPrt−1Ȳ−ictt−1 + αȳȲ−ictt−1 + αȳ2Ȳ
2
−ictt−1 + αyYit−1 + αy2Y
2
it−1
+ αpyPrt−1Yit−1 + αyȳYit−1Ȳ−ictt−1 + αb + νit,
where νit = ε̃it − αpūrt−1 − αpȳūrt−1Ȳ−ictt−1 − αpyūrt−1Yit−1. Note that as the number of obser-
vations of practice increases, ūrt−1 goes toward 0, if urkt is mean independent of urk′t for k 6= k′.
This is reasonable in our setting given the use of multiple trained raters to rate the same teacher,
leading to arguably independent random draws of rater-related measurement error.27
We show results are robust to using principal component analysis to construct our measures (the
primary approach we have seen applied in this literature) or factor models to extract the underlying
27In earlier versions, we also tried controlling for rater fixed effects in measures of practice to account for any
systematic rater differences and again results were very similar.
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teaching practice from multiple measures as in equation (3.5). We are also aware of the concern that
simply including extracted factors in nonlinear models does not completely deal with measurement
error. We adapt the method developed in Hausman et al. (1991) to deal with nonlinear errors in
variables models to our setting where the nonlinearity takes the form of interactions. If anything
these results imply that our estimates of the interactions are biased toward 0, which is typical of
these types of models in the literature (Jaccard and Wan 1995; Busemeyer and Jones 1983).
To the extent that practice is time-varying, the focus on t−1 measures may understate the total
effect of teaching practice. For time-varying practice, we can extract instead the common compo-
nent from the correlation between time t− 1 and t practices, which captures a persistent aspect of
teaching practice. We discuss in Section 3.5.3 the findings when we instrument contemporaneous
teaching practice with t − 1 practices. These results show that if anything our estimation strategy
provides conservative estimates of the interaction of practice with classroom composition.
3.4.4 Testing identifying assumption
We perform a number of tests to ensure that our key identifying assumption holds. First, we test
whether the practice is mean independent of peer characteristics directly by separately regressing
randomly assigned teaching practice (based on t− 1 averages) on different variables of classroom
composition after controlling for randomization block fixed effects.28 Appendix Table C6 presents
these balancing tests which show that teaching practice is not correlated with either of our mea-
sures of classroom composition, whether we use observed peers or initially-assigned peer. Second,
regressions of the randomly-assigned teaching practice on student-level covariates also suggest
that random assignment of teachers held. Third, though random assignment to classroom is not
needed for identification, Appendix Table C6 also presents balancing tests which regress student
characteristics on peer characteristics to see if there is evidence of matching in the data. Again, the
balancing test generally supports that there is no matching of students (either using the observed
28A similar approach is implemented in Kane et al. (2013).
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or initially-assigned peers), suggesting that classroom composition does not appear to be endoge-
nous, at least in terms of observables.29 That results of our balancing tests for peer characteristics
and teachers are similar in the initially-assigned and observed classroom compositions helps to
alleviate concerns about students re-sorting after teachers were randomly assigned. We can test
further the implications for our estimation if there is some matching based on unobservables that
we did not detect with our tests, by replacing the observed peer characteristics with the initially-
assigned peer characteristics in our regressions. We show that results are robust to this setting in
Section 3.5.3, alleviating any remaining concerns about potential violations of non-random sorting
of students in response to randomly-assigned teachers.
3.5 Results
To ground our analysis more closely in the literature, we begin with the typical specifications
that treat teachers and classroom composition as separable inputs. We then add interactions with
classroom composition to show how the significance of measured teaching practices change across
these specifications. All estimates include controls for randomization block fixed effects, stu-
dent characteristics and teacher aptitude, the Content Knowledge of Teaching (CKT) assessment,
though results are robust to their exclusion.30 For the endogeneity concerns described in Section
3.4, we focus the initial analysis on lagged measures of teaching practice, and consider contem-
poraneous measures in Section 3.5.3. Given that our teaching practices are correlated, including
them in the same regression may make it more difficult to detect significant effects of practices.
Therefore, we begin by treating the teaching practices separately, and then check the robustness
to including them in the same regression in Section 3.6. All standard errors are clustered at the
randomization block level (the level of randomization and the level of the fixed effects). We also
tried specifications that clustered at the class level, and if anything standard errors are smaller in
this case.
29We find 3 out of 22 coefficients to be statistically significantly different from 0 at the 0.1 level, which is less than
expected by chance.
30See MET project (2010a) and footnote 11 for a description of this teacher assessment. The controls help with
standard errors but do not matter for consistency because of the random assignment of treatment.
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3.5.1 Do Teaching Practices have a Direct Effect on Test Scores?
Panels A and B of Table C7 display estimates of the effect of classroom management and
challenge/ student-centered practices, respectively on math performance. Even columns allow the
effect of teaching practice to vary by a student’s initial achievement. Results in columns (1) and (2)
are naive OLS specifications, where the lagged teaching practice of the current teacher (Pjt−1) is
the variable of interest. Columns (3) and (4) report intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates, replacing Pjt−1
with the teaching practice of the randomly-assigned teacher (Prt−1). Columns (5) and (6) present
treatment on the treated (TT) results where Pjt−1 is instrumented with Prt−1.
Given the breadth of the measures, it is perhaps surprising that none of the specifications (in
both panels) show that the level of teaching practices play a statistically significant role in math
performance.31 However, these results are consistent with the findings in Garrett and Steinberg
(2015), where the average of all FFT measures do not seem to have a direct impact on students’
performance in their ITT and IV specifications.32 In a similar vein, while interactions of student
prior achievement with classroom management or challenge/student-centered practices are statis-
tically significant in ITT and IV specifications, F-tests (reported at the bottom of each panel) show
that the coefficients associated with these practices are in many specifications not jointly signifi-
cant. At first glance, these findings suggest that our constructs of teaching practice may not capture
an aspect of teaching practice that is meaningful for math performance. However, the next section
shows that these conclusions are misleading when we build in complementarities between teaching
practice and peers.
3.5.2 Teaching Practice and Classroom Composition
We expand the previous analysis by fully estimating equation (3.3), including interactions be-
tween classroom composition and teaching practice. Panels A and B of Table 3.4 present results
for classroom management and challenge/student-centered practices, respectively. Odd columns
31These results also holds if instead of using averages of the sub-domains, we consider a principal component
approach or the Hausman et al. (1991) econometric strategy.
32We also performed ITT specifications where average of all FFT measures are included as a regressor (instead of
the subdomains). Our results also show that there is no direct impact of average FFT on student achievement.
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Table 3.3: Effects of Teaching Practice without Classroom Interactions
Actual Random IV Actual with
Teacher Teacher Rand. Teacher
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A
Classroom Management 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009
(0.025) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.024)
C.M. ×Matht−1 0.018 0.022* 0.023*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Matht−1 0.737*** 0.737*** 0.738*** 0.737*** 0.738*** 0.738***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Avg Peer Matht−1 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.015
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
P-value (joint signif. of teach-
ing practice)
0.380 0.239 0.219
F-Stat. (first stage)† 251.3 167.1
Panel B
Challenge/Student-Centered 0.021 0.019 0.025 0.023 0.029 0.026
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
C.S.C. ×Matht−1 0.017 0.025* 0.026*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Matht−1 0.737*** 0.737*** 0.737*** 0.737*** 0.738*** 0.738***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Avg Peer Matht−1 0.015 0.013 0.014 0.011 0.016 0.014
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
P-value (joint signif. of teach-
ing practice)
0.195 0.042 0.029
F-Stat. (first stage)† 279.8 186.6
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the randomization block level. Panel A and B correspond to different regressions with math as the
dependent variable. Lagged teaching practices are used and sample size is 2632. These regressions include
randomization block fixed effects and controls for the level and a squared term of prior math achievement
and average peer prior achievement, as well as CKT and student characteristics listed in Table C3. † Reports
the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic for a weak instrument test.
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accommodate models where average peer prior achievement is interacted with teaching practice
(in addition to student prior achievement), while even columns additionally control for classroom
interquartile range and its interaction with teaching practice.33 Columns (1) and (2) report ITT
results (i.e. Pjt−1 is replaced with Prt−1 as per equation (3.4)). Columns (3) and (4) report TT
estimates where Pjt−1 is instrumented with Prt−1.
Panel A shows that classrooms benefit more from higher average peer initial achievement when
the teacher uses good classroom management practices, which is consistent with the mechanisms
discussed in our model. For example, ITT and TT results show that a one standard deviation in-
crease in classroom management increase test scores around 7.4% to 8.9% of a standard deviation
when peer average prior year performance is one standard deviation above the mean. In contrast,
the even columns show that the effectiveness of classroom management practices does not vary
significantly with the IQR in classroom prior achievement. On the one hand, these results have
the intuitive interpretation that a student cannot benefit from higher-achieving peers if the teacher
does not have good classroom management practices, which would foster positive classroom be-
haviors. On the other hand, it could be expected that classroom management practices are more
effective among low-achieving students. Instead, our finding is consistent with the understanding
that classroom management is also an important challenge in higher-achieving classrooms, though
the sources of disengagement may be different from in lower-achieving classrooms (Shernoff,
Csikszentmihalyi, Schneider, and Shernoff 2003).
Furthermore, consistent with the results in Table C7, the level effects of classroom manage-
ment practices are still not statistically significantly different from 0 and point estimates are small.
Moreover, the interactions between classroom management and student’s prior achievement be-
come statistically insignificant in most specifications, suggesting that failure to account for com-
plementarities with classroom composition may lead to stronger conclusions about student-level
heterogeneity in the effects of teaching practice. A further notable change is that classroom man-
agement emerges as a jointly statistically significant predictor of test performance when interacted
33See footnote 23 for an explanation of why we include IQR in our specifications rather than standard deviation.
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with average peer prior achievement at the 99% confidence level in most specifications.
Panel B shows results for challenge/student-centered practices. Generally, we find that classes
with higher average initial achievement also benefit more for challenge/student-centered practices.
However, the benefits of challenge/student-centered practices are smaller in classrooms with higher
IQR in initial achievement. A standard deviation increase in this practice leads to a 5 to 6% re-
duction in achievement for classrooms that are a standard deviation above average IQR. Like in
the case of classroom management, the level effect of challenge/student-centered practices are not
statistically significantly different from 0 and neither are the interactions with initial achievement,
after controlling for interactions with classroom composition. Furthermore, joint tests also confirm
that challenge/student-centered practices emerge as statistically significant predictors of achieve-
ment at the 99% confidence level after permitting heterogeneity by classroom composition.
In summary, the findings in Table 3.4 provide four main messages.34 First, teaching practices
seem to show significant complementarities with classroom characteristics, ranging in magnitude
from 3% to 8.9% of a standard deviation increase in math, for a standard deviation increase in
teaching practice in a class that is one standard deviation above the mean in prior performance.
We view these estimates as sizable given that some of the larger estimates of a standard deviation
increase in teacher value-added on math scores range from 0.11 to 0.16 (Chetty et al. 2014b). A
standard finding in the literature is that the first two years of teacher experience, where experience
effects are largest, increase student performance by only 0.06 of a standard deviation (Ladd and
Thompson 2008).
Second, failure to account for complementarities with classroom composition lead us to un-
derstate the importance of these teaching practices. Third, student-level heterogeneity in ef-
fects of teaching practice appear less relevant after accounting for the complementarities with
classroom composition. Finally, the contrasting evidence between classroom management and
34We also performed similar regressions on a broader sample to test to what extent our sample restrictions described
in Appendix ?? are affecting our results. If instead we restrict the data to: a) fourth and fifth grade students who
were randomly assigned a teacher, b) both a student’s actual and randomly assigned teacher have non-missing year 1
teaching practice measures, c) students have non-missing test scores in both years, and d) keep randomization blocks
with at least a 25% compliance rate, leads to a sample of 4086 students. This larger sample provides very similar
results to those reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.4.
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challenge/student-centered practices also points to the importance of considering these measures
separately, i.e., a single measure of teaching quality, the focus in the literature, does not fit the
findings when we allow for classroom context to moderate effects. We return to explore this in
more detail in Section 3.6.
3.5.3 Robustness
Endogeneity of classroom composition Given that teachers are randomly assigned to class-
rooms and that we focus on t−1 practices, a primary remaining endogeneity concern, as discussed
in Section 3.4, is potential resorting of students to classrooms based on the teacher who is randomly
assigned. Balancing tests reported in Section 3.4.4 already suggest that this is not the case, in that
observable student and peer characteristics are not correlated with the randomly-assigned teacher’s
practice. However, given that we observe the students who were initially randomly assigned to the
teacher, we can also test whether estimates of the interaction are systematically different if we re-
place actual peers with randomly-assigned peers. These estimates are reported in columns (5) and
(6) of Table 3.4. Interactions between classroom composition and teaching practice are not statisti-
cally significantly different from their comparable estimates in columns (1) and (2), though smaller
in magnitude. This is consistent with a slight downward bias in columns (5) and (6) generated from
random measurement error in peers.
Streamlined specification We also compare estimates in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.4 to
estimates where we use minimal controls, dropping student and teacher quality controls and the
quadratics in prior achievement and classroom composition along with interactions between prior
achievement and classroom composition. Results (available upon request) are very similar. In
particular, classroom composition interactions with teaching practice are within 0.005 of each
other.
Contemporaneous teaching practice One implication of focusing on lagged measures of teach-
ing practice is that our estimates of the interactions between classroom composition and teaching
practice may understate the true effects. While we prefer focusing on these conservative estimates
because of concerns about the endogeneity of contemporaneous teaching practice, we also explore
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Table 3.4: Teaching Practice and Classroom Composition
Random IV Actual with Random
Teacher Rand. Teacher Teacher and
Class
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A
Classroom Management 0.005 0.008 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.005
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020)
C.M. ×Matht−1 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.015 0.014
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
C.M. × Avg. Peer Matht−1 0.079*** 0.074*** 0.089*** 0.084*** 0.056*** 0.051**
(0.021) (0.025) (0.023) (0.030) (0.020) (0.022)
C.M. × IQR Peer Matht−1 -0.017 -0.014 -0.017
(0.019) (0.023) (0.018)
P-value (joint signif. of teach-
ing practice)
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.007
First Stage F-Stat.† 84.4 42.9
Panel B
Challenge/Student-Centered 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.015 0.017 0.014
(0.022) (0.020) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
C.S.C ×Matht−1 0.016 0.012 0.017 0.013 0.022* 0.020
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
C.S.C × Avg Peer Matht−1 0.044*** 0.031** 0.050*** 0.037** 0.035** 0.039**
(0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
C.S.C. × IQR Peer Matht−1 −0.053*** −0.058*** −0.037***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
P-value (joint signif. of teach-
ing practice)
0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.000
First Stage F-Statistic† 67.1 53.4
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Standard errors are clustered
at the randomization block level. Sample size is 2632. Lagged teaching practices are used throughout;
columns (5) and (6) control for characteristics of initially randomly assigned peers. Panel A and B correspond
to different regressions with math as the dependent variable. These regressions include randomization block
fixed effects and controls for the level and a squared term of prior math achievement and average peer prior
achievement, as well as CKT and student characteristics listed in Table C3. Even columns also include the
IQR in peer prior achievement. Whenever peer variables are included we also include their square, and all
pairwise interactions of peer variables and prior achievement. †Reports the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic
for a weak instrument test.
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how the interactions of teaching practice with classroom composition change when we instrument
for contemporaneous teaching practices with lagged teaching practices. These results are presented
in Appendix table C9 and discussed in detail in Appendix ??. We show that interactions between
teaching practice and classroom composition remain robust, but (as expected) are significantly
larger in magnitude.
Measurement error in teaching practice An additional concern with our findings is to what ex-
tent our results (e.g. lack of significance in the level of the teaching practice measures) are affected
by problems of measurement error in our key teaching practice variables. In order to address this
point, we implement a measurement error correction strategy that follows Hausman et al. (1991).
This approach is more convenient than the usual IV strategy that accounts for error in variables,
because the variables of interest enter non-linearly into our model and we are over-identified by
having more than 2 measures of each practice. In appendix ??, we provide a description of how
we adapt the Hausman et al. (1991) method to our context, and describe results obtained after
implementing it. For completeness, we also report results when performing IV corrections (i.e. in-
strumenting one of the measures that corresponds to a given teaching practice with the remaining
measures of that teaching practice). Overall, the findings indicate that our current strategy of tak-
ing averages of the teaching practice variables provides similar results to strategies that correct for
measurement error following these alternative approaches. The level effects and interactions with
initial achievement remain close to 0, but the interactions with classroom composition increase
slightly after correcting for measurement error.
Aggregation We also consider whether our aggregation of the 8 subdomains into 2 separable
components masks important heterogeneity. Appendix Table C10 shows that similar findings hold
when we consider the 8 different subdomains. The estimates, while still significant, are generally
smaller in magnitude as would be expected due to increased measurement error.35
35See Appendix section ?? for related discussion.
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3.6 Mechanisms
3.6.1 Teaching Practice vs. Teacher “Quality”
While the previous section provides compelling evidence that teacher effectiveness varies by
classroom composition, we now explore the extent to which classroom-management and challenge/student-
centered practices may proxy for similar aspects of teacher effectiveness and/or whether more
standard, unidimensional measures of teacher quality are the primary channel through which our
teacher effectiveness measures operate. For instance, teachers who have better classroom man-
agement practices may also engage in more challenge/student-centered practices; therefore not
including both domains in the same specification may bias our estimates. This exploration raises
a number of interesting questions. To be clear, there is no consensus on how teaching quality
should be measured, and FFT was designed to capture different aspects of effective teaching. This
means that in some ways classroom management and challenge/student-centered practices are in
fact measures of quality. Furthermore, the fact that classroom-management and challenge/student-
centered practices interact differently with classroom composition already suggests that a single
unidimensional quality may not be correct. Yet, we have other relevant unidimensional scales of
quality, such as the Content Knowledge for Teaching assessment, as well as principal and student
surveys, which we consider here.
In order to address these key points, Table 3.5, Columns (1) and (2) present ITT (i.e. Pjt−1
is replaced with Prt−1) and IV (i.e. Pjt−1 is instrumented with Prt−1) results from a model that
simultaneously controls for classroom management and challenge/student-centered practices and
their interactions with peer composition. These results show that interactions of classroom man-
agement with the average peer initial achievement are robust, but seem to explain the interaction
of challenge/student-centered practices with the average peer initial achievement in the previous
tables because of strong correlations between these two practices. In contrast, interactions of
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challenge/student-centered practices with the IQR in peer initial achievement remain robust.36 Fi-
nally, in comparing the results in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 we see that key classroom composition in-
teractions become stronger when both teaching practices are included in a single specification.
This suggests that if there is a bias in our interactions from omitted teaching practice/quality, it is
leading us to understate the true complementarity with classroom composition.
Columns (3) to (5) of Table 3.5 report results from ITT specifications similar to column (1)
where we additionally include different proxies for overall teacher “quality” and their interactions
with classroom characteristics.37 First, we included teacher performance in the Content Knowledge
for Teaching (CKT) assessment interacted with classroom characteristics. Second, we included the
teacher’s lagged average score on student assessments from the TRIPOD survey. TRIPOD assesses
the extent to which students experience the classroom environment as engaging, demanding, and
supportive of their intellectual growth.38 Finally, we included school principal evaluations on
teachers performance which are reported in the MET database.39 These results show that across all
specifications our key interactions between teaching practices and classroom composition remain
significant, and the size of these coefficients is very similar to our previous specifications. None
of these alternative measures of “quality” interact with peer average initial achievement and IQR
in the same way as our two practices. In contrast to our practice measures, these show statistically
significant heterogeneity in effects by the student’s initial achievement, suggesting that “quality”
as measured through CKT and principal assessments matters more for better students.
We tried additional specifications that included teacher experience (as an alternative teacher
control) and its interactions with classroom and students characteristics provide almost identical
36Appendix tables 13, 14, and 15 report all the parameters of these specifications.
37Notice that in all previous specifications, we were controlling for a measure of teacher aptitude (i.e. CKT), but
it was not interacted with classroom characteristics. We cannot control for the usual measures of teacher value-added
(i.e. adjusted random effects) because these models inherently neglect the presence of classroom-teacher interactions.
38Tripod is a protocol that measures teacher effectiveness based on student surveys. See Kane and Staiger (2012)
for a description of this tool and the importance for predicting teacher value-added.
39The fact that our specifications include randomization blocks (which in this case are school-grade fixed effects)
should account for systematic difference in principals’ reporting.
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results to those reported in columns (3)-(5) of Table 3.5.40 We also included teacher value-added
from the previous year as an alternative measure of teacher quality. Again, the estimates of the ef-
fects of behavior management and challenge/student-centered practices are not statistically signifi-
cantly different,41 providing further support that these measures are picking up something different
from a unidimensional measure of quality.
3.6.2 Overall FFT
Often FFT is treated as a unidimensional measure of quality. We also consider results when
we include the average FFT of the teacher in the regressions, rather than classroom management
and challenge/student-centered practices separately. Results (available upon request) are similar to
those in column (1) of Table 3.5. We find that like classroom management, overall FFT interacts
with the average classroom composition and is statistically significantly different from 0. The coef-
ficient is slightly smaller, 0.06. Like challenge/student-centered practices, FFT negatively interacts
with IQR of classroom prior achievement and is statistically significantly different from 0. Again
the coefficient is slightly smaller in magnitude, -0.05. Also similarly, there is no evidence of a level
effect or interaction with prior achievement. All these results are in line with our previous finding.
It makes sense that they are slightly smaller in magnitude, given that the aggregate mixes the 2
practices. We prefer our specification that treats the practices separately because it illustrates how
not all aspects of FFT interact positively with the average of classroom composition or negatively
with the IQR of prior achievement.
3.6.3 Class size
Because IQR is correlated with class size, an interesting question is whether interactions of
challenge/ student-centered practices are driven by larger class sizes. We test this by adding in-
teractions of classroom management and challenge/student-centered with class size to column (1)
of Table 3.5. We do not include these results as we find no evidence that either practices interacts
with class size. Furthermore, positive interactions of classroom management and average peer
40Reults available upon request. This is true with both a continuous measure of experience and an indicator of
whether the teacher has 3 or less years of experience.
41These results are available upon request.
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prior achievement and negative interactions of challenge/student-centered practices with the IQR
remain robust, and if anything increase in magnitude with the additional controls.
3.7 Evaluating Teachers
The development of teacher evaluation protocols have been at the core of the education policy
debate in recent decades. For example, policymakers in the US have widely implemented account-
ability programs that intended to reward or punish teachers based on students gains in achieve-
ment.42 More recently, schools have also incorporated classroom observation protocols like FFT
to further assess teachers. For example, in 2012, the New Jersey Legislature passed the TEACHNJ
Act, which mandated implementation of a new teacher evaluation system starting in the 2013 -
2014 school year and links tenure decisions to evaluation ratings. In response to this mandate,
New Jersey has developed the program AchieveNJ that relies on classroom observation protocols
such as FFT to evaluate teachers.43
Due to the increasing availability of data to evaluate teachers (e.g. value-added measures),
many scholars have highlighted the benefits of replacing the least effective 5% to 7% of teachers
with average teachers (Chetty et al. 2014b; Hanushek 2011). However, these exercises in evaluat-
ing teachers and determining rankings rely crucially on the assumption that teacher effectiveness
can be isolated from classroom characteristics. Our findings of a statistically significant com-
plementarity between teaching practices and classroom composition suggest that the estimated
teacher contributions will depend on classroom composition. To further quantify the relevance of
these complementarities within the context of our empirical strategy, we implemented different
simulation exercises that aim to determine how rankings of teacher contributions to learning vary
when teachers are re-allocated into different classrooms.
We focus on our estimates in column (5) of Table 3.5 to create, based on our measures of
teaching practices, a measure for teacher contribution to learning. We choose these estimates
42For example, North Carolina implemented the ABCs (Accountability for Basic skills and for local Control)
program in 1997, and the US federal government developed the NCLB (No Child Left Behind) program in 2002.
43Teacher practice accounts for 55% of the teacher evaluations. The following link provides the list of ap-
proved teacher practice evaluation instruments used in New Jersey: https://www.nj.gov/education/AchieveNJ/teacher/
approvedlist.pdf
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Table 3.5: Teaching Practices and Alternative Teacher “Quality” Controls
Random IV Actual Random Teacher
Teacher with Random Alt. Teacher Control:
Teacher CKT 7C PSVY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Classroom Management −0.012 −0.016 −0.014 −0.016 −0.015
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
C.M. ×Matht−1 0.004 0.004 0.011 0.004 0.003
(0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
C.M. × Avg Peer Matht−1 0.076** 0.087** 0.077** 0.076** 0.076***
(0.029) (0.036) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027)
C.M.× IQR Peer Matht−1 0.026 0.035 0.026 0.026 0.026
(0.022) (0.026) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021)
Challenge/Student-Centered 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.011
(0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
C.S.C. ×Matht−1 0.010 0.011 0.002 0.016 0.005
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
C.S.C. × Avg Peer Matht−1 −0.010 −0.009 −0.010 −0.010 −0.005
(0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
C.S.C. × IQR Peer Matht−1 −0.062*** −0.071***−0.063***−0.057** −0.054**
(0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021)
Alt. Teacher Control −0.008 −0.006 0.055***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.017)
T.C. ×Matht−1 0.044*** −0.029** 0.032**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
T.C. × Avg Peer Matht−1 −0.019 −0.007 −0.016
(0.018) (0.020) (0.016)
T.C. × IQR Peer Matht−1 −0.012 −0.017 −0.003
(0.021) (0.021) (0.016)
P-value joint signif. teaching
practice (C.M.& C.S.C).
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
P-value joint signif. alt.
teacher control (T.C.)
0.052 0.172 0.013
First Stage F-Statistic† 27.7
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Standard errors are clustered
at the randomization block level. Sample size is 2632. Dependent variable is math and teaching practices are
measured at t − 1. Regressions use lagged teaching practice of current teacher and include randomization
block fixed effects the same student and peer controls included in Table (3.4). † Reports the Kleibergen-Paap
rk Wald statistic for a weak instrument test. CKT denotes Content Knowledge for Teaching assessment, 7C
denotes overall student survey teacher ratings based on Tripod and PSVY denotes principal assessments of
teacher quality. TC denotes alternative teacher control (i.e. CKT, 7C, or PSVY). See Appendix Table (C11)
for all parameters.
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because they include a role for overall teacher quality through principal surveys, which is shown






(α̂pPj′+ α̂pȳPj′Yit−1 + α̂pyPj′Ȳctt−1 + α̂pIPj′IQRctt−1 +RV Aj),
where IQRctt−1 denotes the interquantile range of the classes prior achievement, Nj denotes the
class size for teacher j, αpI the related coefficient estimate and Pj is a vector of classroom man-
agement practices, challenge/student-centered practices (using the average prior measures as dis-
cussed above), the principal’s evaluation of teacher quality, and RV Aj corresponds to estimates of
“residual teacher value-added” that are recovered from the regression residuals.44 We explore two
different thought experiments to understand the magnitude of the effects.
First, consider a teacher whose classroom management, challenge/student-centered, principal
evaluation and residual value-added are all one standard deviation above average. Holding all other
teachers classroom compositions fixed, but giving this teacher a classroom that is one standard de-
viation higher (relative to the mean) average classroom peer prior achievement (holding IQR fixed)
would increase her teaching contribution to student learning ( ˆTC) by 0.07 of a standard deviation
and increase her rank in the teacher contribution distribution by 0.176 percentiles (on a 0 to 1 rank
scale).45 In a similar vein, holding the average peer initial achievement fixed and increasing IQR
by one standard deviation would decrease teacher contribution by 0.03 and decrease her rank by
0.076 percentiles.
Because the above simulation makes the unrealistic assumption that we can change one teacher’s
classroom composition holding all other classroom compositions fixed, we also consider a simu-
lation that reshuffles teachers within the randomization block.46 This is potentially more similar to
44In particular, we construct these measures of teacher value-added by applying the shrinkage technique that is
commonly used in the value-added literature (i.e. shrink the mean residuals by teacher from the specification in
column (5) of Table 3.5 We name it “residual teacher value-added” because it represents only a part of the total teacher
contribution to student learning).
45The standard deviation of ˆTCj is 0.202. Moreover, note that 1 standard deviation average peer achievement
(which is in standard deviation units) also increases prior student achievement by 0.42.
46If a randomization block has more than two classrooms, then teachers are reshuffled at random into a different
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the usual allocation problem that principals face every year for a given math course/level, which
is how the randomization blocks were defined. In this case, ˆTC changes in absolute value by 0.30
of a standard deviation and the teacher’s rank changes on average by 0.12 percentiles. As a re-
sult, 22% of the randomization blocks show a different ranking of teachers. These counterfactual
changes in rank are not trivial from a policy perspective. Our simulation shows that around 35% of
the teachers that were ranked in the bottom 5 to 10% of the teaching contribution would no longer
belong to that group after such re-allocation of classrooms.
In summary, simulations suggest that complementarities between teaching practices and class-
room composition play a key role in determining teacher contributions to learning, with sizable
effects on teacher rank and in terms of standard deviations of learning. In this regard, our findings
suggest caution on how to implement policies that aim to replace the bottom 5% of teachers given
that teachers relative ranks are likely to depend on the characteristics of the classroom they are
facing.
3.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we illustrate that the effects of teaching practice vary significantly with classroom
composition. Our preferred estimates indicate that classroom management practices increase math
achievement by 0.09 of a standard deviation when average classroom initial peer math performance
is 1 standard deviation above average. In contrast, challenge/student-centered practices decrease
math performance by -0.07 of a standard deviation when the classroom IQR in initial achievement
is 1 standard deviation above average. We view these estimates as sizable given that some of the
larger estimates of a standard deviation increase in teacher value-added, which is based on unob-
servable teacher contributions to math, range from 0.11 to 0.16 (Chetty et al. 2014b). Simulations
also illustrate the reassigning classrooms to teachers within randomization block would change
their teacher contribution by 0.30 standard deviations and change their rank on average by 0.12
percentiles.
We make three key contributions to the literature on teacher effectiveness. First, we illustrate
classroom.
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that failure to account for moderating effects of classroom composition may lead researchers to
severely misstate the importance of a given measured teaching practice for achievement. This helps
address the common mystery of why teacher effectiveness is so hard to measure and may even
help reconcile mixed findings in different contexts. Second, failure to account for the moderating
effects of classroom composition also leads us to overstate the importance of individual student-
level heterogeneity in the effects of teaching practice. Indeed, in our context, it appears that all
heterogeneity is driven by classroom composition.
Third, the focus in the literature on a single, unidimensional measure of teacher effectiveness
may be misguided. Our two measures of teacher effectiveness interact with different aspects of
classroom composition. Furthermore, we show that our estimated interactions of teaching practice
with classroom composition remain after controlling for additional standard measures of teacher
“quality,” such as Content Knowledge for Teaching Assessment, student evaluations and principal
surveys. In contrast to our FFT-based teaching practice measures, these additional measures of
teacher quality show some evidence of heterogeneity by student prior achievement, but do not
interact with classroom composition, providing supportive.
Our findings also have important implications for the peer effects literature. Because the effects
of peers vary significantly with teaching practice, this suggests that failure to account for these in-
teractions may also severely understate the importance of peers in different contexts. Furthermore,
it suggests the potential for a change in policy emphasis from reallocating students to classrooms to
meet different achievement objectives (which can be costly and involve severe tradeoffs among dif-
ferent types of students) to determining teaching practices that best fit different classroom contexts
or better-matching of teachers to classrooms.
Finally, our results also have important implications for policies related to (1) teacher evalua-
tion and accountability and (2) teacher professional development and training. Classroom obser-
vations of teaching practice–scored using the FFT and other protocols–are now routinely used in
annual teacher evaluation and accountability. Our findings suggest that, depending on teachers’ as-
signments or the overall school context, specific domains of instructional practice may be more rel-
evant to teacher effectiveness than others. As such, specific domains of instruction (rather than an
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overall observational score) may be emphasized in accountability systems depending on teaching
assignments and/or school context. Moreover, the presence of complementarities between teach-
ing practices and classroom composition suggest that further caution should be exercised when
teachers are evaluated based on these protocols. In particular, we show that rankings of teacher
contributions to learning are largely sensitive to even relatively small within-school classroom re-
assignments. Therefore policies that aim to replace the bottom 5% to 10% of teachers could be
sensitive to the characteristics of the classrooms that teachers face.
In terms of teacher professional development and training, our findings reinforce the impor-
tance of explicit attention to challenges stemming from classroom-achievement heterogeneity (Co-
hen and Lotan 1997; Seaton, Marsh, and Craven 2010). We further find that scores on protocol
subdomains do not appear to be as orthogonal in practice as they are in principle, or are intended
to be.47 Further research could benefit from determining how to more fully differentiate, to the
extent it is feasible, different aspects of teaching practice to make more formative recommenda-
tions for teacher training and development. That said, our research provides compelling evidence
that any such recommendations should be adapted to the challenges faced by different school and
classroom contexts.
47That is, the MET observational protocol seem to have been developed as formative measures of instruction, where
ideally the protocol would be useful in assessing “weak points” to target for instructional improvement. This is our
own interpretation of these protocol. The supporting documentation we examined for the FFT protocol for example,







Table A1: Summary Statistics: Research Sample Pre- and Post-Restrictions
Pre-Restrictions Post-Restrictions
Mean Count Mean Count
Math EOG Test Score 360.043 323568 362.160 66423
ELA EOG Test Score 356.660 322998 358.617 66423
Math ‘A’ Course Grade 0.232 324131 0.278 66423
Math ‘B’ Course Grade 0.345 324131 0.393 66423
Math ‘C’ Course Grade 0.274 324131 0.230 66423
Math ‘D’ Course Grade 0.109 324131 0.078 66423
Math ‘F’ Course Grade 0.039 324131 0.021 66423
ELA ‘A’ Course Grade 0.261 323937 0.312 66423
ELA ‘B’ Course Grade 0.359 323937 0.394 66423
ELA ‘C’ Course Grade 0.258 323937 0.210 66423
ELA ‘D’ Course Grade 0.092 323937 0.066 66423
ELA ‘F’ Course Grade 0.030 323937 0.017 66423
Economically Disadvantaged 0.480 334496 0.386 66423
Limited English Proficient 0.067 334496 0.053 66423
Student With a Disability 0.125 334496 0.058 66423
Gifted Math 0.129 334496 0.174 66423
Gifted Reading 0.121 334496 0.161 66423
Gifted Math and Reading 0.098 334496 0.129 66423
Male 0.511 334367 0.477 66417
Asian 0.024 328912 0.021 65070
American Indian 0.015 328912 0.012 65070
Black 0.277 328912 0.201 65070
White 0.548 328912 0.651 65070
Hispanic 0.106 328912 0.089 65070
Multiracial 0.030 328912 0.026 65070
Followed Grades 5 to 8 0.812 334527 1.000 66423
Same School Grades 6 to 8 0.771 293253 1.000 66423
Observed Teacher Grades 6 to 8 0.485 334527 1.000 66423
Retained During Grades 6 to 8 0.035 334527 0.000 66423
Total Number of Schools 753 373
Notes: This table compares the research sample before and after sample restrictions. One observa-
tion refers to a student-grade combination and the sample before restrictions includes all NC public
school students in 6th grade for the first time during the 2008-2009 school-year, 7th grade for the
first time during the 2009-2010 school-year and 8th grade for the first time during the 2010-11
school-year. Sample restrictions are detailed in Section 1.2. In addition to student characteristics,
this table also summarizes the fraction of students I can follow from grades 5 to 8, the fraction of
students enrolled in the same school from grades 6 to 8 (conditional on a student’s school being
observed in the data each year), the fraction of students for which I can observe their teachers from
grades 6 to 8, and the fraction of students retained in grades six to eight.
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Table A2: Short-Term Effects of Standards on Standardized Test Scores: Robustness to Student
Fixed-Effect IV Estimates
Yit Yit Yit Yit Yit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A Math
Math Leniency -0.058*** -0.061*** -0.063*** -0.070*** -0.089***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
ELA Leniency -0.008*
(0.005)
Yit−1 Math -0.237*** -0.237*** -0.243***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Yit−1 ELA 0.046*** 0.046***
(0.007) (0.007)
Student Controls Yes Yes No No No




Count 66423 66423 66423 66423 66423




ELA Leniency -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.028***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Yit−1 Math 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.008) (0.008)
Yit−1 ELA -0.282*** -0.283*** -0.290***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Student Controls Yes Yes No No No




Count 66423 66423 66423 66423 66423
F-stat first† 5787.641 16339.425 16772.146 16781.584 16781.584
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Panels A and
B correspond to math and ELA regressions in which standardized test scores are regressed on the
contemporaneous standards of a students’ teachers. Column (1) uses the same sample as Table
(1.5) and includes student fixed-effects. Column (2) shows that student fixed-effect results are
similar without controlling for grading standards in both subjects. Column (3) shows that student
fixed-effect results are essentially unchanged after dropping controls all controls except for lagged
achievement. Column (4) reports the smallest estimated effect, while Column (5) reports the
largest, after manually set the persistence of lagged achievement to different values between 0
and 1. These regressions cluster standard errors at the student level and include year dummies
to account for year-specific shocks. † Reports the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic for a weak
instrument test.
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Yit Yit Git Git
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A Math
Math Leniency t 0.015 -0.041*** 0.206***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.012)
ELA Leniency t -0.011 -0.010 0.029***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.011)
Math Leniency -0.002 -0.007
t+ 1 (0.005) (0.008)
ELA Leniency 0.002 0.002
t+ 1 (0.006) (0.008)





Math Leniency t -0.004 -0.010** 0.035***
(0.010) (0.005) (0.010)
ELA Leniency t 0.022* -0.007 0.176***
(0.013) (0.005) (0.012)
Math Leniency -0.007* -0.014**
t+ 1 (0.004) (0.007)
ELA Leniency 0.002 0.012*
t+ 1 (0.005) (0.007)




Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. These “falsifi-
cation tests” are meant to inform whether or not grading standards are highly correlated within
students. Panels A and B correspond to math and ELA outcomes, respectively, and sixth and
seventh grade students are stacked in all regressions. All regressions are reduced form rather
than 2SLS estimates. Column (1) regresses future teachers’ grading standards (a student’s teach-
ers at time t + 1) on the grading standards of a student’s current teachers (at time t). The
p-value from joint significance tests on standards in both subjects is reported as well. Columns
(2) and (4) report the effects of a student’s current teachers on contemporaneous achievement
and course grades. These specifications are identical to Table (1.5) but the sample includes only
sixth and seventh grade students. Columns (3) and (5) test whether future teachers affect current
achievement and course grades. Each regression controls for predetermined student and peer
characteristics listed in Table (1.1) at the start of time t, Xit−1. These regressions also cluster
standard errors at the school-grade level and include year dummies to account for year-specific
shocks.
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Table A4: Short-Term Effects of Standards Estimator from Appendix (A.2) on Standardized Test
Scores and Course Grades: IV Estimates with School-Grade Fixed-Effects
Yit Yit Git Git
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A Math
Math Teacher’s Rigor 0.285*** 0.284*** -0.497*** -0.487***
(Alt. Est.) (0.019) (0.020) (0.033) (0.035)
ELA Teacher’s Rigor 0.006 -0.042
(Alt. Est.) (0.030) (0.051)
Count 66423 66423 66423 66423
F-stat first† 397.208 78.159 397.208 78.159
Corr(ŝjg−t,q̂jg−t) 0.571
Panel B ELA
Math Teacher’s Rigor 0.029** 0.041
(Alt. Est.) (0.014) (0.025)
ELA Teacher’s Rigor 0.102*** 0.092*** -0.693*** -0.708***
(Alt. Est.) (0.026) (0.027) (0.045) (0.046)
Count 66423 66423 66423 66423
F-stat first† 170.560 78.159 170.560 78.159
Corr(ŝjg−t,q̂jg−t) 0.402
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Columns (1)
of Panels A and B correspond to regressions in which math or ELA standardized test scores
are regressed on a teacher’s contemporaneous rigor in the same subject, which are instrumented
with a teacher’s average rigor in the reference data. This estimator for grading standards is
different than the one used in the main text, but is similar to those used in prior studies and is
detailed further in Appendix (A.2). Column (2) introduces the rigor of a student’s teacher in the
other subject, instrumenting for both teacher’s standards similarly. Columns (3-4) are similar
to Columns (1-2) except the dependent variable is course grades Git, where 4 refers to A, 3
to B, 2 to C, 1 to D and 0 to E/F. Each regression controls for predetermined student and peer
characteristics listed in Table (1.1). These regressions also include school-grade fixed effects and
standard errors are clustered at the school-grade level. † Reports the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
statistic for a weak instrument test.
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Table A5: Short-Term Effects of Standards by A, B and C Minimum Thresholds: IV Estimates
with School-Grade Fixed-Effects
Yit Yit Yit Yit Yit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A Math
Math, -0.091*** -0.068*** -0.061**
A Leniency (0.013) (0.017) (0.031)
Math, -0.085*** -0.015
B Leniency (0.012) (0.056)
Math, -0.082*** -0.040** -0.029
C Leniency (0.014) (0.017) (0.043)
Count 66423 66423 66423 66423 66423








ELA, -0.016* -0.007 -0.031
A Leniency (0.009) (0.011) (0.023)
ELA, -0.016 0.054
B Leniency (0.010) (0.048)
ELA, -0.024** -0.020 -0.058
C Leniency (0.012) (0.014) (0.038)
Count 66423 66423 66423 66423 66423







Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Columns (1)-(3)
of Panels A and B correspond to math and ELA regressions in which test scores are regressed
on a teachers’ contemporaneous standards minimum A, B and C thresholds where higher values
denote more lenient grading. These standards are instrumented with a teachers’ standards (ŝ−t)
estimated using the reference data. Column (4) includes the A and C threshold in the same
regression, while Column (5) includes all thresholds. Each regression controls for predetermined
student and peer characteristics listed in Table (1.1). These regressions also include school-grade
fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the school-grade level. †Reports the Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald statistic for a weak instrument test.
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A.2 Alternate Measures of Standards
Prior studies measure standards using a different estimator, which I refer to as the alternate
estimator and denote s∗jgt (Betts and Grogger 2003; Figlio and Lucas 2004). The intuition is that
we can recover standards as the difference between a student’s course grade and standardized test







where βG is estimated using either OLS or within-teacher variation.1
This approach is similar to equation (1.12) and the differences may seem trivial. Yet these
differences turn out to be important for a number of reasons: First, my approach is motivated by
a structural model in which a teacher determines the mapping of student performance to course
grades. Thus, my primary estimator is more easily extended to estimate specific grade thresholds
following Section 1.3, and has a clear interpretation. Second, even with just two covariates, say x1
and x2, the residual, after regressing x1 on x2, is not the same as the residual after regressing x2 on
x1. Empirically, calculating residuals after estimating equation (A.1) will pick up teacher quality
along with standards. For example, suppose that all students learn more with a better teacher who
increases Yit. If we measure standards as (Yit − βGGit), better teachers will have much higher
values because higher test scores may not end up changing a student’s letter grade (i.e., many
students may earn an A regardless of their teacher) but better teachers can improve an A student’s
test scores. Third, my primary estimator controls for test scores in all available subjects with a
flexible functional form, while the alternate estimator only compares the levels of test scores and
grades in one subject. Fourth, the alternate estimator does not allow peers to affect own course
grades. The distribution of achievement in a classroom may affect the probability of earning an A,
1I estimate equation (A.1) using teacher-grade fixed-effects for consistency with my primary estimator. Addition-
ally, rather than controlling for grades linearly, I include course grade indicators so that this estimator is estimated
more flexibly.
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even holding a teacher’s standards constant.
I present results using an estimator of grading standards following equation (A.1) in Table (A4),
which can be compared directly to similar specifications using my preferred estimator of standards
(see Tables 1.5 and 1.6). There are a few key takeaways from comparing these tables. First, the
alternate estimator of standards has a much stronger correlation with teacher value-added, which is
to be expected given how it is measured. Second, Column (2) of Table (A4) shows that the effects
of standards on test scores is much larger in magnitude than those in Column (2) of Table (1.5)
and statistically significant at the 1% level in both subjects. These findings show that measurement
issues are key to understanding how standards affect student achievement and course grades.
A.3 Panel Data Approaches to Address Nonrandom Matching
As mentioned, high and low achieving students may also vary in unobserved ways, or be ex-
posed to many different inputs that observable student and class characteristics may not capture.
Beginning in elementary school many students are sorted into classrooms by ability—in fact, Hor-
vath (2015) find that about half of all North Carolina elementary schools begin tracking in elemen-
tary school. Different tracks may be exposed to a number of different inputs including differences
in teacher quality, peer characteristics, curriculum and grading standards. A student’s academic
track is unobserved in the data, and grading standards may be correlated with the track.
To mitigate these concerns, I use two approaches. First, I use a student fixed-effect estimator
to ease concerns about selection on fixed and additive unobservable characteristics of a student
(e.g., ability, behavior). Let ηi be some unobserved student heterogeneity that determines whether
students get a hard grading teacher and also affects test score gains. Figlio and Lucas (2004) use a
student fixed-effects estimator to difference it out from the residual prior to estimating the effects







X + ηi + e
1
it for g=6,7,8 (A.2)
a similar equation, yet the superscript indicates that parameters may vary from earlier equations.
107
Technically, lagged dependent variables become endogenous when student fixed-effects are in-
cluded in large N, small T panels (Nickell 1981). This could also bias the estimated effect of
grading standards on student achievement. To get a sense for the magnitude of this bias, I move to
a simpler model in which I regress a student’s achievement on her lagged achievement in the same





S ŝjgt + α
1
Y Yit−1 + ηi + e
1
it for g=6,7,8 (A.3)
In this simpler model, I manually set the persistence of lagged achievement to different values




Next, I develop “falsification tests” to explore the likelihood that grading standards of a teacher
are correlated with a student’s unobserved track. Letting ŝjt+1g+1−(t+1) denote the grading stan-
dards of a student i’s future teacher (in the subsequent year), I test whether grading standards are
correlated within students,
ŝjt+1g+1−(t+1) = α0 + αC ŝjg−t +Xit−1α
′
X + µhg + eit for g=6,7. (A.4)
The parameter of interest, αC , informs whether or not students assigned to a hard grading
teacher today are more likely to be assigned to a hard grading teacher the following year.
Second, I test whether the grading standards of a student’s future teacher, ŝjt+1g−(t+1), affect
current achievement (or course grades).
Yit = α0 + αS ŝjt+1g−(t+1) +Xit−1α
′
X + µhg + eit for g=6,7. (A.5)
Because future teachers cannot have a causal effect on past outcomes, finding that αS 6= 0
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would suggest the presence of selection on unobservables or an unobserved input correlated with
grading standards (such as a student’s academic track).
A.4 Constructing Teacher Value-Added
I construct teacher value-added in a few steps. First, I estimate the effect of initial student and
peer characteristicsXit−1 on student achievement Yit using the reference data set.
Yit = Xit−1α̃
′
X + ψjg + εit. (A.6)
Equation (A.6) is estimated with teacher-grade fixed-effects ψjg because observable student
and peer characteristics may be correlated with the unobserved teacher effect.
Next, I construct test scores in both the cohort and reference data set which are adjusted for the
observed (predetermined) characteristics of a student and her classroom peers i.e.,
Ŷit ≡ Yit −Xit−1α̃
′
X . (A.7)
Third, I average these residualized test scores Ŷit at the teacher-grade level separately in the













Averages of these residualized test scores, q̂jgt, is what I refer to as teacher value-added. Studies
have shown that teachers with higher value-added have a large positive impact on test scores, the
probability of attending college and future salaries and decrease the probability of having a child
as a teenager (Chetty et al. 2014a,c). While I cannot rule out a correlation between teacher quality
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and grading standards with observational data, I can test if teacher value-added affects a student’s
realized course grades. Additionally, I will use the effect sizes found using teacher value-added as





Table B1: Summary Statistics: Student Characteristics
Mean SD Min Max Count
Student Characteristics
Math EOG Test Score G8 0.000 1.000 -4.269 2.795 16313
ELA EOG Test Score G8 0.000 1.000 -4.470 2.915 16313
Science EOG Test Score G8 0.000 1.000 -4.952 3.621 16313
Math EOG Test Score G7 0.000 1.000 -3.495 2.421 16313
ELA EOG Test Score G7 0.000 1.000 -4.619 2.699 16313
Math EOG Test Score G6 0.000 1.000 -3.350 2.792 16313
ELA EOG Test Score G6 0.000 1.000 -4.129 2.570 16313
Math GPA Grades 6 to 8 3.030 0.722 0.000 4.000 16313
ELA GPA Grades 6 to 8 3.124 0.698 0.000 4.000 16313
Science GPA Grade 8 3.132 0.868 0.000 4.000 16313
Economically Disadvant. 0.327 0.469 0.000 1.000 16313
Limited English Proficient 0.038 0.191 0.000 1.000 16313
Student With a Disability 0.044 0.205 0.000 1.000 16313
Gifted Math 0.220 0.414 0.000 1.000 16313
Gifted Reading 0.203 0.402 0.000 1.000 16313
Gifted Math and Reading 0.163 0.369 0.000 1.000 16313
Male 0.491 0.500 0.000 1.000 16313
Asian 0.024 0.154 0.000 1.000 15951
American Indian 0.012 0.108 0.000 1.000 15951
Black 0.164 0.371 0.000 1.000 15951
White 0.700 0.458 0.000 1.000 15951
Hispanic 0.075 0.263 0.000 1.000 15951
Multiracial 0.024 0.153 0.000 1.000 15951
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for all observed student characteristics in the re-
search sample, after sample restrictions described in this paper. Less than three hundred students
are missing demographic information. For these students, I have replaced the missing values to
zero and included missing indicators where applicable.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
Math Teacher’s 0.002 0.000 -0.008 0.004 -0.001
Leniency G7 (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
ELA Teacher’s -0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.003
Leniency G7 (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Count 15808 11854 16086 16313 16313
P value (Joint Sig.
Standards)

















(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel B
Math Teacher’s 0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 0.000
Leniency G7 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
ELA Teacher’s 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.001
Leniency G7 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Count 16313 6874 14065 15123 14065
P value (Joint Sig.
Standards)
0.350 0.429 0.869 0.818 0.991
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Panel A and
B correspond to different regressions that test whether 7th grade standards affect plans to attend
a four year college, weighted high school GPA, ACT composite scores, AP course-taking (both
taking at least one, and the share), expressed interest in a STEM college major and measured
interest in a college major. Following equation (2.7), I include controls for the level, square and
cubic term of prior test scores, prior course grades, prior teacher judgments and other student
characteristics listed in Appendix Table (B1). I also control for peer average prior test scores in
these subjects and peer average prior course grades. These regressions include school-grade fixed-
effects and standard errors are clustered at the school-grade level. P values are reported from joint
significance tests on all teachers’ grading standards.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
Math Teacher’s 0.000 0.003 -0.006 0.003 0.001
Leniency G7 (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
ELA Teacher’s -0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.004
Leniency G7 (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Math Teacher’s -0.004 0.008 0.005 -0.003 0.005
VA G7 (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
ELA Teacher’s 0.001 0.007 0.013 0.009 0.006
VA G7 (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
Count 15808 11854 16086 16313 16313
P value (Joint Sig.
Standards)

















(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel B
Math Teacher’s 0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001
Leniency G7 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
ELA Teacher’s 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.001
Leniency G7 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Math Teacher’s -0.009 0.012* 0.007 0.000 0.001
VA G7 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
ELA Teacher’s 0.013** -0.009 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
VA G7 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Count 16313 6874 14065 15123 14065
P value (Joint Sig.
Standards)
0.452 0.595 0.827 0.823 0.984
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. These regressions
follow Table (B2) but additionally include controls for teacher quality (value-added). P values are
reported from joint significance tests on all teachers’ grading standards.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
Math Teacher’s -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.010* -0.007
Leniency G6 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
ELA Teacher’s -0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.008 0.000
Leniency G6 (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Count 15808 11854 16086 16313 16313
P value (Joint Sig.
Standards)

















(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel B
Math Teacher’s -0.004 -0.005 -0.015** 0.001 -0.004
Leniency G6 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
ELA Teacher’s -0.007 0.004 0.010 0.009* 0.011**
Leniency G6 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Count 16313 6874 14065 15123 14065
P value (Joint Sig.
Standards)
0.244 0.688 0.044 0.156 0.134
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Panel A and
B correspond to different regressions that test whether 6th grade standards affect plans to attend
a four year college, weighted high school GPA, ACT composite scores, AP course-taking (both
taking at least one, and the share), expressed interest in a STEM college major and measured
interest in a college major. Following equation (2.7), I include controls for the level, square and
cubic term of prior test scores, prior course grades, prior teacher judgments and other student
characteristics listed in Appendix Table (B1). I also control for peer average prior test scores in
these subjects and peer average prior course grades. These regressions include school-grade fixed-
effects and standard errors are clustered at the school-grade level. P values are reported from joint
significance tests on all teachers’ grading standards.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
Math Teacher’s -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.008 -0.004
Leniency G6 (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
ELA Teacher’s -0.002 0.004 0.002 -0.008 0.001
Leniency G6 (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Math Teacher’s 0.009 0.015 0.020*** 0.009 0.011**
VA G6 (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
ELA Teacher’s -0.002 0.009 -0.008 -0.001 0.001
VA G6 (0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Count 15808 11854 16086 16313 16313
P value (Joint Sig.
Standards)

















(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel B
Math Teacher’s -0.001 -0.004 -0.016** 0.000 -0.004
Leniency G6 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
ELA Teacher’s -0.007 0.004 0.009 0.010* 0.011*
Leniency G6 (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Math Teacher’s 0.012** 0.005 -0.002 -0.003 0.000
VA G6 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
ELA Teacher’s -0.002 -0.000 -0.005 0.004 -0.001
VA G6 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Count 16313 6874 14065 15123 14065
P value (Joint Sig.
Standards)
0.472 0.768 0.054 0.163 0.178
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. These regressions
follow Table (B4) but additionally include controls for teacher quality (value-added). P values are













Management of instructional groups, transitions, and
materials and supplies
Creating an environ-
ment of respect and rap-
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Activities and assignments, grouping of students, in-
structional materials and resources, structure and pac-
ing
Using assessment in in-
struction (UAI)
Assessment criteria, monitoring of student learning,


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Grade Level 4.50 0.50 4.00 5.00
Joint Math and ELA Class 0.87 0.33 0.00 1.00
Age 9.40 0.92 7.52 12.20
Male 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Gifted 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
Special Education 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
English Language Learner 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00
White 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
Black 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
Hispanic 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
Asian 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
American Indian 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00
Race Other 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
Race Missing 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00
Math Score (Year 09-10) 0.02 0.90 -2.82 2.75
Math Score (Year 10-11) 0.04 0.90 -3.26 3.01
Percentage of Class w/ 09-10
Math Scores
0.91 0.07 0.67 1.00
Percentage of Class in Ran-
dom Assignment
0.78 0.14 0.32 1.00
Teachers per Randomization
Block
2.86 0.83 2.00 4.00
Randomization Block Com-
pliance Rate
0.93 0.09 0.50 1.00
Notes: Joint Math/ELA Class refers to a self-contained course in which students learn
both math and ela, the remaining courses are either math or ela only. We summarize
the percentage of each class w/ prior math test scores since students new to the district
will not have prior test scores. We also summarize the percentage of each class in
randomization because not all students in the classes we observe were on the original
randomly assigned class rosters.
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Table C4: Summary Statistics: Pre-Restricted Sample
Mean SD Min Max
Grade Level 4.52 0.50 4.00 5.00
Joint Math and ELA Class 0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00
Age 9.46 0.96 7.52 13.20
Male 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
Gifted 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Special Education 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
English Language Learner 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
White 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Black 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00
Hispanic 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00
Asian 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
American Indian 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00
Race Other 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
Race Missing 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
Math Score (Year 09-10) 0.11 0.93 -3.14 2.84
Math Score (Year 10-11) 0.14 0.93 -3.26 3.02
Percentage of Class w/ 09-10
Math Scores
0.91 0.07 0.63 1.00
Percentage of Class in Ran-
dom Assignment
0.76 0.19 0.03 1.00
Teachers per Randomization
Block
3.03 1.49 1.00 12.00
Randomization Block Com-
pliance rate
0.66 0.40 0.00 1.00
Observations 5730
Notes: This sample corresponds to all students in the 2010-11 school year in either a
fourth or fifth grade Math or Joint Math/ELA course. Since our estimation strategy
leverages the random assignment of classrooms to teachers, we restrict the sample to
students with a randomly assigned teacher. No further restrictions are made. Not all
cells have the same number of observations.
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Avg. Matht−1 -0.022 -0.015
(0.079) (0.119)
IQR Matht−1 0.036 0.041
(0.107) (0.103)
Avg Matht−1 Rand -0.089 -0.046
(0.103) (0.124)
IQR Matht−1 Rand -0.023 0.032
(0.087) (0.084)
Notes: Each cell corresponds to a separate regression of the dependent variable
indicated in the column header on the row-variable, controlling for randomization
block fixed-effects. Standard errors are clustered at the randomization block level.
Columns (1) and (2) refers to a student’s randomly assigned teacher’s practice
measured in t − 1 (i.e., Prt−1 in the present notation). Rows 3 and 4 correspond
to the average and IQR of math of the randomly assigned peers.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Matht−1 -0.021 -0.005 0.050 -0.029 0.053 0.006
(0.020) (0.024) (0.048) (0.036) (0.048) (0.025)
ELL -0.048 -0.015 -0.200 0.025 -0.197 -0.023
(0.059) (0.061) (0.129) (0.124) (0.136) (0.091)
Gifted -0.033 -0.053 0.491** 0.160 0.274 0.230*
(0.075) (0.144) (0.227) (0.107) (0.175) (0.123)
Special
Educ.
0.118** 0.089 -0.128* 0.043 -0.055 0.028
(0.059) (0.057) (0.065) (0.084) (0.055) (0.066)
Male 0.008 0.002 -0.023 -0.008 -0.035 -0.025
(0.013) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.023) (0.018)
White 0.011 -0.044 0.035 0.011 -0.039* -0.014
(0.029) (0.032) (0.042) (0.036) (0.023) (0.032)
Black 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.041 0.055** 0.044
(0.028) (0.031) (0.046) (0.048) (0.026) (0.048)
Hispanic -0.059** -0.046 -0.036 -0.029 -0.022 -0.017
(0.028) (0.034) (0.029) (0.043) (0.028) (0.046)
Asian 0.087 0.142** 0.070* -0.037 0.053 0.000
(0.054) (0.055) (0.039) (0.066) (0.044) (0.064)
American In-
dian
0.062 0.176 -0.339 0.247 -0.215 0.076
(0.145) (0.118) (0.205) (0.174) (0.212) (0.139)
Race Other 0.070 0.063 -0.083 -0.058 -0.074** -0.044
(0.066) (0.088) (0.050) (0.048) (0.037) (0.053)
Notes: Each cell corresponds to a separate regression of the dependent variable indicated in the
column header on the row-variable, controlling for randomization block fixed-effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the randomization block level. Columns (1) and (2) refers to a student’s
randomly assigned teacher’s practice measured in t−1 (i.e., Prt−1 in the present notation). Columns
(3) and (4) use the actual classroom composition whereas columns (5) and (6) focus on the peers
who were initially assigned to be grouped with the student. Row 1 of Columns (3) to (6) control for
the average peer prior achievement of the randomization block, to deal with the mechanical negative
correlation highlighted in Guryan, Kroft, and Notowidigdo (2009).
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Table C7: Effects of Teaching Practice without Classroom Interactions
Actual Random IV Actual with
Teacher Teacher Rand. Teacher
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A
Classroom Mgmt 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009
(0.025) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.024)
C.M. ×Matht−1 0.018 0.022* 0.023*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
P-value (joint signif. of
teaching practice)
0.380 0.239 0.219
F-Stat. (first stage)† 251.3 167.1
Panel B
Challenge/ 0.021 0.019 0.025 0.023 0.029 0.026
Student-Centered (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
C.S.C. ×Matht−1 0.017 0.025* 0.026*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
P-value (joint signif. of
teaching practice)
0.195 0.042 0.029
F-Stat. (first stage)† 279.8 186.6
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Standard errors
are clustered at the randomization block level. Panel A and B correspond to different regressions
with math as the dependent variable. Lagged teaching practices are used and sample size is 2632.
These regressions include randomization block fixed effects, levels and squared-terms in prior math
and average peer prior math, as well as CKT and student characteristics listed in Table C3. † Reports
the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic for a weak instrument test.
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Table C8: Comparison between the Hausman Estimator and ITT-IV specifications









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Teaching Practice 0.004 0.001 0.011 0.028 0.022 0.021
(0.019) (0.021) (0.027) (0.019) (0.020) (0.031)
T.P. ×Matht−1 0.009 0.014 0.011 0.001 0.014 0.013
(0.014) (0.015) (0.022) (0.012) (0.013) (0.021)
T.P. × Peer Math 0.052*** 0.105*** 0.111*** 0.005 0.043** 0.019
(0.019) (0.033) (0.039) (0.014) (0.017) (0.044)
T.P. × IQR Math −0.035** −0.004 −0.008 −0.047***−0.055*** −0.063**
(0.016) (0.025) (0.033) (0.016) (0.014) (0.029)
P-value joint signif.
T.P.
0.000 0.000 0.038 0.000
First Stage F-Stat.† 21.7 12.5
Hansen J P-value†† 0.522 0.643
p2 load 1.080 0.804
p3 load 0.859 0.837
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Sample size is 2632.
Managing student behaviors (MSB), Managing classroom procedures (MCP), Creating an environment of re-
spect and rapport (CERR), Engaging students in learning (ESL), Using questioning and discussion techniques
(USDT). The ITT columns uses randomly assigned MCP or ESL scores as “Practice.” The IV columns use
all other practices that load on classroom management to instrument for MCP, and likewise for ESL with
challenge/student-centered practices. Practices are for the randomly assigned teacher measured at t − 1. We
use efficient GMM estimator and FFT MCP-MSB-CERR uses our adapted Hausman estimator to correct for
measurement error, where MCP is the anchor, and MSB is used to construct moment conditions. FFT ESL-
USDT is similar but uses the average of all other challenge/student-centered practices as the third measurement
since we are overidentified. The specification is identical to that in Table (3.4) except here we do not include
controls for student characteristics. † Reports the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic. †† Reports p-value from
Hansen’s J statistic test of overidentifying restrictions.“p2 load” and “p3 load” are the recovered measurement
parameters described in Appendix ??. Standard errors are clustered at the randomization block level, and with
the adapted Hausman estimator we bootstrap standard errors with 200 repetitions.
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Table C9: Contemporaneous Teaching Practice and Classroom Composition
ITT IV ITT IV
Time t− 1 Time t Time
t− 1 Time t
Practice Practice Practice Practice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A
Classroom Management 0.008 0.010 0.049* 0.040
(0.019) (0.018) (0.026) (0.058)
C.M. ×Matht−1 0.011 0.012 0.004 0.026
(0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.021)
C.M. × Avg. Peer Matht−1 0.07∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.022) (0.065) (0.021) (0.062) (0.061)
C.M. × IQR Peer Matht−1 -0.017
(0.019)
First Stage F-Stat.† 28.400 31.563 4.191
Panel B
Challenge/Student-Centered 0.018 0.022 0.072*** -0.006
(0.020) (0.019) (0.026) (0.127)
C.S.C ×Matht−1 0.012 0.018 0.008 0.041
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.033)
C.S.C × Avg Peer Matht−1 0.031**
(0.014)
C.S.C. × IQR Peer Matht−1 −0.053∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.178∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.181∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.052) (0.014) (0.051) (0.051)
First Stage F-Statistic† 26.896 24.538 2.107
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Standard errors are clustered
at the randomization block level. Sample size is 2632. Randomly assigned teachers are used throughout. Panel
A and B correspond to different regressions with math as the dependent variable. These regressions include
randomization block fixed effects and controls for the level and a squared term of prior math achievement and
average peer prior achievement, IQR in peer prior achievement, along with the peer variables squared and in-
teractions with each other and lagged math achievement. Controls for CKT and student characteristics listed in
Table C3 also included. † Reports the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic for a weak instrument test.
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Practice 0.020 0.004 0.003 0.010
(0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022)
Practice ×Matht−1 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.006
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Practice × 0.057*** 0.052*** 0.072*** 0.049**
Avg Peer Matht−1 (0.020) (0.019) (0.026) (0.019)
Practice × -0.019 −0.035** -0.012 −0.040***
IQR Peer Matht−1 (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015)
P-value (joint signif. of teach-
ing practice)
















Practice 0.028 0.011 0.016 0.014
(0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018)
Practice ×Matht−1 0.001 0.011 0.020* 0.015
(0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012)
Practice × 0.005 0.020* 0.037** 0.034**
Avg Peer Matht−1 (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014)
Practice × −0.047*** −0.046*** −0.039*** −0.070***
IQR Peer Matht−1 (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.026)
P-value (joint signif. of teach-
ing practice)
0.035 0.017 0.000 0.000
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the randomization block level. Panel A and B correspond to different regressions with math as the
dependent variable. Lagged teaching practices are used and sample size is 2632. These regressions include
randomization block fixed effects and controls for the level and a squared term of prior math achievement,
average peer prior achievement, IQR of peer prior achievement as well as CKT and student characteris-
tics listed in Table C3. The first 3 subdomains correspond to classroom management, the remainder to
challenge/student-centered.
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Table C11: Teaching Practices and Alternative Teacher “Quality” Controls: Full Results
Random IV Actual Random Teacher
Teacher with Random Alt. Teacher Control:
Teacher CKT 7C PSVY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Classroom Manage-
ment
-0.012 -0.016 -0.014 -0.016 -0.015
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
C.M. ×Matht−1 0.004 0.004 0.011 0.004 0.003
(0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
C.M. × Peer Math 0.076** 0.087** 0.077** 0.076** 0.076***
(0.029) (0.036) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027)
C.M. × IQR Math 0.026 0.035 0.026 0.026 0.026
(0.022) (0.026) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021)
C.M. 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.011
(0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
C.M. ×Matht−1 0.010 0.011 0.002 0.016 0.005
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
C.M. × Peer Math -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.005
(0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
C.M. × IQR Math -0.062*** -0.071*** -0.063*** -0.057** -0.054**
(0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021)
CKT -0.007 -0.011 -0.008 -0.006 -0.013
(0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018)
Alt. Teacher Control -0.006 0.055***
(0.019) (0.017)
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T.C. ×Matht−1 0.044*** -0.029** 0.032**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
T.C. × Peer Math -0.019 -0.007 -0.016
(0.018) (0.020) (0.016)
















Matht−1 0.724*** 0.725*** 0.723*** 0.723*** 0.722***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018)
Math2t−1 -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.042*** -0.045***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Peer Math ×Matht−1 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.002
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
IQR Math ×Matht−1 0.034** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.031** 0.044***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Peer Math × IQR
Math
-0.052*** -0.053*** -0.057*** -0.053*** -0.043**
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(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Peer Math × IQR
Math ×Matht−1
-0.021 -0.021 -0.019 -0.023 -0.016
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Peer Math -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.012
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027)
Peer Math2 -0.010 -0.013 -0.009 -0.009 -0.014
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016)
IQR Math -0.015 -0.018 -0.017 -0.019 -0.008
(0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026)
IQR Math2 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.002
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
ELL 0.008 0.015 0.011 0.007 0.009
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
Gifted 0.195*** 0.188*** 0.195*** 0.192*** 0.198***
(0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.057) (0.056)
Male -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Special Educ. -0.111** -0.110** -0.110** -0.112** -0.108**
(0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.043)
Black -0.157*** -0.159*** -0.148*** -0.154*** -0.156***
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
Hispanic -0.047 -0.051 -0.044 -0.046 -0.049
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
Asian 0.076** 0.069* 0.082** 0.078** 0.070*
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
American Indian -0.045 -0.050 -0.036 -0.045 -0.048
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(0.108) (0.107) (0.107) (0.109) (0.111)
Race Other 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.016 0.013
(0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Race Missing -0.040 -0.046 -0.012 -0.041 -0.044
(0.069) (0.066) (0.073) (0.067) (0.061)
R2 0.649 0.708 0.651 0.650 0.652
P-value joint signif of
C.M. & C.S.C.
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
P-value joint signif of
T.C.
0.052 0.172 0.013
First Stage F-Statistic† 27.717
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% levels. Standard errors are clustered
at the randomization block level. Sample size is 2632. Dependent variable is math and teaching practices are
measured at t−1. Regressions include randomization block fixed effects and controls for the level and a squared
term of prior math achievement and average and IQR of peer prior achievement, their square and all pairwise
interactions of peer variables and prior achievement, as well as student characteristics listed in Table C3. Even
columns also include the IQR in peer prior achievement. † Reports the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic for a
weak instrument test. CKT denotes Content Knowledge for Teaching assessment, 7C denotes overall student
survey teacher ratings based on Tripod and PSVY denotes principal assessments of teacher quality.
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